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यतीन्द्रमतदीपिका

YATĪNDRAMATADĪPIKĀ

1875

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YATĪNDRAMATADĪPIKĀ

BY

SRĪNIVĀSADĀSA

ENGLISH TRANSLATION AND NOTES

BY

SVĀMĪ ĀDIDEVĀNANDA

WITH A FOREWORD BY

P. N. SRINIVASACHARI, M.A.



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FOREWORD

SVĀMĪ ĀDIDEVĀNANDA asked me to write a Foreword to his translation of the *Yatīndramatadīpikā* and I gladly comply with his request for the main reason that the publication of the work is sure to satisfy a long-felt need for a suitable text-book on the Essentials of Viśiṣṭādvaita.

The *Yatīndramatadīpikā* was composed by Śrīnī-vāsārya, a well-known Viśiṣṭādvaitic philosopher who lived in Tirupati, Chittoor District, about the beginning of the seventeenth century. It is a compendious exposition of the teachings of Viśiṣṭādvaita in its aspects of metaphysics, morals and religion, familiarly known as tattva, hita and puruṣārtha. The book is called *Yatīndramatadīpikā*, or the Light of the System of Yatīndra, or Śrī Rāmānuja. Śrī Rāmānuja like other Vedāntins deduces his philosophy from the Sāstra; but gives a comprehensive and synthetic interpretation of it by recognizing the validity of Pāñcarātra as the word of God and accepting the equal value of the teachings of Ṛṣis and the Alṅvārs in the scheme of Ubhaya-vedānta. Viśiṣṭādvaita accepts the reality of experience in all its levels including dreams and illusions. Its tattva comprises the three entities, God, souls and matter which

however are inseparable. God is defined as the s'arīrin or Self of souls and matter, as these two live and move and have their being in Him. God exists in five forms as the Eternal beyond the perishing world, the Infinite in and beyond the finite, the Immanent, and the Incarnations, historical and permanent.

The soul has unique monadic being and is yet a mode deriving its essence from God. It is both substance and attribute. Bhakti and prapatti form the chief means of liberation or mukti. Prapatti as absolute surrender to God is available to all souls. Mukti is the attainment of the Absolute beyond the world of space-time; and then the liberated self enjoys the eternal bliss of Brahman. Spirituality and service go together as the vertical and horizontal ways of expressing love.

This work faithfully brings out the main teachings of S'rī Rāmānuja as summarized above and it mediates between monism and monotheism. The present work eminently succeeds in its laudable attempt to present a readable account of the text and serves as an excellent introduction to the study of Viśiṣṭādvaita. I am sure this translation which is so far the best in the field will have a good reception.

August 20, 1949

P. N. SRINIVASACHARI

PREFACE

STUDY of Indian philosophy is incomplete without a knowledge of Vedānta in its triple setting—Advaita, Viśiṣṭādvaita and Dvaita. For a beginner, the understanding of Advaita is facilitated by a number of short authoritative manuals now available with accurate translation and other accessories for study. Similar publications on the Viśiṣṭādvaita are extremely rare. This book is brought out to remove that want in some measure.

The text printed here is based on the *Yatindra-matadīpikā* published by Mr V. K. Rāmānujācārya and the other two editions of it brought out in the Benares and Ānandās'rama Sanskrit Series respectively. It has only once been rendered into English, about forty years ago, by S'ri Govindācārya Svāmin of Mysore. That edition is now out of print and difficult, if not impossible, to obtain. Though it has been consulted with profit, the present book is conceived on a different plan. The translation here has been made as close and faithful to the original as possible. The collated and punctuated Sanskrit text is given on every page to afford easy reference whenever the verbatim rendering might appear stiff. Copious

notes are appended at the end to elucidate points of difficulty and to supply additional information. An Introduction is prefixed to give a conspectus of the work. It is expected the book in this form will meet the needs of the students of philosophy possessing some knowledge of Sanskrit.

I wish to acknowledge my hearty thanks to Dr K. C. Varadachari, Professor of Philosophy, Sri Venkates'vara College, Tirupati for his valuable help in revising the typescript of the translation ; to Professor P. N. Srinivasachari for his kind Foreword, and to Swami Vimalananda for his invaluable counsel and suggestive criticism. I am indebted to Professor R. Ramanujachari who was kind enough to read through the typescript. And lastly, I would express my gratitude for the constant encouragement and unfailing kindness which I have received in the preparation of this work from Swami Omkarananda.

Sri Ramakrishna Math
Madras, August 16, 1949

ĀDIDEVĀNANDA

INTRODUCTION

THE Viśiṣṭādvaita of S'rī Rāmānuja was not only a reaction against the dry ritualism of the Mīmāṃsakas and the mentalism of atheistic thought which followed the intellectual revolution caused by the Buddha, but also a revival of the theistic Mīmāṃsā as advocated by the Vṛttikāra Bodhāyana known also as Upavarṣa.¹ Vedāntic theism did not emerge suddenly in the evolution of the philosophy of religion in India. Besides Bodhāyana, S'rī Rāmānuja in his *Vedārthasaṅgraha* refers to Ṭaṅka, Dramiḍa, Guhadeva, Kapardin and Bhāruci, who were great exponents of theistic Vedānta in the days of yore.² Sir R. G. Bhandarkar traces the rudiments of theism to a period anterior to the birth of Buddhism and Jainism. The Ghasuṇḍi inscription³ referring to the shrine of Saṅkarṣaṇa and Vāsudeva (about 200 B.C.), the Besnagar inscription recording the erection of a Garuḍa-column in honour of 'Vāsudeva the God of gods' (about 200 B.C.) and the Nānāghaṭṭ⁴ inscription referring to the worship of

¹ See Mm. Lakṣmipuram S'rīnivāsācārya's *Dars'anodaya*, p. 151.

² भगवद्बोधायन-टङ्क-द्रमिड-गुहदेव-कपर्दि-भारुचिप्रभृत्यविगीतशिष्टपरिगृहीतपुरातन-वेदान्तव्याख्यानबुव्यक्तार्थश्रुतिनिकरनिदर्शितोऽयं पन्थाः ।

³ Lüder's List of Brāhmī Inscriptions, No. 6.

⁴ *Ibid.*, No. 1112.

San̥karṣaṇa and Vāsudeva (100 B.C.) prove the existence of a theistic faith at a very early period. The great contribution of S'rī Rāmānuja is that he has given us for the first time a conception of monotheism in a systematic form on the basis of the Upaniṣads and the *Vedāntasūtras*.

The distinctive feature of Viśiṣṭādvaita, as compared with Advaita on the one hand, and Dvaita on the other hand, is its conception of Reality which, while affirming the ultimate unity of the Absolute, allows differentiation through its modes (*prakāras*) without implying any fundamental difference in the Reality itself. Viśiṣṭādvaita accepts as ultimate the three entities of matter (*acit*), individual self (*cit*) and *Īśvara*. Matter and individual self are absolutely dependent on *Īśvara* for their existence, the dependence being similar to that of body upon self. The universe forms the body of *Īśvara*, and he is the Universal Self not only of the unconscious matter but also of the conscious self. Body is that which an indwelling self supports and controls for its own services. Similarly matter and self, being the body of *Īśvara*, are supported and controlled by him for his own purposes. Here we come upon S'rī Rāmānuja's own unique view of the relation of *apr̥thaksiddhi* (inseparability) in which *Īśvara* stands to the world consisting of matter and self. The inseparable relation of body to self, in terms of which the relation of the world to *Īśvara* is conceived, brings out clearly the intimate connection that subsists between substance and attribute. *Īśvara* is substance

and the world of matter and self form his inseparable attributes.

This conception of organic unity may be illustrated by the instance of a mango. Here the colour, the taste, the smell, the flesh, the shell and the fibre which constitute the whole fruit can be distinguished as being different from one another. Each element in the fruit has its own distinctive attributes. Yet when all these are united, the synthetic whole is regarded as a mango. What is common to all the different parts of the fruit is their inseparable existence. Of the various elements which constitute the mango, we can regard any particular one as the substantive element (*vis'eṣya*) and the rest as attributive elements (*vis'eṣaṇas*). Likewise the inseparable unity of matter, self and *Īsvara* constitute the Reality in which *Īsvara*, the substantive element, directs and predominates over the attributive elements. Though the world of matter and self have a real existence of their own, they are entirely subject to the control of *Īsvara* in all their conditions. *S'rī Rāmānuja's* system is called *Viśiṣṭādvaita*, since the attributive elements (matter and self) and the substantive element (*Īsvara*) form a synthetic unity.

PRAMĀ AND PRAMĀṆA

According to *Viśiṣṭādvaita*, *pramā* (valid knowledge) should satisfy two conditions. As regards the first condition, *pramā* should reveal the existence of

an object or agree with external reality ; the second condition of *pramā* is that it should serve some practical need. *Pramā*, therefore, is defined as that which favours the practical interests of life as they really are.¹ The distinctive cause of a particular *pramā* is *pramāṇa*. A cause is considered *distinctive* or *best*, since knowledge arises without delay through its agency. Śrīnivāsa, the author of the present book, following Vedāntadesika admits perception, inference and verbal or scriptural testimony as the three ways of knowing. Perception has for its object something always characterized by difference, as it is impossible to perceive anything without any difference. Even if someone says that a state of consciousness without any difference is possible, such a determination is always marked by some attribute or other.

Perception is of two kinds, determinate and indeterminate. Indeterminate perception does not mean the apprehension of an object bereft of all distinctions. For, whatever enters into human experience under any circumstance appears with some elements of spatial and structural relations. Even the perception of an object for the first time involves thinking and discrimination as 'this' or 'that'. Viśiṣṭādvaita, recognizing the necessity of conceptual factors in any experience, defines indeterminate perception as the cognition of an individual for the first time with attributes, configuration, etc. When the object of the same class is perceived for the second or the third time with the

¹ यथावस्थितव्यवहारानुगुणज्ञानं प्रमा ।

notion of its generic character, the perception is called determinate. This may be illustrated in the following manner: Two persons—a professor of zoology and his servant—go to a Zoological garden. Suddenly they come before an enclosure containing ‘marsupial mammals with strongly developed hindquarters’. The professor, despite his thick eye-glasses, recognizes them at once as kangaroos. His servant, presumably with better eye-sight, stands bewildered without making head or tail of the animal. To the professor it was an apprehension and affirmation of an object as ‘this is such’, and to his servant it was something indefinite, devoid of specific judgement. Yet the servant, in spite of the absence of specific judgement, perceived something not devoid of class character. The professor’s apprehension of the kangaroo may be called determinate, while his servant’s cognition may be likened to indeterminate perception.

An analysis of the act of perception involves three factors: (1) the knowing subject, (2) the object, not as something constructed by the mind, but as something relatively independent of it, and (3) the consciousness which issues from the subject and illuminates the object. In the act of perception, the consciousness issues out from the ātman through the sense-channels, comes in contact with the object, and reveals it. The consciousness while revealing the object reveals itself also. When the consciousness is directed upon an object through any one of the senses, one becomes aware of that object with its attributes. Since Viśiṣṭādvaita

does not recognize any attributeless object, the cognitive act never excludes a perception of the object without attributes. Consequently sense-qualities such as the colour of an object etc. are not constructions of the mind. There is a process of the act of constructing in so far as things with their attributes are presented to the mind. If the attributes of an object are not the construction of the mind, they must have their *locus* elsewhere. And where else could that be save in the object independent of the mind itself? This theory radically affects the usual conception of the individual self and its consciousness. For, the distinction between conscious self and object ceases to be a false one, as the very nature of consciousness presupposes the existence of a conscious self as well as objects independent of the self.

The awareness of an object not in the form of 'oneness', but with a 'bifurcation of subject and object' has an important metaphysical significance. For, in the highest state of God-realization, when the consciousness in its expanded state is directed upon God, the individual is not merged in the Supreme, but becomes aware of the Supreme. But there is a process of unity in so far as the usual barriers between conscious self and God are annulled. The liberated individual realizes that he is a mode of the Divine. Since the conscious self is aware of 'oneness' with God, there cannot be any absolute unity in which the individuality is lost.

It is in this connection that we come upon the unique conception of *jñāna* (consciousness), so important

in the psychological implication of knowledge. Jñāna is neither material nor spiritual, but immaterial (ajada). It illumines itself and other objects. It always exists *for another* and never for itself. That is, it cannot know itself, but illumines objects for the conscious subject of whom it is the attribute. Jñāna is the attribute of Īśvara and jīva. It is, therefore, known as dharmabhūtajñāna or attributive consciousness which suggests there is substantive intelligence as well. Īśvara and jīvas, while possessing knowledge, are jñāna in the substantive sense. As attributive knowledge, jñāna is eternal and all-pervasive in respect of Īśvara, eternal (nityasūris) and liberated selfs. In mundane life, however, it is obscured though it endures in all the three states of waking, dream and deep sleep.

The epistemological conclusion of Viśiṣṭādvaita suggests the trustworthiness of our thoughts and experiences which are of the real. The subject of cognition is as real as cognition and cognitive act. Real objects independent of the mind and corresponding to their contents, are alone known. Therefore, reality of objects is reckoned as absolute. This view is known as satkhyāti, since what exists (sat) is cognized.¹ If what exists (sat) alone is cognized, how can we explain illusions in which knowledge does not correspond to things? For instance, apprehension of silver in nacre-silver illusion, water in desert, dreams, illusion of white conch seen as yellow, etc. To understand the problem of error, each illusion

¹ अतः सर्वं विज्ञानजातं यथार्थमिति सिद्धम् (श्रीभाष्यम्, I. i. 1).

has to be individually judged on its own merits. Broadly speaking, Viśiṣṭādvaita justifies the theory of satkhyāti on metaphysical and psychological grounds. According to the Vedānta doctrine of pañcīkaraṇa, each of the five elements constituting the universe is a compound of an eighth part of each of the other four pure elements and half of its own pure form. In the case of the mirage, though a desert contains all the five bhūtas in varying proportions, only water, which is very insignificant, is apprehended. In nacre-silver illusion, consciousness reveals only the silver element—due to memory, similarity and other causes—which is the insignificant portion of nacre. In the case of other illusions also there is revelation of reality, however trifling it may be. Even the partial identity of an object is accepted as real, since it reveals some aspect of reality though not the whole of it. The difference between pramā and bhrama is this: while pramā satisfies the needs of practical experience as it reveals the reality of objects, bhrama does not. Though metaphysically one can justify even the existence of water element in desert, the mirage is admitted to be an illusion from a practical standpoint, as water content of the desert is too little for practical purpose.

The point to be considered is not to examine the scientific exactitude of the theory of visual perception propounded by past thinkers in justification of satkhyāti. It is useful to find out the underlying principle of satkhyāti. The main function of consciousness is to reveal the reality of an object. Consciousness in its

perfect expanded state reveals reality without any blemish. But in saṃsāra, consciousness reveals partial visions, and incomplete knowledge of things result due to its limiting contraction.

Inference proceeds from the knowledge of vyāpti (pervasion) between vyāpya (pervaded) and vyāpaka (pervader). In a case where fire pervades smoke, fire is called vyāpaka and smoke vyāpya. When there is cognition that smoke is pervaded by fire (*i.e.*, the vyāpaka is more extensive than the vyāpya) the knowledge of vyāpaka, namely, fire is obtained as in the inference, 'Wherever there is smoke, there is fire'. To ascertain the relation of vyāpti between two phenomena, a single observation is not sufficient. Therefore Viśiṣṭādvaita emphasizes the need for repeated observation to establish the universal pervasion beyond doubt. The syllogism is not restricted to five members only. In some cases three-membered syllogism serves the purpose, and in other cases even two-membered syllogism is recognized as sufficient. Upamāna (comparison) and arthāpatti (postulation) are brought under anumāna, since they depend upon the knowledge of vyāpti.

S'abda (verbal or scriptural testimony) is recognized as a special source of knowledge. Scriptural testimony alone can claim the position of the authoritative means of knowledge with regard to Brahman, which never falls within the range of pratyakṣa or anumāna. A statement is authoritative when it is uttered by a trustworthy person, when it is free from errors due to defects of sense organs, or when its meaning is not

contradicted by any other cognition. The Vedas are authoritative *in toto*. The two sections of the Vedas, namely karmakānda and jñānakānda, do not contradict each other. The earlier section or the karmakānda treats of the various modes of upāsana (worship) and the latter section is devoted to Brahman, the object of worship. Hence both the kāndas of the Vedas constitute one homogeneous subject. Unlike the Mīmāṃsā school where validity of verbal statement is restricted to those vedic texts which have for their scope what is yet to be accomplished (sādhya), in Viśiṣṭādvaita the vedic texts which denote Brahman an existent reality (siddha), are also equally authoritative. The Pāñcarātrāgama and the Vaikhānasāgama, which do not contradict the Vedas, are authoritative *in toto* according to this system.

PRAMEYA

The object of valid knowledge (prameya) is divided into two main categories as dravya (substance) and adravya (non-substance). Dravya is not only the material cause but also serves as the locus of change. There are six dravyas—prakṛti, kāla, dharmabhūta-jñāna, nityavibhūti, jīva and Īśvara. Adravya, which is an attribute, is always dependent on dravya. While adravya as an attribute is subject to change, the dravya, as the substantive element, does not undergo any change. A characteristic feature of Viśiṣṭādvaita is that adravya is sometimes viewed as both substance

and attribute. For instance, though *prabhā* (light) is an attribute of an effulgent object, it serves also as a substance, since it is subject to contraction and diffusion, and possesses colour as an attribute. From the absolute standpoint *Īśvara* is the only *dravya*, and the world of matter and selfs are his attributes. *Īśvara* and *jīva* viewed as substantive elements are not subject to modifications, while *prakṛti*, *kāla*, *dharmabhūtajñāna* and *nityavibhūti* as attributive elements undergo change.

The *adravyas* are ten. *Sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* are the qualities of *prakṛti*. Sound, touch, colour, taste and smell are the qualities of the five *bhūtas* like *ākāśa* etc. *Saṁyoga* (conjunction) is the external relation between substances. *S'akti* (potency) is the effecting agent of causation in all causal substances.

PRAKṚTI

Prakṛti, characterized by the three *guṇas*, constitutes the stuff out of which the universe evolves. It is the abode of individual self in mundane existence. It is called *mūlaprakṛti*, since it is the primordial cause of the cosmos. It is known as *ākāśa*, as it is eternal in spite of its manifold changes and modifications. It is termed as *avyakta*, as it is very subtle in its causal state. It is called *avidyā*, as it is opposed to the knowledge of Reality, and is known as *māyā*, as it is the cause of cosmic wonders.

When the matter is in an extremely latent state without distinction of name and form, it is known as

pralaya. From prakṛti, known as tamas in the beginning of evolution, mahat appears with the three states of sattva, rajas and tamas. Mahat evolves into ahaṅkāra with the same three states called sāttvikāhaṅkāra (vaikārika), rājasāhaṅkāra (taijasa) and tāmasāhaṅkāra (bhūtādi). From sāttvikāhaṅkāra, aided by the rājasāhaṅkāra, proceed the eleven senses (five karmendriyas, five jñānendriyas and manas). From tāmasāhaṅkāra, aided by taijasa, arise the five gross elements of ākāśa etc. through the media of the five tanmātras of sound, touch, colour, savour and odour.

The entire process of cosmic evolution is nothing but change of states. The distinction between cause and effect is not real. A particular anterior state is called cause and a particular posterior state is called effect. Every effect connotes a pre-existing cause. The doctrine of satkāryavāda or pariṇāmavāda affirms the non-difference of cause and effect.

KĀLA

Kāla (time) is eternal and all-pervasive. Unlike prakṛti, it is devoid of the three guṇas of sattva, rajas and tamas. Time as effect, which we experience in our ordinary life, is changing and non-eternal. Months and years according to human and divine standards, the four yugas, the birth of Manus, etc., and nitya, naimittika and prākṛta dissolutions are dependent on time. It serves as an instrument in the cosmic functions of Īśvara. Though time has independence in

the *līlāvibhūti* (play-manifestation), it has no independent status in the *nityavibhūti* (eternal-manifestation).

NITYAVIBHŪTI

Nityavibhūti is the immaterial, infinite domain beyond *prakṛti* and its three *guṇas*. It is self-luminous and is characterized by what is known as *suddhasattva*, different from the *sattva* of the three *guṇas*. It is known by the different names of *paramapada*, *tripādvibhūti*, *ānandaloka*, etc. *Vaikuṇṭha*, the city of God, is situated within the realm of *nityavibhūti*. It is the stuff out of which the bodies of *Īśvara*, the eternals, and the liberated selfs are made. It is the means for the enjoyment of the liberated selfs. The five *śaktis* of *sarva*, *nivṛtti*, *vis'va*, *puruṣa* and *parameṣṭhin*, and the six attributes of *jñāna*, *śakti*, *bala*, *ais'varya*, *vīrya* and *tejas* manifest in this eternal domain of *suddhasattva*. Though it is beyond *prakṛti*, it is capable of descending and permeating the consecrated images (*arcā*) in sacred places.

DHARMABHŪTAJÑĀNA

The conception of *dharmabhūtajñāna* has already been indicated in dealing with the psychology of perception. It is eternal and all-pervasive in respect of *Īśvara* and *jīvas*. It is not only self-illuminated but is also of the nature of both *dravya* and *guṇa* (substance and attribute). *Dravya* is that which is the substratum of states, and *guṇa* depends upon *dravya*.

Dharmabhūtajñāna is conceived as a dravya, since it is the substratum of change through its states of expansion and contraction ; and as a guṇa, since it inheres in a substance like jīva or Īśvara.

Terms such as mati, prajñā, saṁvit, s'emuṣī, etc. are synonyms of dharmabhūtajñāna. All mental states are reduced to consciousness, inasmuch as jñāna is the attribute as well as the essence of individual self. There is no feeling that is not more or less mixed by thinking, no volition that is not influenced by thought. The consciousness is, as it were, an ocean which has the multifarious ripples of mental life. Hence pratyakṣa, anumāna, s'abda, instincts, desires and passions are but the various phases of dharmabhūtajñāna. It embraces the paths of karma, jñāna and bhakti, and constitutes the root of religious experience. Finally, when the religious experience develops into firm meditation which is compared to the uninterrupted flow of oil, it becomes the means for realizing the beatific form of the Divine. Thus the religious consummation is absolutely dependent on the perfect manifestation of dharmabhūtajñāna.

The spiritual discipline in the path to perfection begins with karmayoga which is action without any regard for the fruits, illumined by the true knowledge of the individual self and the Highest. The discipline of karmayoga destroys the impurities of the mind, generates jñāna, and through it, or directly, prepares the mind for bhakti. Jñānayoga is meditation upon the individual self, as distinct from prakṛti and its

effects, after realizing its true nature from the instructions of the preceptor. Bhaktiyoga is a continuous stream of remembrance of Īśvara, uninterrupted like the continual flow of oil poured from one vessel to another, and is characterized by the eightfold limbs of yama, niyama, āsana, prāṇāyāma, pratyāhāra, dhāraṇā, dhyāna and samādhi. Such steady remembrance which is of the same character as intuition results only from the sevenfold discipline (sādhana-saptaka) of viveka (discrimination), vimoka (mental detachment), abhyāsa (constant practice), kriyā (good actions), kalyāṇa (virtuous conduct), anavasāda (cheerfulness), and anuddharṣa (non-exultation).

Bhaktiyoga is the classical pathway to liberation. But there is an alternative path to release for those who find it difficult to practise the austere disciplines of sādhana-saptaka and aṣṭāṅgayoga, and who are not qualified to receive instruction in the Veda and the Upaniṣads. This may be followed by anyone, irrespective of his or her limitations, physical, mental, or social. This is known as prapatti. The heart of prapatti is absolute self-surrender with the firm faith in the saving grace of Īśvara. The main characteristics of prapatti are 'to conceive what is in conformity with the will of God, to reject what is disagreeable to Him, to have firm faith that He will save, to seek Him alone as the protector and to surrender one's self to him in all meekness'. A single act of self-surrender in all sincerity is sufficient to bring about release at once.

JĪVA

Like Īśvara, the jīva is of the nature of consciousness and possesses dharmabhūtajñāna as an inseparable attribute. It is real, eternal and unborn. It is distinct from the body, the sense organs, mind and vital airs. Though the individual self, as a mode of Brahman, is essentially of the same nature, it is actually distinct; for it is of monadic size and resides in a separate body. It is the agent, the enjoyer, the embodied Self and the body. It is the embodied Self with regard to its physical body. It is the body with regard to Īśvara. It is not only sentient, but it is also of the essence of ānanda. Saṁsāra is due to avidyā which is of the nature of karma, accumulated by the jīva in its previous births. In this condition jñāna and ānanda are obscured but fully manifest in the state of liberation. In spite of its monadic size, the jīva can contact the ends of space through its attributive knowledge.

The jīvas, which are innumerable, belong to three classes. The nityas (eternals) are those who have never been caught in saṁsāra, and who have from eternity been enjoying ānanda in the Supreme Abode. The muktas (liberated) are those souls who have attained liberation through bhakti and prapatti. The baddhas (the bound) are those who are not liberated from the transmigratory existence due to avidyā and karma. At the moment of giving up the body, the jīva which has attained to the knowledge of Brahman issues out of the body through the aperture in the crown of the

head and moves upwards through the rays of the sun. The released self ultimately reaches its supreme goal and enjoys ānanda for ever being established in the communion with God. Mokṣa is essentially of the nature of sāyujya (communion), and not sālōkya (co-existence), sārūpya (similarity) or sāmīpya (intimacy).

ĪśVARA

The relation of Īśvara to cit and acit has already been mentioned. He is the controller (niyantā), the principal (śeṣin) of all, the worshipped in every act, the bestower of all fruit, the sustainer of all and the supreme cause of all effects, while cit and acit are his modes and subsidiaries (śeṣas), the controlled and the supported. Since consciousness presupposes a conscious self, the Reality is not identical with consciousness. Hence Īśvara is not, pure non-differenced Being, nor pure Consciousness, but the highest Self, characterized essentially by consciousness and unsurpassable ānanda. He is the sole cause of the universe since he comprehends it within himself in latent form prior to creation, and then by his will manifests what is latent.

The conception of God as the Supreme Person and creator raises the following question: How can the Supreme Being be eternally perfect, if he manifests himself as the world? Will not the imperfections of the world adhere to the perfect Being also? Viśiṣṭādvaita attempts to solve this problem by its doctrine of sārīra-sārīri-sambandha or the relation between the world

and Brahman as body and soul. Brahman has the world of life and matter for his body, and constitutes the Universal Self of that body. The world-body has two states, *kāraṇa* and *kārya*, or the causal and the effected, the nature of which are contraction and expansion. These states belong to the world-body of Brahman alone and not Brahman himself. Expansion is evolution and contraction is involution. Brahman *becomes* or manifests the world in the sense that he evolves the body which is his attribute. Not that the essence of Reality is in a state of flux. The notion of a Supreme Person, whose attribute only is in a state of manifestation, makes the divine Being, the substantive element, the ground of all existence. The entire process of evolution in the form in which *Īśvara* manifests himself in and through the world-body is an opportunity given to *jīvas* to attain a life of perfection and communion with the Supreme. Though this view of evolution attributes to the divine Being a transcendent activity, he as the *Antaryāmin*, reveals his nature in the entire process of evolution and human history. This imparts a unique value to the religious experience of all individuals in their intellectual, moral and psychic levels.

The imperfections clinging to the body do not affect the Universal Self, and the transcendental attributes of the Universal Self do not pervade the body. It is just like infancy, youth, old age and other bodily modifications, which are not the attributes of *jīvas*, but belong to the body, while pleasure, pain,

etc. belong only to the knowing self and not to the body. Thus the relation of *s'arīra-s'arīrin* absolves the Reality from having even a shadow of evil.

Though *Viśiṣṭādvaita* conceives the Reality as qualified by the realms of *cit* and *acit*, these modes do not constitute the whole of Reality ; for the realms of *cit* and *acit*, which as *existents* are real, are not identified with *Īśvara* who is a self-conscious Being and the substratum of everything. The view of Reality as *ādhāra* and *niyantā* not only gives a glimpse of the nature of the Supreme Being, but also suggests the personal nature of the Divine. The *Viśiṣṭādvaita* conception of Deity must be sharply distinguished from pantheism on the one hand, and anthropomorphism on the other hand. There is no room for pantheism since the Reality, in spite of being the *Antaryāmin* in all, is looked upon as *Nārāyaṇa*, concrete and endowed with consciousness and super-individuality. Likewise any sort of anthropomorphism is out of place, since the Supreme Being is thought of as possessing the six attributes of *jñāna*, *aishvarya*, *śakti*, *bala*, *vīrya* and *tejas*, besides the infinite auspicious qualities of love, mercy, kindness, etc. which transcend the ordinary qualities of human personality.

Though very often the view has been expressed that Hinduism possesses no elements of theism, *Viśiṣṭādvaita* offers a theistic ideal which affirms the existence of the Supreme Person and consistently interprets our experience as a whole so as to account

for the oneness of the world. Īśvara is an actually existent reality who embraces and comprehends all individual selves and the world of matter—not as isolated entities—but as intimately related to one another in an organic manner, and thus forming a perfect and coherent unity. They have no existence apart from him; in and through him life and matter have meaning and significance.

THE AUTHOR AND HIS WORK

This compendium, entitled *Yatīndramatadīpikā*, is one of the most favourite works among the students of Viśiṣṭādvaita. If the writings of Śrī Vedānta-deśika, the great exponent of Viśiṣṭādvaita, are grand and imposing in diction and presentation, this little work is simple, lucid and full of meaning. As a compendious presentation of the epistemology, psychology and cosmology of Viśiṣṭādvaita, this manual may be said to have no parallel among the works of its class in the system.

Śrīnivāsa, the author of this standard manual, seems to have been a resident of holy Tirupati, now a township in the Chittoor district of the Presidency of Madras. It is clear from the colophon of the work that he was a son of one Svāmi-puṣkariṇī Govindācārya, a devotee of Śrī Venkateśa, and a disciple of Mahācārya of Vādhūla-gotra.¹ This Mahācārya or Mahārya is identified with Doḍḍayyācārya of the Kandāla Vādhūla-

¹ इति श्रीमद्वाधूलकुलतिलकश्रीमन्महाचार्यस्य प्रथमदासेन श्रीमद्वेङ्कटगिरिनाथपदकमल-
सेवापरायणस्वामिपुष्करिणीगोविन्दाचार्यसन्तुना श्रीनिवासदासेन विरचिता यतीन्द्रमतदीपि-
काख्या शारोरकपरिभाषा समाप्ता ।

gotra.¹ Māhācārya ranks with the great exponents of the Viśiṣṭādvaita philosophy. He wrote a famous commentary named *Caṇḍamāruta* on Vedāntadeśika's *Satadūṣaṇī* which exhibits his genius and originality as a thinker. Apart from *Caṇḍamāruta*, he has to his credit more than seven works, most of which have not yet been printed. Some of these are *Advaitavidyāvijaya*, *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya-upanyāsa*, *Parikaravijaya*, *Parāśaryavijaya*, *Brahmavidyāvijaya*, *Vedāntavijaya*, and *Sadvidyāvijaya*. According to Govindācārya Svāmin, Mahācārya was a friend and contemporary of Appayyadīkṣita, one of the greatest scholars of his time. Mr M. T. Narasimha Iyengar thinks that he had a controversy with Dīkṣita on the philological significance of the word Nārāyaṇa.² Dīkṣita is generally placed between 1520-1593 A.D. So Mahācārya might have lived towards the end of the sixteenth or the beginning of the seventeenth century.

In this connection it is worth noting that Dharmarāja Adhvarin, the celebrated author of the *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, also lived in the seventeenth century. It appears that Śrīnivāsa was aware of his senior contemporary's work as he in some places quotes the very words of Dharmarāja while presenting the *prima facie* view of Advaita.³ While Dharmarāja calls his work *Vedānta-paribhāṣā*, Śrīnivāsa names his *Sārīrakaparibhāṣā*.

¹ See the Introduction to 'The Light of the School of Rāmaṇuja' by Govindācārya Svāmin.

² *Ibid.*

³ चैतन्यं त्रिविधम्—अन्तःकरणावच्छिन्नं चैतन्यम्, अन्तःकरणवृत्त्यवच्छिन्नं चैतन्यं, विषयावच्छिन्नं चैतन्यं चेति ।

S'rīnivāsa was a direct descendant in the long line of S'rīvaiṣṇava apostles. His immediate preceptor Mahācārya and other Mahācāryas of the same line who were domiciled in Colasimhapuram trace their ancestry to Dās'arathi, a nephew of S'rī Rāmānuja.¹ So our author had the benefit of the traditional teachings, so valued in the guruparampara of S'rīvaiṣṇavas. S'rīnivāsa has no pretensions to originality, since he, at the beginning of his work, acknowledges his indebtedness to the former ācāryas beginning from Bhagavān Bodhāyana to his immediate guru, Mahācārya. In the epilogue also he gives a long list of ancient works from which he has drawn upon. The list starts with the *Dramiḍabhāṣya* and ends with *Parāśaryavijaya*, the work of Mahācārya. This suggests that the famous *Dramiḍabhāṣya* was available as late as the seventeenth century.

¹ See the Introduction to ' *The Light of the School of Rāmānuja*.

ABBREVIATIONS

<i>BG.</i>	Bhagavadgītā
<i>Br. Up.</i>	Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad
<i>Chā. Up.</i>	Chāndogya Upaniṣad
<i>In. Pāñ.</i>	Introduction to Pāñcarātra
<i>Kaṭha Up.</i>	Kaṭha Upaniṣad
<i>Kauṣī. Up.</i>	Kauṣītaki Upaniṣad
<i>Mahānār. Up.</i>	Mahānārāyaṇa Upaniṣad
<i>Muṇḍ. Up.</i>	Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad
<i>NS.</i>	Nyāyasūtras
<i>PMS.</i>	Pūrvamīmāṃsāsūtras
<i>Pras. Up.</i>	Prasna Upaniṣad
<i>S'vet. Up.</i>	S'vetāsvatara Upaniṣad
<i>Taitt. Up.</i>	Taittirīya Upaniṣad
<i>Taitt. Brā.</i>	Taittirīyabrāhmaṇa
<i>TS.</i>	Tarkasaṅgraha
<i>VP.</i>	Viṣṇupurāṇa
<i>VS.</i>	Vedāntasūtras
<i>YS.</i>	Yogasūtras



THESE / THÈSES

1. Introduction	1
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3. Les lois de Newton	3
4. Les lois de Kepler	4
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15. Les lois de Maxwell	15
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ANALYSIS OF CONTENTS

AVATĀRA ONE : INTRODUCTORY

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1. S'rīman Nārāyaṇa, qualified by cit and acit, is the sole Reality. 2-5. Padārthas are divided into pramāṇa and prameya ; enumeration of prameya. 6. Adṛavya. 7. Definition of pramāṇa and pramā. 8. Nature of saṁśaya, anyathājñāna and viparītājñāna. 9. Three defects of definition : avyāpti, ativyāpti and asambhava. 10. Rejection of definition of pramāṇa, which makes known what is not already known.

PRATYAKṢA

11. Pramāṇas are three : pratyakṣa, anumāna and śabda. 12. Definition of pratyakṣa as pramāṇa. 13. Pratyakṣa is twofold : nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka. 14. Mode of perception. 15. Perception of substances is due to saṁyoga and perception of attributes of substances is effected by relation of saṁyuktāśrayaṇa. 16. Nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka perceptions are divided into two kinds : arvācīna and anarvācīna. 17. Objection : Why is smṛti not considered a separate pramāṇa ? Reply : Since smṛti is dependent on reminiscent impression of a prior cognition, it cannot be recognized as an independent means of knowledge. 18. Nature of smṛti. 19. Sadṛśa, adṛṣṭa, cintā and sāha-carya rouse recollection. 20. Whatever is well experienced before becomes the object of recollection. 21. Pratyabhijñā and abhāva are not separate pramāṇas, but come under

pratyakṣa. 22. Ūha, saṁsāya and pratibhā are included in pratyakṣa. 23. All knowledge is of the real, even erroneous perceptual knowledge. 24. Satkhyāti is accepted. 25. What is called satkhyāti is reality of object of consciousness; error consists in invalidating workability of an object. 26. Cognition of dream etc. is also real. 27. Explanation of cognition of white conch as yellow. 28. Cognition of redness of crystal near China-rose is real. 29. Cognition of water in mirage is real. 30. Cognition of one direction being mistaken for another is true. 31. Cognition of firebrand seen as a fiery circle when whirled round is real. 32. Cognition of one's own face in mirror etc. is likewise real. 33. Cognition of double moon due to distorting medium is also true. 34. All apprehensions are real. 35. Difference implies counter-entity. 36. Objection: Cognition derived from statement 'Thou art the tenth' should be perceptual; reply: That is not acceptable since such cognition is partly perceptual and partly word-generated. 37. Rejection of Advaita view of threefold distinction made in Consciousness. 38. Refutation of Naiyāyika view that nirvikalpaka is cognition of attributeless object. 39. Objection: Schools of Kaṇāda and Pāṇini, useful to every branch of knowledge, should not be rejected; reply: No system *in toto* is rejected; whatever is amenable to reason is accepted. 40. Rejection of anti-Sūtrakāra views, such as causation of universe by atoms, personal origin of Vedas, etc.

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and s'āṅkita. 7. Vyāpya, sādhana, līṅga mean the same. 8. Five forms or characteristics of vyāpya. 9. Pakṣa. 10. Sapakṣa. 11. Vipakṣa. 12. Bhādhita-viśayatva. 13. Asatpratipakṣatra. 14. Classification of vyāpya into anvayavyatirekin and kevalānvayin. 15. Five-formed vyāpya is anvayavyatirekin. 16. Same vyāpya without vipakṣa is kevalānvayin. 17. Kevalavyatirekin is inadmissible. 18. No supersensuous cognition in kevalānvayin and anvayavyatirekin. 19. According to another classification anumāna is divided into svārtha and parārtha. 20. Some admit svārtha alone. 21. Five members of syllogism. 22. Pratijñā. 23. Hetu. 24. Udāharaṇa. 25. Upanaya. 26. Nigamana. 27. Naiyāyikas accept five-membered syllogism mentioned above. 28. Mīmāṃsakas admit pratijñā, hetu and udāharaṇa. 29. Saugatas recognize udāharaṇa and upanaya. 30. According to Viśiṣṭādvaita vyāpti and character of pakṣatā are established by udāharaṇa and upanaya. 31. Five fallacies of reason. 32. Asiddha is threefold. 33. Svarūpāsiddha. 34. Āśrayāsiddha. 35. Two varieties of vyāpyatvāsiddha. 36. Viruddha. 37. Two varieties of anaikāntika. 38. Definition of sādharmaṇa and asādharmaṇa. 39. Prakaraṇasama. 40. Kālātyayāpadiṣṭa. 41. Upamāna is included in anumāna. 42. Arthāpatti comes under anumāna. 43. Tarka is hypothetical argument. 44. Nis'caya is determination. 45. Vāda is debate. 46. Jalpa establishes position of both sides. 47. Vitaṇḍā is non-establishment of one's own position. 48. Chala is quibbling. 49. Jāti. 50. Nigrahassthāna. 51. Conclusion. 22-37

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by the wish of Īśvara. 5. Bhagavān's body in Vyūha, Vibhava and Arcā is made up of non-material substance. 6. Embodiment of muktas is for the service of Īśvara. 7. Īśvara is characterized by unsurpassable attributes of splendour, beauty, etc. 8. Bodies of muktas are not karma-made. 9. Refutation of views that there is no embodiment in mukti, that nityavibhūti is a portion of prakṛti, etc. 10. Symbolic representation of Divine ornaments and weapons. 11. Description of Vaikuṇṭha 79-85

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OM SRI NARAYAN
SRINAGAR NO

attributes of Bhagavān such as knowledge, power, etc. are expressions of his jñāna and śakti. 15. Definition of divine attributes such as jñāna, śakti, bala, etc. 16. Bhakti and prapatti are the only means for release. 17. Karmayoga, jñānayoga, etc. are means to liberation through bhakti. 18. Nature of karmayoga. 19. Nature of jñānayoga. 20. Bhaktiyoga is continuous stream of remembrance of God. 21. Bhaktiyoga is generated by sevenfold discipline of viveka, vimoka, etc. 22. Definitions of viveka, vimoka, etc. 23. Nature of bhakti. 24. Forms of bhakti as parabhakti, parajñāna and paramabhakti. 25. Bhakti is twofold : sādhanabhakti and phalabhakti. 26. Objection : When Vedānta texts have enjoined 'śravaṇa' and 'manana' as the means to salvation, how can 'dhyāna' effect release? Reply : Śravaṇa and manana, being anuvāda, refer to what is already established and therefore all texts enjoin 'dhyāna' only. 27. Various vidyās such as antarakṣividyā etc. are modes of bhakti. 28. Nature of prapatti. 29. Since bhakti and prapatti are the only means to release, the means enunciated by others (such as Cārvākas, Vijñānavādins, Jains, etc.) are rejected 86-101

AVATĀRA EIGHT: JĪVA

1. Common characteristics of jīva and Īśvara. 2. Nature of jīva. 3. Jīva is different from body, senses, mind, etc. 4. Jīva is monadic. 5. Jīva is eternal and unborn. 6. Jīva is different in each body. 7. Consciousness, monadness, etc. determine jīva's essential nature. 8. Refutation of various conceptions of jīva by Buddhists, Cārvākas, Sāṅkhya, etc. 9. Objection : If jīva is not all-pervasive how can it enjoy its fruits in other regions? Reply : It is possible by power of adṛṣṭa, which is a special kind of consciousness. 10. Jīva is of three kinds : the bound, the freed and the

eternal. 11. Origin of devas etc. 12. Human beings, animals and non-ambulants explained. 13. Womb-born, egg-born, sprout-born and sweat-born. 14. Owing to power of avidyā, bound jīvas are subject to manifold afflictions. 15. Various kinds of bound jīvas explained. 16. Mumukṣus are of two kinds : votaries of kaivalya and mokṣa. 17. Mokṣa-seekers are of two kinds : bhaktas and prapannas. 18. Members of three varṇas only are qualified for bhakti. 19. According to *Vedāntasūtras* sūdras are not qualified. 20. Bhaktas are of two kinds. 21. Nature of prapanna ; everyone is qualified for self-surrender. 22. Prapanna is of two kinds : ekāntin and parama-ekāntin. Parama-ekāntin is of two kinds : dr̥pta and ārta. 23. Description of mukti. 24. Mukta attains equality with Brahman in enjoyment of bliss. 25. Objection : Muktas cannot wander all over worlds since Scripture declares that the liberated do not return ; reply : Muktas can wander according to their own will ; Scripture prohibits ' return ' due to karma. 26. The eternals. . 102-121

AVATĀRA NINE : ĪŚVARA

1. Definition of Īśvara. 2. Īśvara is both material and efficient cause. 3. Definitions of material cause, efficient cause, etc. 4. Śrīman Nārāyaṇa is the sole cause of universe. 5. How can causality result in Nārāyaṇa ? Reply : This is determined by examination of Vedānta texts. 6. According to principle of ' sāmānya-viśeṣa ' all general terms such as Ś'iva, Śambhu, etc. terminate in particular term ' Hiranya-garbha '. 7. Terms such as Hiranyagarbha etc. refer to Nārāyaṇa. 8. Antarāditavydyā refers to Viṣṇu. 9. All vidyās including daharavidyā must be construed as referring to Nārāyaṇa. 10. Objection : According to non-dualistic passages of śrutis identity of Brahman with Self is alone real and that everything else is unreal ; therefore Nārāyaṇa

cannot be import of Vedānta texts; reply: Nārāyaṇa is proved to be cause of universe from Vedānta texts which treat of causality; the apparent contradiction between dualistic and monistic texts is harmonized by ghaṭakas'rutis. 11. Traditional teaching of Viśiṣṭādvaita. 12. Refutation of Sāṅkhya, Mīmāṃsā, Yoga and Pāśupata views in respect of Īśvara. 13. Īśvara is untouched by imperfections adhering to universe-body. 14. Īśvara is vibhu. 15. Various attributes of Īśvara. 16. Nārāyaṇa is the creator, the protector and the destroyer of the universe. 17. Īśvara abides in fivefold form: Para, Vyūha, Vibhava, Antaryāmin and Arcā. 18. Para is highest Nārāyaṇa in Vaikuṇṭha. 19. Vyūha is fourfold: Vāsudeva, Saṅkarṣaṇa, Pradyumna and Aniruddha. 20. Each Vyūha descends into three sub-Vyūhas such as Keśava etc. 21. Description of Keśava, Mādhava, etc. 22. Vibhava is avatar such as Matsya etc. 23. Purpose of various avatars such as Matsya, Kūrma, etc. 24. Avatars are manifold such as the primary, the secondary, the full, etc. 25. Īśvara incarnates by His own will, and not owing to karma. 26. Īśvara as Antaryāmin abides in all jīvas. 27. Arcā is that special form of Īśvara which accepts any substance for body. 28. Arcā is fourfold. 29. Bhagavān is ever present with S'rī in all fivefold states. 122-140

AVATĀRA TEN; ADRAVYA

1. Adravya is tenfold: sattva, rajas, tamas, sound, touch, colour, taste, smell, conjunction and potency. 2. Nature of sattva. 3. Nature of rajas. 4. Nature of tamas. 5. Sattva, rajas, tamas pervade entire prakṛti and belong to puruṣas controlled by prakṛti. 6. Fruits of three guṇas. 7. Nature of sound. 8. Objection: S'rutis declare sound to be a substance; reply: sound is a non-substance, since producibility of Praṇava is possible through 'express

sense'. 9. Nature of touch. 10. Nature of colour. 11. Nature of taste. 12. Nature of smell. 13. Refutation of pīlupākavāda. 14. Nature of conjunction; non-eternal conjunction. 15. Eternal conjunction. 16. Nature of potency. 17. Objection: When qualities are enumerated as twenty-four, how could they be determined to be ten only? Reply: Since many attributes can be explained in the light of and subsumed under ten heads, qualities are ten only. 18. Conclusions regarding adravya. 19. Names of Viśiṣṭādvaita treatises from which the author has derived material. 20. Tattva, hita and puruṣārtha have been explained in this work. 21. Though sages declare Reality to be one, different ācāryas view the tattva in various forms. 22. Purport of Vedānta is that non-dual Brahman qualified by cit and acit is the one Reality

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श्रीः

यतीन्द्रमतदीपिका

प्रथमोऽवतारः

उपोद्धातः

श्रीवेङ्कटेशं करिशैलनाथं श्रीदेवराजं घटिकाद्रिसिंहम् ।

कृष्णेन साकं यतिराजमीडे स्वप्ने च दृष्टान् मम देशिकेन्द्रान् ॥ १ ॥

यतीश्वरं प्रणम्याहं वेदान्तार्यं महागुरुम् ।

करोमि बालबोधार्थं यतीन्द्रमतदीपिकाम् ॥ २ ॥

YATĪNDRAMATADĪPIKĀ

AVATĀRA I

INTRODUCTORY

I glorify S'ri Veṅkaṭeśa,¹ S'ri Devarāja the Lord of Karis'aila,² Nṛsimha (the Lord of) Ghaṭikādrī,³ and Yatirāja⁴ together with Kṛṣṇa;⁵ and my supreme teachers who were seen by me in a vision. (1)

I bow to Yatis'vara,⁶ Vedāntārya⁷ and Mahāguru⁸; and I begin to compose *Yatīndramatadīpikā* for the instruction of beginners, (2)

१. श्रीमन्नारायण एव चिदचिद्विशिष्टाद्वैततत्त्वं, भक्तिप्रपत्तिभ्यां प्रसन्नः स एव उपायः, अप्राकृतदेशविशिष्टः स एव प्राप्य इति वेदान्तवाक्यैः प्रतिपादयतां व्यासबोधायनगुहदेवभारुचिब्रह्मनन्दिद्रमिडाचार्यश्रीपराङ्कुशनाथयामुनमुनियतीश्वरप्रभृतीनां मतानुसारेण बालबोधार्थं वेदान्तानुसारिणी यतिपतिमतदीपिकाख्या शारीरकपरिभाषा महाचार्यकृपावलम्बिना मया यथामति सङ्ग्रहेण प्रकाश्यते ।

२. सर्वं पदार्थजातं प्रमाणप्रमेयभेदेन द्विधा भिन्नम् । प्रमाणानि त्रीण्येव । प्रमेयं द्विविधं—द्रव्याद्रव्यभेदात् । द्रव्यञ्च द्विविधं—जडम-

1. S'rīman⁹ Nārāyaṇa alone having cit (the sentient) and acit (the non-sentient) for His qualifications is the sole Reality, one without a second. He alone Who is associated with the non-material realm¹⁰ is the means (to salvation) when propitiated by devotion and self-surrender, and He alone is the goal to be attained. Vyāsa,¹¹ Bodhāyana,¹² Guhadeva, Bhāruci, Brahmanandin,¹³ Dramiḍācārya,¹⁴ S'rī Parāṅkuśa,¹⁵ Nātha,¹⁶ Yāmunamuni,¹⁷ Yatis'vara¹⁸ and others establish *this* by means of the Vedānta texts. Following their school I, by the grace of Mahācārya,¹⁹ proceed to expound to the best of my ability and in a summary fashion (the work) *S'ārīrakaparibhāṣā*,²⁰ called *Yatipatimatadīpikā*²¹ based on the Vedānta for the instruction of beginners.

2. All knowable things are divided into two kinds, as pramāṇa (the means of valid knowledge) and prameya (object of valid knowledge). The means of valid knowledge is only threefold.²² The object of

जडमिति । जडं च द्वेधा—प्रकृतिः कालश्चेति । प्रकृतिश्चतुर्विंशतितत्त्व-
त्मिका । कालस्तु उपाधिभेदात् त्रिविधः ।

३. अजडं तु द्विविधं—पराक् प्रत्यगिति । अजडं परागपि
तथा—नित्यविभूतिर्धर्मभूतज्ञानं चेति ।

४. प्रत्यगपि द्विविधः—जीवेश्वरभेदात् । जीवस्त्रिविधः—
बद्धमुक्तनित्यभेदात् । बद्धोऽपि द्विविधः—बुभुक्षुमुमुक्षुभेदात् । बुभुक्षुद्वि-
विधः—अर्थकामपरो धर्मपरश्चेति । धर्मपरो द्विविधः—देवतान्तरपरो

valid knowledge is twofold, because of the difference as
dravya (substance) and adravya (non-substance).
Dravya is of two kinds, as jaḍa (material) and ajaḍa
(immaterial). Jaḍa is of two kinds, as prakṛti (pri-
mordial matter) and time. Prakṛti is of the nature of
twenty-four categories.²³ Time is of three kinds owing
to limitation.²⁴

3. The ajaḍa is of two kinds, as parāk (the
external) and pratyak (the internal). The parāk which
is ajaḍa, is in its turn of two kinds, as nityavibhūti (the
eternal manifestation) and dharmabhūtajñāna (the
attributive consciousness).

4. The pratyak is also of two kinds, because of
the difference as jīva (the individual self) and Īśvara.
Jīva is of three kinds, because of the difference as
baddha (the bound jīva in saṁsāra), mukta (the releas-
ed jīva) and nitya (the eternally free). The baddha is of
two kinds, because of the difference as bubhukṣu²⁵ (the
pleasure-seeker) and mumukṣu²⁶ (the salvation-seeker).
The bubhukṣu is of two kinds, as arthakāmapara

भगवत्परश्चेति । मुमुक्षुर्द्विविधः—कैवल्यपरो मोक्षपरश्चेति । मोक्षपरो द्विविधः—भक्तः प्रपन्नश्चेति । प्रपन्नो द्विविधः—एकान्ती परमैकान्ती चेति । परमैकान्ती द्विविधः—द्वैतार्तभेदात् ।

५. पञ्चधावस्थित ईश्वरः—परव्यूहविभ्वन्तर्याम्यर्चावतारभेदात् । पर एकधा । व्यूहश्चतुर्धा—वासुदेवसङ्कर्षणप्रद्युम्नानिरुद्धभेदात् । केशवादि व्यूहान्तरम् । मत्स्यादयो विभवः पुनरनन्ताश्च । अन्तर्यामी प्रतिशरीरमवस्थितः ।

(the votary of artha and kāma) and dharmapara (the votary of dharma). The dharmapara is of two kinds, as the votary of various gods and the votary of Bhagavān. Mumukṣu is of two kinds, as the votary of self-realization (kaivalya) and the votary of release (mokṣa). The votary of mokṣa is of two kinds, as bhakta (lover of God) and prapanna (one who has resigned his self to God). The prapanna is of two kinds, as ekāntin (one-pointed) and parama-ekāntin (extremely one-pointed). The parama-ekāntin is of two kinds, because of the difference as dr̥pta (the patient aspirant) and ārta (the impatient aspirant).

5. Īśvara abides in five forms, because of the difference as Para, Vyūha, Vibhava, Antaryāmin and Arcā. Para (the self-transcendent absolute) is uniform (i.e., single and complete). The Vyūha is fourfold, because of the difference as Vāsudeva, Saṅkarṣaṇa, Pradyumna and Aniruddha. Keśava etc. are other types of Vyūhas. Matsya and others are Vibhavas (incarnations), and they are numberless. The Antaryāmin (the indweller) abides in every body. The

अर्चावतारस्तु — श्रीरङ्गवेङ्कटाद्रिहस्तिगिरियादवाद्विघटिकाचलादिषु सकल-
मनुजनयनविषयतां गतो मूर्त्तिविशेषः ।

६. अद्रव्यं तु सत्त्वरजस्तमःशब्दस्पर्शरूपरसगन्धसंयोगशक्ति-
भेदाद्दशधैव ।

७. एवमुद्दिष्टानामुद्देशकमेण लक्षणपरीक्षे क्रियेते । तत्र प्रमाकरणं
प्रमाणम् । प्रमाणं लक्ष्यम् । प्रमाकरणत्वं लक्षणम् । यथावस्थितव्यवहारानु-
गुणज्ञानं प्रमा । प्रमा लक्ष्यम् । यथावस्थितव्यवहारानुगुणज्ञानत्वं लक्षणम् ।

incarnations of Arcā are those special forms presented to
the vision of all men in sacred shrines like S'raṅgam,²⁷
Veṅkaṭādrī,²⁸ Hastigiri,²⁹ Yādavādrī, Ghaṭikācala,³⁰ etc.

6. Adravya is of ten kinds, because of the differ-
ence as sattva (goodness), rajas (passion or activity),
tamas (darkness or inertia), s'abda (sound), spars'a
(touch), rūpa (colour), rasa (taste), gandha (smell),
saṁyoga (conjunction) and s'akti (potentiality).

7. Now the definition and examination of the
categories will be attempted in the order in which they
have been enumerated above. Of these, the instru-
ment of valid knowledge is pramāṇa. What is defined
(here) is pramāṇa. The definition is that it (pramāṇa)
has the quality of causing pramā (valid knowledge).
Pramā is that knowledge which is adapted to practical
interests of life as they really are.³¹ What is defined
(here) is pramā. The definition is that it (pramā)
has the quality of knowledge adapted to practical
interests of life as they really are. If it be said:

‘ज्ञानं प्रमा’ इत्युक्ते शुक्तिकायाम् ‘इदं रजतम्’ इति ज्ञाने अतिव्याप्तिः ; अत उक्तं ‘व्यवहारानुगुणम्’ इति । एवमपि तत्रैवातिव्याप्तिः ; आन्ति-
दशायामपि ‘इदं रजतम्’ इति व्यवहियमाणत्वात् । अत उक्तं ‘यथा-
वस्थितम्’ इति । ‘यथावस्थित’-इति पदेन संशयान्यथाज्ञानविपरीत-
ज्ञानव्यावृत्तिः ।

८. धर्मिग्रहणे मिथोविरुद्धानेकविशेषस्मरणं संशयः । यथा
ऊर्द्धताविशिष्टे ‘स्थाणुर्वा पुरुषो वा’ इति ज्ञानम् । अन्यथाज्ञानं नाम
धर्मविपर्ययासः । यथा कर्तृत्वेन भासमाने आत्मनि कुयुक्तिभिः कर्तृत्वस्य

‘Pramā is knowledge’, there would be over-pervasion in the (erroneous) cognition of a nacre in the form, ‘this is silver’; hence it is said ‘adapted to practical interests of life’. Even then there would be over-pervasion as one may have the perception (of a nacre) in the form, ‘this is silver’ in a state of delusion; hence it is said ‘as they really are’. By the expression ‘as they really are’, saṃśaya (doubt), anyathājñāna (wrong knowledge) and viparītajñāna (contrary knowledge) are excluded.

8. Saṃśaya is the recollection of several mutually contradictory attributes when a thing is apprehended; for instance, the (dubitative) cognition in respect of a tall object, ‘Is this a stump or man?’. What is called anyathājñāna is the misapprehension of one attribute for another; for instance, the predication made by sophistic arguments, that the agency (of the individual self) is a delusion, whereas the individual

आन्तत्वोपपादनम् । विपरीतज्ञानं नाम धर्मिविपर्ययासः । यथा वस्तुनो वस्त्वन्तरज्ञानम् ।

९. लक्षणस्य त्रीणि दूषणानि सन्ति । अव्याप्त्यतिव्याप्त्यसंभवे भेदात् । लक्ष्यैकदेशे लक्षणस्यावर्तमानत्वमव्याप्तिः । 'कपिलवर्णवत्त्वं गोलक्षणम्' इति लक्षणे कृते शुक्लायामव्याप्तिः । लक्ष्यादन्यत्र प्रवर्तमानत्वमतिव्याप्तिः । लक्ष्ये काप्यविद्यमानत्वमसंभवः । यथा—'चक्षुर्विषयो जीव' इत्युक्ते असंभव एव । अत्रोक्तदूषणत्रयाभावात् प्रमालक्षणं स्वस्थम् ।

self shines as an agent. What is called viparītajñāna is the misapprehension of one thing for another; for instance, the cognition of another object in the place of the (intended) object.³²

9. A definition has three defects: avyāpti (non-pervasion), ativyāpti (over-pervasion) and asambhava (absolute inapplicability). Avyāpti is the absence of the definition in a thing sought to be defined; for instance, in the definition, 'the characteristic of the cow is the possession of orange-brown colour', there is non-pervasion in respect of (the cows) possessing white colour. Ativyāpti is the presence of the definition in something else other than the things sought to be defined.³³ Asambhava is the absence of definition anywhere in the thing defined. The statement, 'the self is an object of ocular perception' is an example of total inapplicability. Therefore the definition of pramā is established, because of the absence of the above-said three defects.

१०. साधकतमं करणम् । अतिशयितं साधकं साधकतमम् । यस्मिन् सति अविलम्बेन ज्ञानमुत्पद्यते तत् 'अतिशयितम्' इत्युच्यते । तेन प्रमाकरणं प्रमाणमिति सिद्धम् । अनधिगतार्थगन्तु प्रमाणमित्यादिकं तु तत्तद्वादिभिरेव निरस्तत्वादनादरणीयम् ।

प्रत्यक्षम्

११. तानि प्रमाणानि प्रत्यक्षानुमानशब्दाख्यानि त्रीण्येव ।

१२. अत्र साक्षात्कारप्रमाकरणं प्रत्यक्षम् । अनुमानादिव्यावृत्त्यर्थं 'साक्षात्कार' इति । दुष्टेन्द्रियजव्यावृत्त्यर्थं 'प्रमा' इति ।

10. The instrument (karaṇa) is that which is the best cause (for the production of pramā).³⁴ The best cause is that which is most important. It is said that (instrument) is 'most important' by which knowledge arises without delay. Hence it is established pramāṇa is the cause of valid knowledge. The definition of pramāṇa as one which makes known what is not already known and the like are unacceptable inasmuch as they have been refuted by their own propounders.³⁵

PRATYAKṢA

11. These pramāṇas are three—pratyakṣa (perception), anumāna (inference), and s'abda (verbal testimony).

12. Of these, pratyakṣa is that which is the instrument of valid perceptual knowledge. 'Perceptual' is used to differentiate it from inference.

१३. तच्च प्रत्यक्षं द्विविधं—निर्विकल्पकसविकल्पकभेदात् । निर्विकल्पकं नाम गुणसंस्थानादिविशिष्टप्रथमपिण्डग्रहणम् । सविकल्पकं तु सप्रत्यवमर्शं गुणसंस्थानादिविशिष्टद्वितीयादिपिण्डज्ञानम् । उभयविधमपि एतद् विशिष्टविषयमेव । अविशिष्टग्राहिणो ज्ञानस्यानुपलम्भादनुपपत्तेश्च ।

१४. ग्रहणप्रकारस्तु—आत्मा मनसा संयुज्यते, मन इन्द्रियेण, इन्द्रियमर्थेनेति । इन्द्रियाणां प्राप्यप्रकाशकारित्वनियमात् । अतो घटादि-

‘Valid knowledge’ is used to differentiate it from the (erroneous) knowledge arising from the defective sense organ.³⁶

13. And this perception is twofold, because of the difference as nirvikalpaka (indeterminate) and savikalpaka (determinate). What is called nirvikalpaka is the cognition of the first individual qualified by its attributes, configuration, etc. The savikalpaka is the cognition of the second (third and so on) individual qualified by its attributes, configuration, etc. grasped with retrospection.³⁷ In both cases this (perception) has for its object only what is qualified (by attributes etc.). Since it is not possible to possess knowledge which apprehends unqualified (objects), (the perception of non-differenced objects) is inadmissible.

14. The mode of perception is thus: The individual self is joined with the mind (manas), mind with the sense organ, and the sense organ with the object of knowledge; since, as a rule, the sense organs do their function by coming into contact with the object to be cognized. Therefore when the visual sense is in contact with an object, in the form of jar etc., ocular knowledge

रूपार्थस्य चक्षुरादिरूपेन्द्रियस्य च सन्निकर्षे सति 'अयं घटः' इति चाक्षुषज्ञानं जायते । एवमेव स्पर्शनप्रत्यक्षादयोऽपि ।

१५. द्रव्यग्रहणे संयोगः सम्बन्धः । द्रव्यगतरूपादिग्रहणे समवायानङ्गीकारात् संयुक्ताश्रयणसम्बन्धः ।

१६. निर्विकल्पकसविकल्पकभिन्नं प्रत्यक्षं द्विविधम्—अर्वाचीनम् अनर्वाचीनं चेति । अर्वाचीनं पुनर्द्विविधम्—इन्द्रियसापेक्षं तदनपेक्षं चेति । तदनपेक्षं च द्विविधम्—स्वयं सिद्धं दिव्यं चेति । स्वयं सिद्धं योगजन्यम् । दिव्यं भगवत्प्रसादजन्यम् । अनर्वाचीनं तु इन्द्रियानपेक्षं

arises in the form 'this is jar'. Thus also are the tactual and other perceptions.

15. Conjunction (saṃyoga) is the sense-relation when a substance is perceived. When the colour of a substance is perceived, the sense-relation is 'dependence in what is conjoined (with the sense organ)',³⁸ since we do not admit (the relation of) 'inherence'.³⁹

16. Nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka perceptions are twofold, as the arvācīna (recent) and anarvācīna (the ancient). The arvācīna is again twofold, as the dependent of sense and the independent of sense. The independent of sense is twofold, as the self-accomplished and the divine. The self-accomplished is the result of yoga. The divine (perception) is what is engendered by the grace of Bhagavān. The anarvācīna does not require the aid of the senses ; it is the knowledge of the liberated (selves), the eternal and Īśvara. The

मुक्तनित्येश्वरज्ञानम् । अनर्वाचीनं तु प्रसङ्गादुक्तम् । एवं साक्षात्कारप्रमा-
करणं प्रत्यक्षमिति सिद्धम् ।

१७. ननु यथावस्थितव्यवहारानुगुणज्ञानं प्रमेत्युक्तम् । एवञ्च
स्मृतेरपि यथावस्थितव्यवहारानुगुणत्वेन प्रामाण्यात् स्मृतेरपि प्रमाणत्वेन
परिगणनाच्च त्रीण्येव प्रमाणानीति कथं प्रतिपाद्यते ? इति चेत्, उच्यते :—
स्मृतेः प्रामाण्याङ्गीकारेऽपि संस्कारसापेक्षत्वात् तस्याः प्रत्यक्षमूलभूतत्वान्मूल-
भूते प्रत्यक्षेऽन्तर्भाव इति न पृथक् प्रमाणत्वकल्पनम् । अतस्त्रीण्येवेति
प्रमाणानि संभवन्ति ।

१८. स्मृतिर्नाम पूर्वानुभवजन्यसंस्कारमात्रजन्यं ज्ञानम् । संस्कारो-

anarvācina has been referred to owing to the context. Thus it is established that pratyakṣa is the instrument of valid perceptual knowledge.

17. 'Now, pramā was defined as that knowledge which is adapted to practical interests of life as they really are. But exactly the recollection (smṛti) also has the quality of being adapted to experience as it really is; since recollection also may be considered as a pramāṇa, how was it stated that the pramāṇas are three only?' If this be asked, it is said in reply: Even if recollection is admitted as pramāṇa, it has to depend on reminiscient impressions (saṃskāra); since perception is the origin of recollection, it is brought under perception,⁴⁰ and so there is no need to regard it as a separate pramāṇa. Therefore the pramāṇas are three only.

18. What is called recollection is the knowledge derived only from the reminiscient impressions caused

द्वोधश्च 'सदृशादृष्टचिन्ताद्याः स्मृतिबीजस्य बोधकाः' इत्युक्तप्रकारेण कचित्सदृशदर्शनाद्भवति, कचिददृष्टात्, कचिच्चिन्तया । आदिशब्देन साहचर्यस्यापि ग्रहणात्तेनापि च भवति ।

१९. सादृश्यजा यथा—देवदत्तयज्ञदत्तयोः सदृशयोर्देवदत्तदर्शनेन यज्ञदत्तस्मृतिः । द्वितीया यथा—यादृच्छिकी कालान्तरानुभूतश्रीरङ्गादि-दिव्यदेशस्मृतिः । तृतीया यथा—चिन्त्यमाने सति श्रीवेङ्कटेशस्य कमनीय-

by a prior experience. And what recalls the reminiscent impression is as follows: 'Those that rouse the seed of recollection are *sadr̥śa* (similarity), *adr̥ṣṭa* (unseen effect of previous karma), *cintā* (deep thinking), etc.' In accordance with what has been said (above), the (recaller) is sometimes the similar-sight (of an object previously seen); sometimes an unseen effect (of one's actions); sometimes deep thinking. Since from the term 'ādi' (etcetera), 'association' (or concomitance) is to be understood, even that becomes (the cause of recollection).

19. What is caused by similarity is thus: If Devadatta and Yajñadatta resemble each other, the sight of Devadatta kindles the recollection of Yajñadatta. The second: like the spontaneous remembrance of a prior experience, such as the sacred place of S'rīraṅgam etc.⁴¹ The third: like the recollection of the lovely, divine, and auspicious figure of S'rī Veṅkaṭeśa while (consciously) thinking. The fourth is

दिव्यमङ्गलविग्रहस्मृतिः । चतुर्थी तु सहचरितयोर्देवदत्तयज्ञदत्तयोर्मध्ये अन्य-
तरदर्शनेन तदन्यतरस्मृतिः ।

२०. सम्यक् पूर्वमनुभूतस्य सर्वस्य स्मृतिविषयत्वनियमः । कचि-
त्कालदैर्घ्यात् व्याध्यादिना वा संस्कारप्रमोषात् स्मृत्यभावः ।

२१. यथा स्मृतेः प्रत्यक्षेऽन्तर्भावस्तथा 'सोऽयं देवदत्त' इति
प्रत्यभिज्ञाया अपि प्रत्यक्षेऽन्तर्भावः । अस्मन्मते अभावस्य भावान्तररूपत्वात्
तज्ज्ञानस्यापि प्रत्यक्षान्तर्भावः । भूतले घटात्यन्ताभावो भूतलमेव । घटप्राग-
भावो नाम मृदेव । घटध्वंसश्च कपालमेव ।

thus : between Devadatta and Yajñadatta who are seen
in association, the sight of one kindles the recollection
of the other.

20. The principle is that whatever is well experi-
enced before, becomes the object of recollection. The
absence of recollection is caused either by long duration
of time (after experience) or by disease etc. which
obscure the reminiscent impressions.

21. Just as recollection is included in pratyakṣa,
recognition (pratyabhijñā) also in the form of 'this is
that Devadatta' is included in perception.⁴² In our
system, since non-existence is nothing but another
form of existence,⁴³ the knowledge of non-existence
is also included in pratyakṣa. (For instance), on
this floor, the absolute non-existence of the jar is the
floor itself. The antecedent non-existence of the
jar is clay itself. The destruction of the jar means
potsherds,

२२. प्रायः पुरुषेण अनेन भवितव्यम् एतदूहः । पुरः किंसंज्ञ-
कोऽयं वृक्ष इति अनध्यवसायो ज्ञानं संशय उक्तः । एतयोरपि प्रत्यक्षेऽन्तर्भावः ।
पुण्यपुरुषनिष्ठा प्रतिभापि प्रत्यक्षेऽन्तर्गता ।

२३. सर्वं विज्ञानं यथार्थमिति वेदान्तविदां मतमित्युक्तत्वात्,
अमादिप्रत्यक्षज्ञानं यथार्थमेव ।

२४. अख्यात्यात्मख्यात्यनिर्वचनीयताख्यात्यन्यथाख्यात्यसख्या-
तिवादिनो निरस्य सत्ख्यातिपक्षस्वीकारात् ।

२५. सत्ख्यातिर्नाम ज्ञानविषयस्य सत्यत्वम् । तर्हि भ्रमत्वं कथम् ?

22. Conjecture (ūha) is such as this : ' Indeed this must be a person '. It has been said that doubt is the non-determinative cognition of the form, ' What is this tree in front of me ? '. These (conjecture and doubt) are also included in pratyakṣa. Special mental powers (prātibhā) of holy personages are also included in pratyakṣa.

23. Since it has been said that according to the knowers of Vedānta all knowledge is of the real, the perceptual knowledge in the form of error etc. is of the real.⁴⁴

24. Rejecting the theories of akhyāti (non-apprehension), ātmakhyāti (self-apprehension), anirvacanīyakhyāti (indefinable apprehension), anyathākhyāti (misapprehension) and asatkhyāti (non-being's apprehension), the theory of satkhyāti (reality-apprehension) is accepted.⁴⁵

25. What is called satkhyāti (the theory of reality-apprehension) is the reality of the object of

इति चेत्, विषयव्यवहारबाधात् भ्रमत्वम् । तदुपपादयामः—पञ्चीकरण-
प्रक्रियया पृथिव्यादिषु सर्वत्र सर्वभूतानां विद्यमानत्वात् । अत एव शुक्ति-
कादौ रजतांशस्य विद्यमानत्वाज्ज्ञानविषयस्य सत्यत्वम् । तत्र रजतांशस्य
स्वरूपत्वात् तत्र न व्यवहार इति तज्ज्ञानं भ्रमः । शुक्त्यंशभूयस्त्वज्ञानात्
भ्रमनिवृत्तिः ।

२६. स्वप्नादिज्ञानं तु सत्यमेव । तत्तत्पुरुषानुभाव्यतया तत्त-
त्कालावसानान् रथादीन् परमपुरुषः सृजतीति श्रुत्याऽवगम्यते ।

२७. 'पीतः शङ्ख' इत्यादौ नयनवर्तिपित्तद्रव्यसंयुक्ता नायन-

consciousness. If it be asked what then is bhrama (error), (it is said in reply) that bhrama consists in in-
validating the workability of an object.⁴⁶ We shall thus
explain it : By the process of quintuplication, all the
elements are present in all (the elements) like earth etc.
Therefore owing to the presence of a small portion of
silver in the nacre, the object of that consciousness (*i.e.*,
silver) is true. But there, as the portion of silver-content
is infinitesimal, it cannot serve the purpose of practical
life; hence that cognition is bhrama.⁴⁷ The bhrama
disappears, because of the knowledge of the preponde-
rance of the nacre-content (in the object).

26. The cognition of dream etc. is also real.
From the śruti we understand that the Supreme Person
creates chariots etc.,⁴⁸ subsisting for a certain time only,⁴⁹
for the experience of the particular individual self⁵⁰
(in accordance with its spiritual merit and demerit).

27. In the case of (the cognition), 'the conch is
yellow', (the explanation is as follows): The visual

रश्मयः शङ्खादिभिः सह संयुज्यन्ते । तत्र पित्तगतपीतिमाभिभूतः शङ्ख-
गतशुक्लिमा न गृह्यते । अतः सुवर्णानुलितशङ्खवत् 'पीतः शङ्ख' इति
प्रतीयते । सूक्ष्मत्वात् पीतिमा स्वनयननिष्क्रान्ततया स्वेनैव गृह्यते, न तु
अन्यैः ।

२८. जपाकुसुमसमीपवर्तिस्फटिकमणिरपि 'रक्त' इति गृह्यते ।
तज्ज्ञानं सत्यमेव ।

२९. मरीचिकायां जलज्ञानमपि पञ्चीकरणप्रक्रियया पूर्वोक्तवदुप-
पद्यते । पञ्चीकरणप्रक्रिया तु उत्तरत्र वक्ष्यते ।

३०. दिग्भ्रमोऽपि तथैव । दिशि दिगन्तरस्य विद्यमानत्वात्
अवच्छेदकमन्तरेण दिगिति द्रव्यान्तरानङ्गीकाराच्च ।

rays of the eye which are in contact with the bile of the
eye⁵¹ enter into conjunction with the conch; then the
whiteness belonging to the conch is overpowered by the
yellowness of the bile, and hence not cognized. There-
fore arises the cognition, 'the conch is yellow', like a
gold-gilt conch. The yellowness issuing from his eye,
owing to his extreme subtlety, is apprehended by him
alone and not by others.

28. (Likewise) the crystal which is placed near a
China-rose is cognized as red.⁵² The cognition of that
also is real.

29. In the aforesaid manner the cognition of
water in the mirage also is true⁵³ owing to the quintupli-
cation of elements. The process of pañcīkaraṇa will be
described in the sequel.

30. In the same way, the case of one direction
being mistaken for another is true; since one direction

३१. अलातचक्रादौ तु शैघ्रयात्तदन्तरालाग्रहणात्तत्तद्देशसंयुक्त-
तत्तद्वस्तुन एव चक्राकारेण ग्रहणम् । तदपि सत्यमेव ।

३२. दर्पणादिषु निजमुखादिप्रतीतिरपि यथार्था । दर्पणादि-
प्रतिहतगतयो नायनरश्मयो दर्पणादिग्रहणपूर्वकं निजमुखादि गृह्णन्ति ।
तत्राप्यतिशैघ्रयादन्तरालाग्रहणात् तथा प्रतीतिः ।

३३. द्विचन्द्रज्ञानादावपि अङ्गुल्यवष्टम्भतिमिरादिभिर्नयनतेजो-

which (really) exists in another direction is cognized⁵⁴
and apart from the limiting adjuncts (which divide the
directions) no (distinct) substance as direction (dik) is
admitted (in our system).⁵⁵

31. In the case of the firebrand swung round
rapidly, owing to the non-apprehension of the intervals⁵⁶
by virtue of the rapidity of the movement, that object
itself which is in conjunction with (all) points of the
space (i.e. circle) is cognized in the form of a (fiery)
wheel. This cognition is also real.

32. The cognition of one's own face in mirrors
etc.⁵⁷ is likewise true. (What happens is) that when
the motion of the visual rays (issuing from the eye to-
wards the mirror) is reversed by the mirror, those rays
cognize the person's own face after the perception of
the mirror; and even in this case, owing to the non-
apprehension of any interval (between the mirror-
perception and face-perception) by virtue of the rapidity
(of the process), the face is perceived as if in the mirror.

33. In the case of the apprehension of a double
moon (what happens is this): Owing to pressure of the

गतिभेदेन सामग्रीभेदात् सामग्रीद्वयमन्योन्यनिरपेक्षं चन्द्रद्वयग्रहणे हेतुर्भवति ।
सामग्रीद्वयं पारमार्थिकं, तेन द्विचन्द्रज्ञानं भवति ।

३४. अतः सर्वं ज्ञानं सत्यं सविशेषविषयं च । निर्विशेष-
वस्तुनोऽग्रहणात् ।

३५. एवंभूतं प्रत्यक्षं भेदविशिष्टमेव प्रथमतो गृह्णाति । भेद
इति व्यवहारे तु प्रतियोग्यपेक्षा न स्वरूपे । तेन अनवस्थान्योन्याश्रय-
दोषोऽपि नास्ति । उपर्युपर्यपेक्षाऽनवस्था । परस्परापेक्षोऽन्योन्याश्रयः ।

finger on the eye, or by some disease of the eye called timira etc., the visual rays are divided; (and consequently), there originates difference in the apparatus of the vision (sāmagri); (then) the mutually independent double apparatus of the vision becomes the cause for the cognition of the double moon.⁵⁸ The doubling of the apparatus of vision being true, by it the double apprehension of the moon takes place.

34. Hence all apprehensions are likewise true, having for their contents objects affected with difference, because a non-differenced object is never apprehended.⁵⁹

35. Then, perception which is of the aforesaid nature at first apprehends difference alone. Difference in its experience (or expression) as such requires a counter-entity, but never in its essential nature.⁶⁰ Hence the faults of *regressus in infinitum* and logical seesaw are absent.⁶¹ *Regressus in infinitum* is begging the question. Logical seesaw is mutual dependence.

३६. ननु 'दशमस्त्वमसि' इत्येतदपि प्रत्यक्षं किं न स्यात्? इति चेत्, न। 'त्वम्' इत्येतस्य प्रत्यक्षत्वेऽपि 'दशमोऽहम्' इत्यस्य वाक्यजन्यत्वात्। यदि 'दशमोऽहम्' इत्यस्य प्रत्यक्षविषयत्वं तर्हि 'धर्मवोस्त्वमसि' इत्येतस्यापि प्रत्यक्षत्वं स्यात्। अङ्गीकारे अतिप्रसङ्गात्। अत एव 'तत्त्वमसि' इति वाक्यस्य नापरोक्षज्ञानजनकत्वम्।

३७. एतेन प्रत्यक्षप्रमाकरणं प्रमाणम्। प्रमा च आत्मचैतन्यमेव। चैतन्यं च त्रिविधम्—अन्तःकरणावच्छिन्नचैतन्यम्, अन्तःकरणवृत्त्यवच्छिन्नचैतन्यं, विषयावच्छिन्नचैतन्यं चेति। यदा त्रयाणामैक्यं तदा

36. 'Now, why should not the apprehension derived from "Thou art the tenth" be treated as perception?'⁶² If this be asked, the reply is no; for, though 'thou' is a perceptual cognition, 'the tenth I am' is sentence-generated cognition. If it be insisted that 'Thou art the tenth' must be treated as an object of perceptual cognition, then (by the same logic) 'Thou art meritorious' also must come under perception.⁶³ If that be admitted, then it will be an extra-ordinary stretch of a rule! Hence knowledge generated from such a sentence as 'Thou art That' is not immediate.

37. By what has been said, the (following) distorted views are hereby refuted:⁶⁴ 'Pramāṇa is that which is the instrument of valid perceptual knowledge; (that) valid knowledge is but consciousness. Consciousness is of three kinds: consciousness limited by the internal organ, consciousness limited by the activity (vṛtti) of the internal organ, and consciousness limited by the content. When all the three kinds of

साक्षात्कारः । सोऽपि निर्विशेषविषय एव अभेदमेव गृह्णातीत्यादिकुदृष्टि-
कल्पना निरस्ता ।

३८. निर्विकल्पकं तु नामजात्यादियोजनाहीनं वस्तुमात्रावगाहि
किञ्चिदिदमित्यादिनैयायिकमतमपि निरस्तम् ।

३९. ननु 'काणादं पाणिनीयं च सर्वशास्त्रोपकारकम्'
इत्युक्तत्वात् कथं गौतममतनिरासः ? इति चेत्, उच्यते । नास्माभिः
कास्त्वर्येनास्य मतस्य निरासः क्रियते । यावदिह युक्तियुक्तं तावत्
स्वीक्रियते । परकल्पिततटाकोपजीवनवत् । न खलु तटाकस्थः पङ्कोऽपि
स्वीक्रियते ।

consciousness become one, then there is immediate apprehension; and that (sākṣātkāra) has for its object that which is devoid of any difference; it comprehends difference only'.

38. The Naiyāyika view⁶⁵ that the non-determinate cognition is the apprehension of the mere object divested of all (qualifications) such as genus etc. is also refuted.

39. 'Now, how is the school of Gautama⁶⁶ refuted? For, it has been said "that the schools of Kaṇāda⁶⁷ and Pāṇini⁶⁸ are helpful (to the understanding of) every branch of knowledge".' If this be said, it is replied: that school is not refuted by us *in toto*. Whatever is amenable to reason that is accepted by us, like the subsistence derived from the tank built by others, but not the mire in it.

४०. अतः परमाणुकारणत्ववेदपौरुषेयत्वेश्वरानुमानिकत्वजीव-
विभुत्वानि, सामान्यसमवायविशेषाणां पदार्थत्वेन स्वीकारः, उपमानादेः
पृथक् प्रमाणत्वकल्पनं, संख्यापरिमाणपृथक्त्वपरत्वापरत्वगुरुत्वद्रवत्वादीनां
पृथक् गुणत्वकल्पनं, दिशोऽपि द्रव्यत्वकल्पनमित्यादिसूत्रकारादिविरुद्धा
प्रक्रिया नास्माभिः स्वीक्रियते इति न विरोधः ।

इति श्रीवाधूलकुलतिलकश्रीमन्महाचार्यस्य प्रथमदासेन श्रीनिवास-
दासेन विरचितायां यतीन्द्रमतदीपिकायां प्रत्यक्षनिरूपणं
नाम प्रथमोऽवतारः ॥

40. Hence there is no contradiction in our reject-
ing the (following) views which are against the opinion
of the Sūtrakāra and others: the causation (of the uni-
verse) by atoms⁶⁹; the personal origin of the Vedas⁷⁰;
proving (the existence of) Īśvara by inference⁷¹; the
pervasiveness of the individual self⁷²; acceptance of
generality, inherence and particularity as categories⁷³;
to regard 'comparison' as a separate pramāṇa⁷⁴; to
consider number, size, separateness, remoteness, proxi-
mity, weight, fluidity, etc. as separate attributes⁷⁵; to
regard 'direction' as a separate substance etc.

Here ends the first 'avatāra' on pratyakṣa of Yatīndramatadīpikā
composed by Śrīnivāsadāsa, the foremost disciple of Śrīman
Mahācārya, an ornament in the line of Śrī Vādhūlas

द्वितीयोऽवतारः

अनुमानम्

१. अथानुमानं निरूप्यते । व्याप्यस्य व्याप्यत्वानुसन्धानात् व्यापकविशेषप्रमितिर्नुमितिः । तत्करणमनुमानम् । व्याप्यस्य धूमस्य अग्निव्याप्यत्वानुसन्धानात् व्यापकविशेषप्रमितिर्वहिप्रमितिः ।

२. अनधिकदेशकालनियतं व्याप्यम् । अन्यूनदेशकालवर्ति

AVATĀRA II

ANUMĀNA

1. Now inference is explained. Inferential cognition is that which is the valid knowledge of the particular 'pervader' (vyāpaka), obtained from the observation of the pervadedness of the 'pervaded' (vyāpya).¹ Inference is the instrument of that (*i.e.*, the inferential cognition). Inferential cognition of fire is that which is the valid knowledge of the particular pervader (fire) obtained from the observation of the fact of smoke being invariably pervaded by fire.

2. The pervaded is that which is, as a rule, not more extensive (than the vyāpaka) in respect of space and time. The pervader is that which is not less

व्यापकम् । तदिदमविनाभूतं व्याप्यम्; तत्प्रतिसम्बन्धि व्यापकमिति ।

३. तेन निरुपाधिकतया नियतसम्बन्धो व्याप्तिरित्युच्यते ।
सेयं 'यत्रधूमस्तत्र वह्निः' इति । व्याप्तिर्भूयोदर्शनात् गृह्यते ।

४. व्याप्तिर्द्विविधा—अन्वयव्यतिरेकमेदात् । साधनविधौ सा-
ध्यविधिरूपेण प्रवृत्ता व्याप्तिरन्वयव्याप्तिः । यथा—'यो यो धूमवान् स
सोऽग्निमान्' इति । साध्यनिषेधे साधननिषेधरूपेण प्रवृत्ता व्याप्तिर्व्यति-
रेकव्याप्तिः । यथा—'योऽग्निः स निर्धूम' इति ।

extensive (than the vyāpya) in respect of space and time. This pervaded has invariable relation (with the pervader); (and) the pervader is the correlate of that (i.e., the pervaded).

3. Therefore it is said that pervasion is the invariable relation (between the pervaded and the pervader) not based on any adventitious condition.² This pervasion in the form, 'wherever there is smoke, there is fire', is perceived after repeated observation.³

4. Pervasion is of two kinds, because of the difference as the affirmative (concomitance) and the negative (concomitance). When, by the affirmation of the *probans*, the *probandum* is determined, that pervasion is called the affirmative pervasion; for instance, 'whatever has smoke, has fire'. When, by the negation of the *probandum*, the negation of the *probans* is determined, that pervasion is called the negative pervasion; for instance, 'whatever has no fire, has no smoke'.

५. सेयमुभयविधा व्याप्तिरुपाधिसम्भवे दुष्यति । साध्यव्यापकत्वे सति साधनाव्यापकत्वम् उपाधिः । यथा वह्निना धूमे साध्यमाने आर्देन्धनसम्बन्ध उपाधिः । मैत्रीतनयत्वेन श्यामत्वे साध्यमाने शाकपाक-जत्वमुपाधिः ।

६. स चोपाधिर्द्विविधः—निश्चितः शङ्कितश्चेति । निश्चितो यथा—‘विप्रतिपन्ना सेवा दुःखहेतुः, सेवात्वात्, राजसेवावत्’ इत्यत्र पापारब्धत्वमुपाधिः । अयन्तु ईश्वरसेवायां नास्तीति निश्चयादयं निश्चितोपाधिः । शङ्कितो यथा—‘विप्रतिपन्नो जीव एतच्छरीरावसाने मुक्तिमान्, निष्पन्नसमाधित्वात्, शुकादिवत्’ इत्यत्र कर्मात्यन्तपरिक्षय उपाधिः । स च

5. When upādhi (adventitious condition) intervenes, both the kinds of pervasion become vitiated. Upādhi is that which is invariably pervasive of the *probandum* and non-pervasive of the *probans*. For instance, where smoke is to be inferred by fire, the upādhi is contact with wet fuel.⁴ (Or), where, by being the son of Maitrī, brownness is to be inferred, the upādhi is having been born of a substance of the particular digested green vegetables.

6. Upādhi is of two kinds : the determined and the doubted. The determined is (as follows) ; ‘service (of Īśvara), it is disputed, is the cause of sorrow, because it is servile, like the service to a king.’ Here the upādhi is the effectuation of sin.⁵ But since it is established that this does not exist in the service of Īśvara, this upādhi is called the determined. The doubted is as follows : ‘The individual self, it is disputed, after giving up the body becomes free, because the samādhi is perfect, like that

निष्पन्नसमाधौ विप्रतिपन्ने जीवे, अस्ति नास्तीति सन्दिग्धत्वात् शङ्कितोपाधिः । अतो निरुपाधिकसम्बन्धवत् व्याप्यमिति सिद्धम् ।

७. व्याप्यं साधनं लिङ्गम् इति नार्थान्तरम् ।

८. तस्य द्वे रूपे अनुमित्यङ्गभूते—व्याप्तिः पक्षधर्मता चेति । पञ्चरूपाण्यपि सन्ति । तानि च पक्षसत्त्वं सपक्षसत्त्वं विपक्षात् व्यावृत्तिः अबाधितविषयत्वम् असत्प्रतिपक्षत्वं चेति ।

९. सिंसाधयिषितधर्मविशिष्टो धर्मी पक्षः । यथा अग्निमत्वादिसाधने पर्वतादिः ।

of 'Sūka'. Here the upādhi is absolute destruction of karma. Since it is doubtful whether such condition exists or not in the individual self, the subject of dispute, whose meditation has become perfect, this upādhi is called the doubted. Hence it is established that the *probans* is present where there is unconditional relation.

7. Vyāpya, sādhana and liṅga are not of different meaning.⁶

8. It (vyāpya) has two forms—pervasion and subject-characterization,⁷ which are the two limbs of inferential cognition. It has also five forms (or conditions). There are the presence in the subject (pakṣasattva), the presence in the similar instance (sapakṣasattva), the absence (of the *probans*) in the counter-instance (vipakṣād vyāvṛtti), unstultified object (abādhitaviṣayatva) and absence of the opposite *probans* (asatpratipakṣatva).

9. Pakṣa (subject) is that substrate⁸ which is qualified by the attribute desired to be inferred; as mountain etc. in which fire is to be inferred.⁹

१०. सिसाधयिषितसजातीयधर्मवान् सपक्षः । यथा महान-
सादिः ।

११. साध्यतज्जातीयशून्यो विपक्षः । यथा महाहृदः ।

१२. प्रबलेन प्रमाणेन पक्षे निश्चितसाध्याभाववत्त्वं बाधितवि-
षयत्वम् । यथा—‘महाहृदोऽग्निमान्’ इत्यादि । तदभावस्तु अबाधित-
विषयत्वम् ।

१३. समबलतया प्रतीयमानप्रमाणोपरोधाभावोऽसत्प्रतिपक्षत्वम् ।

१४. एवंभूतं व्याप्यं द्विविधम्—अन्वयव्यतिरेकिकेवलान्वयि-
भेदात् ।

10. Sapakṣa (similar instance) is that which possesses similar attributes (of the *probandum*) which is desired to be inferred ; as hearth etc. (in which the concomitance of fire and smoke is observed).¹⁰

11. Vipakṣa (counter-instance) is that which is devoid of the *probandum* as well as anything similar to that ; as lake etc.¹¹

12. Bādhitaviṣayatva (stultified object) is the non-existence of the *probandum*, which is established in the subject by strong evidence ; as, ‘the lake has fire’ etc.¹² Non-existence of that is ‘unstultified object’.

13. Asatpratipakṣatva is the non-existence of an obstruction by an equally powerful evidence.¹³

14. The *probans* of such description is twofold, because of the difference as anvaya-vyatirekin (the affirmative *cum* the negative) and kevalānvayin (bare co-affirmation).

१५. पूर्वोक्तपञ्चरूपोपपन्नं व्याप्यं अन्वयव्यतिरेकि । यथा—
'पर्वतोऽग्निमान् धूमवत्त्वात्; यो यो धूमवान् स सोऽग्निमान्, यथा
महानसः' । 'योऽग्निः स निर्धूमः, यथा महाहृद्' इति ।

१६. तादृशमेव विपक्षरहितं व्याप्यं केवलान्वयि । यथा—
'ब्रह्म शब्दवाच्यं, वस्तुत्वात्, घटवत्' । विपक्षाभावात् केवलान्वयि
चतुरूपोपपन्नम् ।

१७. केवलव्यतिरेकिणि साध्याप्रसिद्धेस्तद्व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिर्दुर्ग्राहा ।
अतः केवलव्यतिरेकिनिरासः ।

१८. केवलान्वयिनि अन्वयव्यतिरेकिणि च अत्यन्तातीन्द्रियार्थ-
गोचरता निरस्ता ।

15. The aforesaid five-formed *probans* is of the nature of anvaya-vyatirekin : as, 'the mountain has fire, because it has smoke ; whatever has smoke has fire, as a hearth ; whatever has no fire has no smoke, like a lake'.¹⁴

16. The same *probans* without counter-instance is bare anvayin : as, 'Brahman is expressible by word, because it is a thing like a jar'.¹⁵ The bare anvayin has four forms (only), because of the non-existence of the counter-instance.

17. As the *probandum* is not known in kevala-vyatirekin (bare co-negation) the pervasion of co-negation is hard to understand.¹⁶ Therefore the bare negative (*probans*) is rejected.¹⁷

18. The (inferential) cognition of objects which are absolutely beyond the senses in bare anvayin or anvaya-vyatirekin is (hereby) refuted.

१९. तदेतदनुमानं स्वार्थं परार्थं चेति द्विधा विभज्य केचिदाहुः ।

२०. सर्वेषामनुमानानां स्वप्रतिसंधानादिवलेन प्रवृत्ततया स्वव्यवहारमात्रहेतुत्वमिति स्वार्थानुमानमेव इत्यपरे ।

२१. तदनुमानबोधकवाक्यं प्रतिज्ञाहेतूदाहरणोपनयनिगमनरूप-
पञ्चावयवसंयुक्तम् ।

२२. तत्र पक्षवचनं प्रतिज्ञा । यथा—‘पर्वतोऽग्निमान्’ इति ।

२३. लिङ्गस्य वचनं हेतुः । यथा—‘धूमवत्त्वात्’ इति ।

२४. व्याप्तिनिर्देशपूर्वकं दृष्टान्तवचनमुदाहरणम् । तत् द्विधा—
अन्वयव्यतिरेकभेदात् । यथा—‘यो यो धूमवान् स सोऽग्निमान्, यथा

19. Dividing this inference, some say it is of two kinds : that for oneself¹⁸ and that for another.¹⁹

20. Others say that inference is for oneself alone ; for all inferences, owing to their origin by virtue of self-comprehension, become the cause for one's experience alone.

21. The syllogism which apprises that inference is made up of five members such as pratijñā, hetu, udāharāṇa, upanaya and nigamana.

22. Of these, pratijñā (thesis) is the statement which predicates the subject : as, ‘This mountain has fire’.

23. Hetu (reason) is the statement of the *probans* : as, ‘Because it has smoke’.

24. Udāharāṇa (typical instance) is the statement of example after the pervasion is pointed out. This is twofold, because of the difference as the affirmative and the negative : as, ‘Whatever has smoke has fire, as a

महानस' इत्यन्वयोदाहरणम् । 'योऽनग्निः स निर्धूमः, यथा महाद्वाद' इति व्यतिरेकोदाहरणम् ।

२५. दृष्टान्तनिदर्शनेन व्याप्ततया पक्षे हेतूपसंहारवाक्यमुपनयः । सोऽपि द्विविधः—अन्वयव्यतिरेकभेदात् । 'तथा धूमवान्' इति अन्वयोपनयः । 'अयं च न तथा निर्धूम' इति व्यतिरेकोपनयः ।

२६. हेतुपूर्वकं पक्षे साध्योपसंहारवाक्यं निगमनम् । अयमपि द्विविधस्तथैव । यथा—'तस्मादग्निमान्' इति अन्वयेन निगमनम् । 'तस्मादयं निरग्निर्न भवति' इति व्यतिरेकेण ।

२७. एवं पञ्चावयववादिनो नैयायिकाः ।

hearth', is an affirmative example; 'Whatever has no fire has no smoke, like a lake', is a negative example.

25. Upanaya (application) is the concluding statement of the concomitant *probans* in the subject by pointing out the example. This is also twofold, because of the difference as the affirmative and the negative: 'And so this has smoke' is the application of an affirmative type; 'And so this is not without smoke' is the application of a negative type.

26. Nigamana (conclusion) is the concluding statement of the *probandum* in the subject by means of the *probans*. Even this is twofold: as, 'Therefore this (mountain) has fire' is the conclusion of an affirmative type; 'Therefore this (mountain) is not devoid of fire' is the conclusion of a negative type.

27. Thus the Naiyāyikas are the upholders of the five-membered syllogism,

२८. प्रतिज्ञाहेतूदाहरणरूपत्रयवयववादिनो मीमांसकाः ।

२९. उदाहरणोपनयरूपावयवद्वयवादिनः सौगताः ।

३०. अस्माकं त्वनियमः । कचित् पञ्चावयवः कचित्त्रयवयवः कचित् द्वयवयवः । उदाहरणोपनयाभ्यामेव व्याप्तिपक्षधर्मतयोः सिद्धत्वात् । तावतैव अनुमित्युपपत्तेश्च । मृदुमध्यमकठोरधियां विस्तरसंग्रहाभ्यां व्यवहार उपपद्यते इत्यनियम एव । एवं पञ्चावयवसंयुक्तः सद्देतुरेव बह्वचनुमापकः । सद्देतुरित्युक्तत्वात् धूमसदृशधूलीपटलान्न बह्वचनुमितिः ।

28. The Mīmāṃsakas are the expounders of the three-membered syllogism which is of the nature of *pratijñā*, *hetu* and *udāharaṇa*.²⁰

29. The Saugatas²¹ are the expounders of the bi-membered syllogism which is of the nature of *udāharaṇa* and *upanaya*.

30. But for us there is no fixing the number. In certain cases there may be five members, in others three members and in others again two members; since by *udāharaṇa* and *upanaya* only pervasion and subject-characterization are established, the inference is accomplished by these (two) only.²² Since by expansion and reduction (of members) the usages of weak, mediocre and sharp minds are accomplished, there is no fixing the rule. In this manner, right *probans* accompanied by the five members causes the inference of fire. From the expression 'right *probans*' (it follows that) inference of fire is not possible from a mass of dust resembling smoke.

३१. अन्ये हेतुवद्भासमाना हेत्वाभासाः । ते च असिद्धविरुद्धा-
नैकान्तिकप्रकरणसमकालात्ययापदिष्टभेदेन पञ्चप्रकाराः ।

३२. तत्र असिद्धस्त्रिविधः—स्वरूपासिद्ध आश्रयासिद्धो व्या-
प्यत्वासिद्धश्चेति ।

३३. स्वरूपासिद्धो यथा—‘अनित्यो जीवः, चाक्षुषत्वात्,
घटवत्’ इति ।

३४. आश्रयासिद्धस्तु—‘व्योमारविन्दं सुरभि, अरविन्दत्वात्,
सरोजारविन्दवत्’ इति । व्योमारविन्दमाश्रयः । स चासिद्धः ।

31. Some say the fallacious reasons (literally, appearance as *probans*) are those which appear like reason (while they are not). They are divided into five kinds, as asiddha (unestablished), viruddha (adverse), anaikāntika (inconsistent),²³ prakaraṇasama (equal explanation)²⁴ and kālātyayāpadiṣṭa (vitiated by time).²⁵

32. Of these, the asiddha is of three kinds : svarūpāsiddha (unestablished regarding itself), āśrayā-siddha (unestablished regarding its locus) and vyāpyatvā-siddha (unestablished regarding its pervasion).

33. Svarūpāsiddha is as follows:—‘The individual self is eternal, because it is visible, like a jar’.²⁶

34. Āśrayāsiddha is as follows:—‘Sky-lotus is fragrant, because it is a lotus, like the lotus grown in a pond’. Sky-lotus is the locus, and it is never established (*i.e.*, it never exists).²⁷

३५. व्याप्यत्वासिद्धो द्विविधः—एको व्याप्तिग्राहकप्रमाणाभावात्, अपरस्तु उपाधिसद्भावात् । आद्यो यथा—‘यत् सत् तत् क्षणिकम्’ इति । क्षणिकत्वसत्त्वयोः व्याप्तिग्राहकप्रमाणासिद्धेः । द्वितीयो यथा—‘अग्नीषोमीया हिंसा अधर्मसाधिका, हिंसात्वात्, क्रतुबाह्यहिंसावत्’ इत्यत्र निषिद्धत्वमुपाधिः । अतो हिंसात्वहेतुः सोपाधिकः ।

३६. साध्यविपरीतव्याप्तो हेतुर्विरुद्धः । तद्यथा—‘नित्या प्रकृतिः, कृतकत्वात्, कालवत्’ । कृतकत्वहेतुः साध्याभावव्याप्तः ।

35. The *vyāpyatvāsiddha* is twofold—the first one is due to the absence of the evidence which enables one to grasp the pervasion and the other is due to the presence of an adventitious condition (in the *probandum*). The former one is as follows:—‘Whatever is existent is momentary’. Here the evidence that enables one to grasp the pervasion between ‘existence’ and ‘momentariness’ is unestablished.²⁸ The latter is as follows:—‘The slaying involved in *agnīṣomīya* sacrifice engenders demerit, because it is of the nature of slaying, like slaying which is outside the pale of *kratu*’.²⁹ Here the prohibition (of killing animals) is the adventitious condition. Therefore the *probans* which is of the nature of ‘slaying’ is conditioned.

36. *Viruddha* is that reason which is pervaded by the contrary (*i.e.*, non-existence) of the *probandum*: as, ‘matter is eternal, because it is produced, like time’. Here the reason ‘producibility’ is pervaded by the non-existence of the *probandum*.³⁰

३७. सव्यभिचारोऽनैकान्तिकः । स च द्विविधः—साधारणो-
ऽसाधारणश्चेति ।

३८. पक्षसपक्षविपक्षवृत्तिः साधारणः । यथा—‘शब्दो नित्यः,
प्रमेयत्वात्, कालवत्’ । असाधारणस्तु विपक्षसपक्षव्यावृत्तः । यथा—
‘भूमिर्नित्या, गन्धवत्त्वात्’ इति ।

३९. प्रकरणसमस्तु साध्यविपरीतसाधकहेत्वन्तरवान् । यथा—
‘ईश्वरोऽनित्यः, नित्यधर्मरहितत्वात्’ । ‘ईश्वरो नित्यः, अनित्यधर्मरहित-
त्वात्’ इति । अयमेव सत्प्रतिपक्षः ।

४०. कालात्ययापदिष्टो यथा—यस्य हेतोः साध्याभाववान्

37. Anaikāntika is also known as savyabhicāra. It is of two kinds:³¹ sādharmaṇa (common fallacy) and asādharmaṇa (uncommon fallacy).

38. Sādharmaṇa is that which is present in the subject, similar instance and counter-instance: as, ‘Sound is eternal, because it is knowable, like time’.³² Asādharmaṇa is that which is not present in the similar instance and the counter-instance; as, ‘Earth is eternal, because it has smell’.³³

39. Prakaraṇasama is that which admits a different (i.e., counter) reason that proves the contrary (i.e., non-existence) of the *probandum*: as, ‘Īśvara is non-eternal, because he is devoid of eternal attributes’ (and the counter reason is) ‘Īśvara is eternal, because he is devoid of non-eternal attributes’.³⁴ This itself is (called) satpratipakṣa.

40. Kālātyayāpadiṣṭa is as follows: Kālātyayāpadiṣṭa is that reason which is present in the subject

पक्षः स कालात्ययापदिष्टः । यथा—‘अग्निरनुष्णः, पदार्थत्वात्, जलवत्’ ।
अयं च प्रत्यक्षेण उष्णत्वावधारणात् बाधितः ।

४१. एवमनुमाने निरूपिते उपमानादेरनुमानादावन्तर्भावः ।
यथा अतिदेशवाक्यार्थस्मरणसहकृतगोसादृश्यविशिष्टपिण्डज्ञानम् उपमानम् ।
गवयमजानन्नपि ‘यथा गौः तथा गवयः’ इति कुतश्चिदारण्यकवाक्यात् श्रुत्वा
वनं गतो वाक्यार्थं स्मरन् यदा गोसादृश्यविशिष्टपिण्डं पश्यति तदा
तद्वाक्यार्थस्मरणसहकृतसदृशपिण्डज्ञानं जायते । तदुपमानमित्युच्यते ।

in which there is the non-existence of the *probandum*:
as, ‘Fire is not hot, because it is a substance, like
water’. As the hotness (of fire) is determined by
(tactual) perception, the *probans* is stultified.

41. Having thus explained inference, comparison
(*upamāna*) and others are included under inference etc.
For instance, *upamāna* is the knowledge of a figure
qualified by cow-similarity which is accompanied by
the recollection of the meaning of an assimilative³⁵
statement (*atides'avākya*). A person, though ignorant
of the meaning of the word ‘gavaya’,³⁶ hears from a
forester that gavaya is similar to a cow ; he goes to a
forest and remembers the meaning conveyed by the
assimilative statement. When he sees the figure
qualified by cow-similarity, then there arises in him
the knowledge of the figure qualified by cow-similarity,
accompanied by the recollection of the meaning of the
assimilative statement (heard before). That (knowledge)
is said to be *upamāna*. *Upamāna* is included under

स्मरणरूपत्वात् तस्य प्रत्यक्षेऽन्तर्भावः । व्याप्तिग्रहणापेक्षत्वादनुमाने अन्तर्भावः । वाक्यजन्यत्वात् शब्दे वा अन्तर्भाव ऊह्यः ।

४२. अर्थापत्तिर्नाम दिवा अभुञ्जानस्य पुरुषस्य पीनत्वदर्शनात् रात्रौ भोजनं कल्प्यते । एतस्या अनुमाने अन्तर्भावः ।

४३. तर्को नाम व्याप्याङ्गीकारेण व्यापकप्रसङ्गनम् । तद्यथा — 'पर्वतो वह्निमान्, धूमवत्त्वात्' इत्यनुमाने, 'धूमोऽस्तु वह्निर्मास्तु' इत्युक्ते, 'यदि वह्निर्न स्यात् तर्हि धूमोऽपि न स्यात्' इति ; एतस्य प्रमाणानुग्राहकत्वम् ।

perception, since it is of the nature of recollection. It is brought under inference, as it requires (or depends upon) the cognition of pervasion. And it is included under verbal testimony (also), since it is sentence-generated.³⁷

42. It is called *arthāpatti* when postulation of eating at night is made, because fatness is seen in a person who does not eat by day.³⁸ This (also) is included under inference.

43. What is called *tarka* (*reductio ad absurdum*) is the acceptance of the pervader (*vyāpaka*) by the hypothetical admission of the pervaded (*vyāpya*). For instance, in the inference 'The mountain has fire, because, it has smoke', if someone says, 'Let there be smoke but no fire', (the refutation would be), 'If there were no fire, there would be no smoke also'. Thus *tarka* is an aid to *pramāṇa*.

४४. तर्कानुगृहीतप्रमाणपूर्वकत्वावधारणं निश्चयः ।
 ४५. वीतरागकथा वादः ।
 ४६. पक्षद्वयसाधनवती विजिगीषुकथा जरूपः ।
 ४७. स्वपक्षस्थापनहीना तु वितण्डा ।
 ४८. अविवक्षितशब्दार्थारोपेण दूषणं छलम् ।
 ४९. स्वव्यापि दूषणं जातिः । असदुत्तरं जातिरिति वा ।
 ५०. पराजयहेतुर्निग्रहस्थानम् । इत्येषामनुमानाङ्गत्वादनुमाने
 अन्तर्भावः ।

44. Nis'caya (ascertainment) is the determination (of truth) by means of pramāṇa aided by tarka.

45. Vāda (discussion) is debate between two parties without any prejudice.

46. Jalpa (wrangling) is that discussion which establishes the position of both the sides of those who are desirous of gaining victory.

47. Vitanḍā (cavil) consists (in opposition to the other side) without establishing one's own position (in the argument).

48. Chala (quibble) consists in attacks (on the opposite side) by attributing unintended meaning to the word.³⁹

49. Jāti⁴⁰ (futility) consists (in pointing out) a defect which pervades one's own position; or wrong reply is called jāti.

50. Nigrahassthāna (ground of defeat) is the cause of one's defeat. All these, being the limbs of inference, are included under anumāna.

५१. कचित् कचित् नैयायिकमतानुसारेण उक्तमिति न विरोधः ।
इत्यनुमानं निरूपितम् ।

इति श्रीवाधूलकुलतिलकश्रीमन्महाचार्यस्य प्रथमदासेन श्रीनिवास-
दासेन विरचितायां यतीन्द्रमतदीपिकायां अनुमाननिरूपणं
नाम द्वितीयोऽवतारः ॥

51. There is no contradiction in interpreting here and there according to the school of Naiyāyikas. Thus inference has been explained.

Here ends the second 'avatāra' on anumāna of Yaśīndramatadīpikā composed by Śrīnivāsadaśa, the foremost disciple of Śrīman Mahācārya, an ornament in the line of Śrī Vādhūlās

तृतीयोऽवतारः

शब्दः

१. अनुमाननिरूपणानन्तरं शब्दो निरूप्यते । अनाप्तानुक्त-
वाक्यजनिततदर्थविज्ञानं शब्दज्ञानम् । तत्करणं शब्दप्रमाणम् । 'अनाप्ता-
नुक्त' इत्युक्तत्वात् वेदस्य पौरुषेयत्वमतनिरासः । करणदोषबाधकप्रत्यया-
भाववत् वाक्यं वा ।

AVATĀRA III

S'ABDA

1. After the exposition of inference, s'abda¹ (verbal testimony) is explained. Verbal cognition is the knowledge of the meaning, derived from the sentence, unuttered by non-trustworthy person. The s'abda-pramāṇa is the instrument of that (i.e., verbal cognition). 'Unuttered by non-trustworthy person' has been said to refute the doctrine of the personal origin of the Veda. Or that sentence is (s'abda-pramāṇa) which is devoid of the errors of instrument² (karaṇa) and sublating cognition.

२. सर्गादौ भगवान् चतुर्मुखाय पूर्वपूर्वक्रमविशिष्टान् वेदान् स्मृत्वा स्मृत्वा उपदिशतीत्युक्त्या वेदस्य नित्यत्वमपौरुषेयत्वं च सिद्धमिति करणदोषाभावो बाधकप्रत्ययाभावश्च ।

३. ननु वेदवाक्यानां मीमांसकैः कार्यपरतयैव प्रामाण्यस्वीकारात् सिद्धब्रह्मपरवाक्यानां व्युत्पत्त्यसंभवाच्च कथं प्रामाण्यम्? इति चेत्, न । सिद्धब्रह्मपरवाक्यानामपि उपासनान्वयस्वीकारात् । 'पिता ते सुखमास्ते' इति लौकिकसिद्धपरवाक्यस्यापि बोधकत्वदर्शनात् बालानां लोके मातापितृ-

2. In the beginning of (every) creation, Bhagavān, remembering the Vedas in the same order as they had been before, teaches them to Caturmukha³; since it has been said so (in the scriptures), eternality and impersonal origin of the Veda are established; therefore they are devoid of errors of instrument and sublating cognition.

3. 'Now, how can there be authoritativeness for the vedic texts inasmuch as the Mīmāṃsakas maintain that they denote what ought to be accomplished, and since it is not possible to know the meaning of those texts which denote Brahman, which is already existent?'⁴ If this be questioned, no. (For) even the texts, which denote Brahman, an existent entity, are admitted to have meditation for their purport.⁵ Expressive power is also seen in sentences denotative of existent facts such as 'Your father is doing well'.⁶ In our ordinary experience it is seen that when children are taught gradually and repeatedly by their mother,

प्रभृतिभिः अम्वातातमातुलचन्द्रादिषु अङ्गुल्या निर्दिश्य तदभिधायक-
शब्दान् प्रयुञ्जानैः क्रमेण भूयः शिक्षितानां तत्तदर्थबुद्ध्युत्पत्तिदर्शनात्
वेदेऽपि परिनिष्पन्नेऽप्यर्थे शब्दस्य बोधकत्वं सम्भवतीति न अप्रामाण्यशङ्काव-
काशः ।

४. तर्हि अभिचारादिप्रतिपादकवेदांशस्य कथं प्रामाण्यम् इति
न शङ्कनीयम् । तस्य दृष्टफलदर्शनेन अदृष्टस्वर्गादिफलसाधनादौ प्रवृत्ति-
प्रयोजकत्वात् ।

५. यूपादित्यवाक्यं तु आदित्यवद्यूपप्रकाशनपरम् । अतः
कृत्स्नस्य वेदस्य प्रामाण्यम् ।

father, etc., by pointing out with the finger at the (children's) mother, father, uncle, moon, etc., and using words which denote them, ideas rise in their minds that such and such words denote such and such things;⁷ similarly in the case of the Veda also there is the possibility of words' conveying the knowledge even in respect of existent entities. Hence there is no room for doubting the authoritativeness (of the Veda).

4. Nor should it be doubted that how that portion of the Veda which treats of abhicāra⁸ etc. can be authoritative; because its final end is, by demonstrating the visible results, to create volitional desire for conducting activities which bring about invisible fruits such as heaven etc.

5. The text 'The sacrificial post is the sun' denotes that the sacrificial post is as bright as the sun. Hence the authoritativeness of the Veda *in toto*.

६. स च वेदः कर्मब्रह्मप्रतिपादकपूर्वोत्तरभागाभ्यां द्विधा भिन्नः । आराधनकर्मप्रतिपादकं पूर्वकाण्डम् । आराध्यप्रतिपादकमुत्तरकाण्डम् । उभयोर्मीमांसयोरैकशास्त्र्यम् ।

७. भागद्वयात्मको वेद ऋग्यजुःसामाथर्वणरूपेण चतुर्धावस्थितः । पुनरनन्तप्रकारश्च ।

८. ऋगादिवहुप्रकारवान् वेदो मन्त्रार्थवादविधिरूपेण त्रिविधः ।

९. अनुष्ठेयार्थप्रकाशको मन्त्रः ।

१०. विध्यधीनप्रवृत्त्युत्तम्भकवाक्यविशेषोऽर्थवादः ।

6. The Veda is divisible into two parts, the earlier one treating of 'work' and the latter treating of 'Brahman'. The earlier section is that which treats of 'work' that is worship. The latter section is that which treats of (Brahman) which is the object of worship. Hence both the Mīmāṃsās (uttara and pūrva) constitute a single scriptural authority.⁹

7. The Veda, which embodies in itself the two sections, abides in the fourfold form of ṛk, yajus, sāmān and atharvan.¹⁰ Again it abides in innumerable forms.

8. The Veda, consisting of the manifold forms of ṛk etc., is of three kinds : mantra, arthavāda and vidhi.

9. Mantra indicates the thing to be done or performed.¹¹

10. Arthavāda is that kind of passage which encourages activity due to vidhi,¹²

११. हितानुशासनवाक्यमिह विधिः । स च त्रिविधः—
अपूर्वपरिसंख्यानियमभेदात् । ते पुनर्नित्यनैमित्तिककाम्यादिभेदात् बहुविधाः ।
१२. 'ब्रीहीन् प्रोक्षति' (तै. ब्रा.) इति अपूर्वविधिः ।
१३. मनोमयत्वाद्युपासनविधिर्विशिष्टविधिः ।
१४. 'इमामगृभ्णन्' इति अश्वरशनाविधिः परिसंख्याविधिः ।
१५. गुर्वभिगमनादिविधिनियमविधिः ।
१६. सन्ध्योपासनादिर्नित्यविधिः ।
१७. जातेष्ट्यादिविधिनैमित्तिकविधिः ।

11. Here vidhi is that passage which enjoins what is beneficial (to oneself). It (vidhi) is of three kinds—apūrva, parisāṅkhyā, and niyama. Again they are manifold, because of the difference as nitya, naimittika, Kāmya, etc.

12. Apūrvavidhi is (such as) 'He sprinkles the rice-grains with water'.¹³

13. Viśiṣṭavidhi is the injunction of meditation such as 'manomaya' etc.¹⁴

14. Parisāṅkhyāvidhi is (such as) the injunction relating to the horse-rope: (one takes up the horse-rope with the mantra) 'This rope (the ancients) took up'.¹⁵

15. Niyamavidhi is (such as) the injunction relating to the approach (of the student) to the preceptor.¹⁶

16. Nityavidhi is (such as) the injunction relating to evening and morning meditations etc.

17. Naimittikavidhi is (such as) the injunction relating to post-natal iṣṭi etc.¹⁷

24. Jyotiṣa (astrology and astronomy) is that which fixes up the time for the study of the Veda as well as sacrificial performances prescribed in the Veda.

२५. व्याकरणं तु सुशब्दस्वरादिसमर्थनपरम् ।

२६. एवं साङ्गस्य वेदस्य प्रामाण्यं सिद्धम् ।

२७. अथ श्रुत्यविरुद्धाचारव्यवहारप्रायश्चित्तादिप्रतिपादिका
आप्तप्रणीता स्मृतिः प्रमाणम् ।

२८. हिरण्यगर्भादीनामाप्तत्वेऽपि तेषां गुणत्रयवश्यत्वसम्भवात्
तत्कर्तृकयोगकपिलादिस्मृतीनां मन्वादिस्मृत्यविरुद्धांश एव प्रमाणम् ।
तत्त्वविपर्यासात् विरुद्धांशोऽप्रमाणम् ।

२९. वेदोपबृंहणरूपेतिहासपुराणयोरपि प्रामाण्यं स्वतःसिद्धम् ।

25. Vyākaraṇa (grammar) determines the technique of word-formation, accent, etc.

26. Thus the authoritative nature of the Veda with its limbs is established.

27. Then the smṛti, which is composed by trustworthy persons and which explains conduct, usages, expiation,¹⁹ etc. that are not opposed to śruti, is also a valid means of knowledge.

28. Though Hiranyagarbha²⁰ and others are trustworthy, still owing to the possibility of the presence of the three guṇas in them,²¹ such portion of their productions, namely, *Yoga*, *Kapila*²² and other smṛtis, as does not contradict the smṛtis of *Manu*²³ and others, is alone authoritative. But the portion which contradicts them is not authoritative because of the reversal of truth.

29. The authoritative nature of itihāsa²⁴ and purāṇa²⁵ which possess the character of being supplementary to the Veda, is self-established.²⁶

३०. तत्र भारतरामायणयोः कचित् कचिद्विरोधमानेऽपि तत्त्वांशे वेदान्तवाक्यवदविरोधो ज्ञेयः ।

३१. सर्गादिपञ्चकप्रतिपादकपुराणेष्वपि सात्त्विकराजसतामस-
भेदभिन्नेषु तत्त्वांशे विरोधाभावात् विरुद्धांशोऽप्रमाणम्, अन्यत् सर्वं प्रमा-
णम् । पाशुपताद्यागमा अपि तथैव ।

३२. आगमदिव्यतन्त्रतन्त्रान्तरसिद्धान्तभेदभिन्नस्य श्रीपाञ्चरात्रा-
गमस्य कचिदपि वेदविरोधाभावात् कास्त्वेन प्रामाण्यम् । एवं वैखानसा-
गमस्यापि ।

30. Of these, though *Bhārata*²⁷ and *Rāmāyana*²⁸ appear contradictory in some places, they must be regarded as uncontradictory in their portions dealing with truth like Vedānta passages.

31. Even in purāṇas—divided into three groups as sāttvika, rājasa and tāmasa²⁹—which treat of the five topics of sarga³⁰ etc., since there is no contradiction with regard to portions dealing with truth, the contradictory portion is unauthoritative and everything else is authoritative. It is just so in the case of Pāś'upatāgama etc.³¹

32. Ś'ri Pāñcarātrāgama—divided into groups of siddhāntas such as āgama, divya,³² tantra and tantrāntara—is authoritative *in toto*, since it does not contradict the Veda anywhere.³³ Even so in the case of Vaikhānasāgama.³⁴

३३. धर्मशास्त्राणामपि तथैव । शाण्डिल्यपराशरभारद्वाजवसिष्ठ-
हारीतादयो धर्मशास्त्रप्रणेतारः ।

३४. शिल्पायुर्वेदगान्धर्वभरतादिकमप्युपयुक्तांशे तथैव ।

३५. शिल्पो नाम कर्षणादिगोपुरप्राकारनिर्माणादिप्रतिपादकः ।

३६. आयुर्वेदो वैद्यकम् ।

३७. गान्धर्वो नाम गानादिनिरूपकः ।

३८. भरतागमो नृत्यादिनिरूपकः ।

३९. पुनश्चतुःषष्टिकलारूपेषु शास्त्रेषु तत्त्वोपायपुरुषार्थोपयुक्तानि
प्रमाणानि ।

33. The Dharmas'āstras³⁵ are also likewise. S'āṇ-
ḍilya, Parāś'ara, Bhāradvāja, Vasiṣṭha, Hārīta and
others are the promulgators of the Dharmas'āstras.

34. S'ilpa, Ayurveda, Gāndharva, Bharata and
other sciences are likewise (authoritative) in their use-
ful portions.

35. S'ilpa is that science which explains the
(method) of ploughing, construction of city-gate,
enclosure (or rampart), etc.

36. Āyurveda is the science of medicine.

37. Gāndharva is that which teaches the (techni-
que) of music etc.

38. Bharatāgama is that which propounds the
art of dancing etc.

39. Again among sciences which are of the
nature of sixty-four arts³⁶ whatever is useful (in con-
nection with) truth, means and highest welfare of man,
is authoritative.

४०. बकुलाभरणादिसूरिसूक्तयः कात्स्न्येन प्रमाणतराः ।

४१. श्रीमद्रामानुजाचार्यप्रभृतिभिः प्रणीताः श्रीभाष्यादिप्रबन्धाः प्रमाणतमाः ।

४२. पुरुषस्वातन्त्र्याधीनरचनाविशेषविशिष्टं पौरुषेयम् । एतेन काव्यनाटकालङ्कारादीनामपि लक्षणमुक्तं स्यात् ।

४३. एवम् आकाङ्क्षायोग्यतासन्निधिमल्लौकिकवाक्यान्वयपि प्रमाणानि । यथा—‘नद्यास्तरे पञ्चफलानि सन्ति’ इत्यादीनि ।

४४. एवं वैदिकलौकिकसाधारणं वाक्यं द्विविधं—मुख्यवृत्ति-गौणवृत्तिभेदात् ।

40. The holy sayings of saints like Bakulā-bharaṇa³⁷ and others are wholly more authoritative.

41. The treatises like *Sṛībhāṣya*³⁸ etc. composed by Sṛī Rāmānuja and others are most authoritative.

42. Pauruṣeya (*i.e.*, what originates from a person) is that particular composition which depends on the freedom of the person.³⁹ By this, the definition of kāvya (poetry), nāṭaka (drama), alaṅkāra (rhetoric), etc. has been stated.

43. Thus the secular statements characterized by expectancy, compatibility and proximity are also authoritative:⁴⁰ as, ‘There are five fruits on the river-bank’ etc.

44. In this manner what is common to vedic and secular statements is twofold, because of the difference as primary denotation and secondary denotation.

४५. मुख्यवृत्तिरभिधावृत्तिः । यथा---सिंहशब्दस्य मृगेन्द्रे ।

४६. सा अभिधावृत्तिः योगरूढ्यादिवृत्तिभेदवशात् बहुविधा ।

४७. मुख्यार्थबाधे सति तदासत्त्वेऽर्थे वृत्तिरौपचारिकी । सा द्विविधा—लक्षणागौणीभेदात् । प्रथमा यथा—‘गङ्गायां घोष’ इत्यत्र घोषाधिकरणस्य बाधात् तरे लक्षणा । द्वितीया यथा—‘सिंहो देवदत्त’ इत्यत्र देवदत्ते शौर्यादिगुणयोगः ।

४८. एवं वैदिकलौकिकरूपं सर्वं वाक्यजातं सविशेषविषयकं भेदविषयकं च ।

४९. शरीरवाचकशब्दानां यथा शरीरिणि पर्यवसानम्, एवं

45. Primary denotation is abhidhāvṛtti.⁴¹ For instance, the term ‘lion’ denotes ‘king of the beasts’.

46. Primary denotation (of the words) is manifold, because of difference as yoga,⁴² rūḍhi,⁴³ etc.⁴⁴

47. When the meaning indicated by the primary denotation is stultified, the meaning nearest to it is denoted and that denotation is the secondary one. It is of two kinds, because of the difference as lakṣaṇā and gauṇī. The first one is thus: in the statement ‘A hamlet on Gaṅgā’, since the location of the hamlet (on the Gaṅgā) is annulled, the bank (of the Gaṅgā) is indirectly implied. The second one is thus: in the statement ‘Devadatta is a lion’, Devadatta is ascribed with the attributes of strength etc. (like the lion).

48. Thus the whole aggregate of sentences, vedic as well as secular, has objects affected with difference and duality.⁴⁵

49. The ācāryas propound that just as all words denoting ‘body’ have their final meaning in ‘the

भगवच्छरीरभूतब्रह्मरुद्राग्नीन्द्रादिचिद्वाचकशब्दानां तथा शरीरभूतप्रकृति-
कालाकाशप्राणाद्यचिद्वाचकशब्दानां च शरीरिणि परमात्मनि श्रीनारायणे
पर्यवसानमुपपादयन्त्याचार्याः ।

५०. वेदान्तज्ञानात् व्युत्पत्तिः पूर्यत इत्युक्तम् ।

५१. नारायणस्य सर्वशब्दवाच्यत्वं सर्वशरीरकत्वमित्यादिकं तु
उपरि ईश्वरनिरूपणे प्रतिपादयिष्यामः ।

५२. इति शब्दो निरूपितः ।

इति श्रीवाधूलकुलतिलकश्रीमन्महाचार्यस्य प्रथमदासेन श्रीनिवास-
दासेन विरचितायां यतीन्द्रमतदीपिकायां शब्दनिरूपणं
नाम तृतीयोऽवतारः ॥

owner of the body', so all cit-denoting words such as Brahmā, Rudra, Agni, Indra, etc. who constitute the body of Bhagavān, and also the acit-denoting words such as prakṛti, kāla, ākāśa, prāṇa, etc. which constitute (His) body, have their final meaning in 'the owner of the body', Śrīnārāyaṇa, the Supreme Self.⁴⁶

50. It has been already said that from the knowledge of Vedānta, the import of words become perfect.⁴⁷

51. We shall expound on the *avatāra* on 'Īśvara' that Nārāyaṇa is denoted by all terms, that everything is His body etc.

52. Thus the verbal testimony is explained.

Here ends the third 'avatāra' on Śabda of Yatindramatadipikā composed by Śrīnivāsadāsa, the foremost disciple of Śrīman Mahācārya, an ornament in the line of Śrī Vādhūlas

चतुर्थोऽवतारः

प्रकृतिः

१. प्रमाणनिरूपणानन्तरं प्रमेयं निरूप्यते । प्रकर्षेण मेयं प्रमेयम् । तच्च द्विविधं—द्रव्याद्रव्यभेदात् । द्रव्यम् उपादानम् । अवस्थाश्रयमुपादानम् ।

२. ननु 'द्रव्यगुणकर्मसामान्य'-इत्यादिना मतान्तरस्थैः षोढा परिगणनात् कथं द्रव्याद्रव्यभेदेन द्विधा समर्थनम् ? इति चेत्, उच्यते ।

AVATĀRA IV

PRAKṚTI

1. After the exposition of pramāṇa, prameya, (object of valid knowledge) is explained. Prameya is that which is well and correctly cognizable. It is of two kinds, because of the difference as substance and non-substance. Substance is the material cause. Material cause is the locus of states.

2. "The categories are substance, quality, activity, generality", etc ; now, when people holding different views ' thus enumerate (the categories) in a sixfold manner, how can the twofold division of substance and non-substance be maintained ?' If this be asked, it is said in reply ;

३. उत्क्षेपणापक्षेपणाकुञ्चनप्रसारणगमनभेदात् कर्म पञ्चधाव-
स्थितमिति कल्पने गौरवात् 'चलनात्मकं कर्म' इति एकधा एव उपपत्तेः
तस्यापि संयोगमादायैवोपपत्तेः, संस्थानमेव जातिरिति संस्थानातिरेकि-
सामान्यानङ्गीकारात्, समवाये समवायान्तराङ्गीकारे अनवस्थानात्, तस्यापि
संयुक्तविशेषणतयैवोपपत्तेः, जीवेश्वरयोरणुत्वविभुत्वादिविभाजकधर्ममन्तरेण
'विशेष' इति किञ्चित्पदार्थान्तराङ्गीकारे गौरवात्, अतः कर्मसामान्यविशेष-
समवायानां पृथक् द्रव्यत्वेन अनङ्गीकाराच्च द्रव्यमद्रव्यमिति द्विधा विभाग
उपपद्यते ।

3. Since the conception of activity as existing in a fivefold division of upward movement, downward movement, contraction, expansion and (general) movement is cumbrous, and since it stands to reason to accept a single (category) activity which is of the nature of motion,² (hence) it is reasonable to hold that this (activity) is merely conjunction; (and) since structure (saṁsthāna) is itself generic character, and we do not admit any generality different from structure³; since the admission of one inherence to establish another inherence leads to infinite regress,⁴ and even that can be explained by admitting the relation of 'adjunct in what is conjoined'⁵ (saṁyukta-vis'eṣaṇa); since it is cumbrous to admit a category called 'particularity' apart from the monadness and the all-pervasiveness, etc. which are (respectively) the distinguishing characteristics of the individual self and Īśvara: therefore the twofold division (of Prameya) into substance and non-substance is appropriate, inasmuch as we do not admit activity, generality, particularity and inherence as distinct categories.

४. एतेन अभावः सप्तमपदार्थ इत्यपि निरस्तम् । अभावस्य भावान्तररूपत्वात् । प्रागभावो नाम पूर्वावस्थापरम्परा । प्रध्वंसाभावो नाम उत्तरावस्थापरम्परा । अत्यन्ताभावान्योन्याभावौ तु धर्म्यन्तरस्वरूपावेव । एतस्य प्रत्यक्षेऽन्तर्भावः पूर्वमुक्तः । उपादानं द्रव्यमित्युक्तम् । गुणाश्रयो द्रव्यमिति सामान्यलक्षणं सम्भवति ।

५. तानि च द्रव्याणि षट्—प्रकृतिकालशुद्धसत्त्वधर्मभूतज्ञान-जीवेश्वरभेदात् ।

4. By what has been said, non-existence as the seventh category is also refuted ; because non-existence is nothing else but another form of existence. What is called antecedent non-existence is the continuance of a prior state. What is called annihilative non-existence is the continuance of an after-state. Absolute non-existence and mutual non-existence are but different aspects of the essential nature of the locus. It was previously stated that these are brought under *pratyakṣa*. It was also stated that substance is the material cause. (So) the general definition is that the substratum of attributes is substance.

5. These substances are six, because of the difference as *prakṛti* (primordial matter), *kāla* (time), *śuddhasattva* (pure matter), *dharmabhūtajñāna* (attributive consciousness), *jīva* (individual self) and *Īśvara* (Supreme Lord).

६. तत्र जडाजडरूपयोर्विभक्तयोर्मध्ये जडलक्षणमुच्यते—
अमिश्रसत्त्वरहितं जडमिति । तत् द्विविधं—प्रकृतिकालभेदात् ।

७. तत्र सत्त्वरजस्तमोरूपगुणत्रयाश्रयरूपा प्रकृतिः । सा नित्या
अक्षरा अविद्या मायेति शब्दवाच्या च । तस्या भगवत्संकल्पाधीनगुण-
वैषम्यात् कार्योन्मुखावस्था अव्यक्तशब्देनोच्यते । तस्मान्महानुत्पद्यते । स
महान् सात्त्विकराजसतामसभेदात् त्रिधावस्थितः । महतोऽहङ्कार उत्पद्यते ।
सोऽपि सात्त्विकाहङ्कारो राजसाहङ्कारस्तामसाहङ्कारश्चेति त्रिविधो मतः ।
एतेषां त्रयाणां वैकारिकस्तैजसो भूतादिरिति नामान्तराण्यपि सम्भवन्ति ।

6. Of these (substances), divided as jaḍa (material) and ajaḍa (immaterial), the definition of jaḍa is thus: Jaḍa is that which is devoid of pure sattva. This is twofold, because of the difference as prakṛti and kāla.

7. Of these, prakṛti is that which is of the nature of substratum of the three guṇas—sattva, rajas and tamas. It (prakṛti) is eternal, and is denoted by such terms as akṣara, avidyā and māyā. It is denoted by the term avyakta (unmanifest) when it is on the point of becoming manifest on account of the inequilibrium of its guṇas due to the will of Bhagavān. From this, mahat is originated. That mahat abides in a threefold form, because of the difference as sāttvika, rājasa and tāmasa. From mahat, ahaṅkāra (organ of egoity) is originated. Even this is of three kinds: sāttvikāhaṅkāra, rājasāhaṅkāra and tāmasāhaṅkāra. These three have different names, such as vaikārika (modified), taijasa (active) and bhūtādi ⁶ (originator

तेषु वैकारिक इति प्रसिद्धाद्राजसाहङ्कारसहकृतात् सात्त्विकाहङ्कारादेकादशेन्द्रियाणि जायन्ते ।

८. सात्त्विकाहङ्कारोपादानकं द्रव्यमिन्द्रियम् इति इन्द्रियलक्षणम् । इन्द्रियं द्विविधं—ज्ञानेन्द्रियं कर्मेन्द्रियं चेति ।

९. ज्ञानप्रसरणशक्तमिन्द्रियं ज्ञानेन्द्रियम् । तत् षोढा—मनःश्रोत्रचक्षुर्ग्राणरसनात्वग्भेदात् ।

१०. स्मृत्यादिकरणम् इन्द्रियं मनः । तच्च हृदयप्रदेशवृत्तिबुद्ध्यहङ्कारचित्तादिशब्दवाच्यं बन्धमोक्षहेतुभूतं च ।

of elements) (respectively). Among these, from sāttvikāhaṅkāra well known as vaikārika, assisted by rājasāhaṅkāra, the eleven indriyas (organs) are generated.

8. The definition of indriya is thus : Indriya is that substance which has sāttvikāhaṅkāra for its material cause. Indriya is of two kinds : sense organ and motor organ.

9. Sense organ is that indriya which has the power of diffusing knowledge.⁷ It is of six kinds, because of the difference as manas (mind), hearing, sight, smell, taste and touch.

10. Manas is that sense organ which is the cause of memory etc.⁸ It resides in the region (cavity) of the heart, and is denoted by such terms as buddhi, ahaṅkāra, citta,⁹ etc; and it is the cause of bondage as well as deliverance.

११. शब्दादिपञ्चके शब्दमात्रग्रहणशक्तमिन्द्रियं श्रोत्रम् ।
तन्मनुष्यादीनां कर्णशष्कुल्यवच्छिन्नप्रदेशवृत्तिः । द्विजिह्वानां नयनवृत्तिः ।
१२. एवं रूपमात्रग्रहणशक्तमिन्द्रियं चक्षुः । तत् सर्वेषां नयनवृत्तिः ।
१३. गन्धमात्रग्रहणशक्तमिन्द्रियं घ्राणम् । नासाग्रवृत्तिः ।
१४. रसमात्रग्रहणशक्तमिन्द्रियं रसनेन्द्रियम् । जिह्वाग्रवृत्तिः ।
१५. स्पर्शमात्रग्रहणशक्तमिन्द्रियं त्वगिन्द्रियम् । सर्वशरीरवृत्तिः ।
नखदन्तकेशादिषु प्राणमान्द्यतारतम्यात् स्पर्शानुपलम्भः ।

11. Auditory sense (hearing) is that sense organ which has the power of apprehending sound only among the five (qualities of) sound etc. In the case of human beings, it abides in the space limited by the orifice of the ear. In the case of serpents etc., it abides in the eye.

12. Likewise the visual sense (sight) is that sense organ which has the power of apprehending colour only. It abides in the eye in the case of all.

13. The olfactory sense (smell) is that sense organ which has the power of apprehending smell only. It abides at the tip of the nose.

14. The gustatory sense (taste) is that sense organ which has the power of apprehending taste only. It abides at the tip of the tongue.

15. The tactual sense (touch) is that sense organ which has the power of apprehending touch only. It abides all over the body. Touch is not apprehended in nails, hair, teeth, etc. owing to the difference of the feeble state of vital airs in those places.

१६. श्रोत्रादीन्द्रियाणां भौतिकत्वप्रतिपादनं भूताप्यायितृत्वेनौपचारिकम् ।

१७. एतेषां विषयसम्बन्धः कचित् संयोगः कचित् संयुक्ताश्रयणमिति वृद्धसम्प्रदायः ।

१८. उच्चारणादिषु अन्यतमक्रियाशक्तत्वं कर्मेन्द्रियसामान्यलक्षणम् । तच्च वाक्पाणिपादपायूपस्थभेदात् पञ्चधावस्थितम् ।

१९. वर्णोच्चारणकरणमिन्द्रियं वाक् । सा च हृत्कण्ठजिह्वामूलतालुदन्तोष्ठनासामूर्द्धरूपस्थानाष्टकवृत्तिः । मृगादिषु अदृष्टविरहात् तदभावः ।

16. The mention of sense organs such as hearing and others as elemental is figurative since they are strengthened (or satisfied) by the elements.

17. According to ancient tradition the relation of the sense organs to objects is in some cases 'conjunction' (saṁyoga) and in other cases 'dependence in what is conjoined' (saṁyuktāśrayaṇa).

18. The general definition of motor organ is that it has action-capacity for any one of the actions such as pronunciation etc. This abides in a fivefold way, because of the difference as organ of speech, hands, feet, organs of excretion and generation.

19. The faculty of speech (vāc) is that organ which is the means for the pronunciation of sound (letters). This abides in eight places such as heart, throat, root of tongue, palate, teeth, lips, nose and roof of palate. This is not found among animals owing to the absence of destiny (adr̥ṣṭa).¹⁰

२०. शिल्पादिकरणमिन्द्रियं पाणिः । स च मनुष्यादीनां अङ्गुल्यादिवृत्तिः । वारणादीनां नासावृत्तिः ।

२१. सञ्चरणकरणमिन्द्रियं पादः । स च मनुष्यादीनां चरणवृत्तिः । भुजङ्गपतङ्गादीनामुरःपक्षादिवृत्तिः ।

२२. मलादित्यागकरणमिन्द्रियं पायुः । स च तत्तदवयववृत्तिः ।

२३. आनन्दविशेषकरणमिन्द्रियं उपस्थः । स च मेहनादिवृत्तिः ।

२४. एतानीन्द्रियाण्यणूनि । परकायप्रवेशे लोकान्तरगमनादिषु

20 The faculty of grasping (pāṇi) is that organ which is the means for doing manual work. Among human beings this resides in the fingers etc. In the case of elephants this resides in the trunk.

21. The faculty of walking (pāda) is that organ which is the means for movement. Among human beings this resides in the feet; among serpents and birds this resides in the breast and the wings (respectively).

22. The faculty of excretion (pāyu) is that organ which is the means for excreting matter (discharged from the bowels). This resides in the respective limbs.¹¹

23. The faculty of generation (upastha) is that organ which is the means for special pleasure. This resides in the generative organ etc.

24. These indriyas are subtle. They follow the individual self in its entry into other bodies and other

च जीवेन सह गमनमिन्द्रयाणाम् । मुक्तिदशायाम् अप्राकृतदेशगमनासम्भ-
वादिहैव यावत्प्रलयं स्थितिः । करणविधुरैरन्यैः परिग्रहो वा । कर्मेन्द्रियाणां
शरीरनाशान्नाश इति पक्षस्तु श्रीभाष्यादिविरोधेन हेयः ।

२५. एतेन पुरुषेन्द्रियं, स्त्रीन्द्रियम्, एकेन्द्रियवादः, त्वगि-
न्द्रियैकत्वस्वीकार इत्यादिविमतपक्षा निरस्ताः ।

२६. राजसाहङ्कारसहकृतात् भूतादिसंज्ञकतामसाहङ्कारात् शब्दा-
दिपञ्च तन्मात्राणि आकाशादिपञ्च महाभूतानि च उत्पद्यन्ते ।

२७. भूतानामव्यवहितसूक्ष्मावस्थाविशिष्टं द्रव्यं तन्मात्रम् । तदेव
भूतोपादानम् ।

worlds, etc. In the state of liberation as they are
unable to follow (the individual self) to the transcen-
dental realm, they stay here itself till the time of
dissolution. Or, they are taken by others who are
devoid of such organs. The view that the motor
organs are destroyed along with the destruction of the
body should be abandoned as it is opposed to the
S'ribhāṣya¹⁹ and other works.

25. By this, the disputed views like male sense,
female sense, single sense, acceptance of single-tactual
sense are refuted.

26. From tāmasāhaṅkāra named bhūtādi, assisted
by rājasāhaṅkāra, there arise the five tanmātras, sound
etc., and the five great gross elements, ether etc.

27. Tanmātra is substance in that subtle state
which immediately precedes (the production of) gross
elements. This is the material cause of the gross
elements.

२८. विशिष्टशब्दादिविषयाधिकरणं भूतम् ।

२९. तन्मात्राणि शब्दतन्मात्रं, स्पर्शतन्मात्रं, रूपतन्मात्रं, रस-
तन्मात्रं, गन्धतन्मात्रमिति पञ्च ।

३०. भूतानि च तथा—आकाशवायुतेजोप्पृथिवीभेदात् ।

३१. तत्र तामसाहङ्काराकाशयोर्मध्यमावस्थाविशिष्टं द्रव्यं शब्द-
तन्मात्रम् । क्षीरदध्नोरन्तरालपरिणामवत् ।

३२. तस्मादाकाशो जायते । अस्पर्शवस्त्वे सति विशिष्टशब्दा-
धारत्वं श्रोत्राप्यायितृत्वं च आकाशलक्षणमिति । स च प्रत्यक्षः शब्दमात्र-

28. The gross element is the locus of objects such as a particular ¹³ sound etc.

29. Tanmātras are five : sound-tanmātra, touch-tanmātra, colour-tanmātra, savour-tanmātra and odour-tanmātra.

30. The gross elements too are likewise (five), because of the difference as ether, air, fire, water and earth.

31. Of these, the sound-tanmātra is that particular substance which is an intermediate state between tāmāsāhaṅkāra and ether. It is like the intermediate modification between milk and curds.

32. From that (i.e., śabda-tanmātra) the ether arises. The definition of ether is thus : It is the locus of particular sound without possessing touch, and it affords satisfaction to the sense of hearing. It is perceptible, possesses sound as the only attribute, and is

गुणकः अवकाशहेतुः । 'नीलं नम' इति प्रतीतेः पञ्चीकरणप्रक्रियया रूप-
वाँश्च । एतेनाकाशस्य अजन्यत्वनिरासः ।

३३. सूर्यपरिस्पन्दादिभिराकाशस्यैव प्राच्यादिव्यवहारोपपत्तौ
दिगिति न पृथक् द्रव्यकल्पनम् । दिक्सृष्टिस्तु अन्तरिक्षादिसृष्टिवदुपपद्यते ।

३४. आकाशात् स्पर्शतन्मात्रम् । आकाशवाय्वोर्मध्यमावस्था-
विशिष्टद्रव्यं स्पर्शतन्मात्रम् ।

३५. तस्माद्वायुः । विशिष्टस्पर्शवत्त्वे सति रूपशून्यत्वम्, अस्म-
दादिस्पर्शनैकेन्द्रियग्राह्यद्रव्यत्वम्, अनुष्णाशीतविशिष्टस्पर्शवत्त्वे सति गन्ध-
शून्यत्वमित्यादिकं वायोर्लक्षणम् । तस्मिन्नानासलिलातपकुसुमाद्यवयवयो-

the cause of space. It is perceived in the form 'The sky is blue'; it possesses colour by virtue of the quintuplicative process.¹⁴ By this, the (conception of the) non-origination of ether is refuted.¹⁵

33. There is no distinct substance called 'direction'; for the space itself is looked upon as east etc., owing to the movement of the sun. The creation of 'direction' is accounted for like the creation of the sky.

34. The touch-tanmātra arises from ether. The touch-tanmātra is that particular substance which is in an intermediate state between ether and air.

35. From that, air arises. The definition of air is thus: it possesses touch and is devoid of colour; it is a substance which is perceptible to our sense of touch only. It possesses particular touch which is neither hot nor cold and is devoid of smell etc. It is apprehended as cool, hot, fragrant, etc., owing to its

गाच्छीतोष्णसौरभादिप्रतीतिः । स च त्वगिन्द्रियाप्यायकत्वेन उपकरोति ।
तस्य शब्दस्पर्शौ गुणौ ।

३६. तत्र शरीरधारणादिहेतुर्वायुविशेषः प्राणसंज्ञकः पञ्चप्रकारः ।
प्राणापानव्यानोदानसमानभेदात् । हृदि प्राणो, गुदेऽपानः, सर्वशरीरगो
व्यानः, कण्ठे उदानो, नाभिदेशे समान इति नियमः । जङ्गमेष्विव
स्थावरेषु च प्राणसम्बन्धस्तुल्य एव । स च स्पर्शनप्रत्यक्षः । एतेन अनुमेय-
वादनिरासः ।

३७. वायुतेजसोर्मध्यमावस्थाविशिष्टं द्रव्यं रूपतन्मात्रम् ।

contact with the particles of (various objects such as) water, sunshine, flower, etc. It helps by satisfying the sense of touch. It has sound and touch as its attributes.

36. Now, the particular kind of air which is the cause of support of body etc., is called *prāṇa* (vital air). It is fivefold because of the difference as *prāṇa*, *apāna*, *vyāna*, *udāna* and *samāna*. There is the delimitation that *prāṇa* functions in the heart, *apāna* in the anus, *vyāna* in the whole body, *udāna* in the throat and *samāna* in the region of the navel. In the case of non-ambulants the association of *prāṇa* is equal as in the case of ambulants.¹⁶ It is perceptible by the sense of touch. By this, the (Nyāya-vaiśeṣika) view that it can be inferred is refuted.

37. The colour-tanmātra is that particular substance which is in an intermediate state between air and fire.

३८. तस्मात् तेजः । उष्णस्पर्शवत्त्वभास्वरूपवत्त्वादिकं तु तेजसो लक्षणम् । तस्य बहिः पचनादिहेतुत्वम् अग्निसूर्यात्मना । अन्तर्वैश्वानरसंज्ञकजाठराग्निरूपेण । दिवाभीतादिव्यतिरिक्तानां चाक्षुषज्ञाने आलोकादिरूपेण सहकारी भवति ।

३९. तच्चतुर्धा—भौमदिव्यौदर्याकरजभेदात् ।

४०. तत्र पार्थिवमात्रेन्धनं तेजो भौमं ; तत् दीपादि । जलमात्रेन्धनं दिव्यं ; तत् सूर्यादि । पार्थिवजलेन्धनम् औदर्यं ; तत् जाठरम् । निरिन्धनं तेज आकरजं ; तत् सुवर्णादि । सुवर्णस्य द्रव्यान्तरसंसर्गादुष्णस्पर्शाभावः ।

38. From that arises fire. The definition of fire is that it possesses hot touch, effulgent colour, etc. Externally it is the means for maturation in the form of the fire and the sun. Internally it is (the means of maturation) in the form of gastric fire known as *vais/vānara*. Fire in the form of light assists the ocular perception of all save owls and other such beings.

39. It is of four kinds, because of the difference as *bhauma* (terrestrial), *divya* (celestial), *audarya* (gastric) and *ākaraṇa* (mineral).

40. Of these, *bhauma* is that fire which has the earth element as its only fuel ; for instance, flame etc. *Divya* is that fire which has water as its only fuel ; (for instance) the sun etc. *Audarya* is that fire which has earth *cum* water as its fuel ; (for instance) the fire in the stomach. *Ākaraṇa* is that fire which is devoid of fuel ; (for instance) gold etc. The absence of hot touch in gold is due to its contact with other substances.

४१. पुनः सामान्येन प्रभा प्रभावाँश्चेति विभक्तः ।

४२. आवरणसदसद्भावाधीनसंकोचविकासः प्रसारितेजोविशेषः प्रभा । सा च प्रभावद्भिः सहोत्पद्यते सह नश्यति । द्रव्यरूपा गुणभूता सावयवा च ।

४३. अनेन प्रभायाः केवलगुणत्वमतनिरासः ।

४४. प्रभाविशिष्टं तेजः प्रभावत् । तच्चतुर्विधमिति प्रतिपादितम् । तत्तेजः शब्दस्पर्शरूपगुणवच्च ।

४५. तेजःसलिलयोर्मध्यमावस्थाविशिष्टं द्रव्यं रसतन्मात्रम् ।

41. Again, it is generally divided as effulgence (prabhā) and the effulgent (prabhāvān).

42. Effulgence is a particular kind of diffusing fire subject to contraction and expansion of light dependent on the presence and absence of obscuration (āvaraṇa). It arises along with the effulgent; it is destroyed along with it. It is of the nature of substance as well as quality, and is made up of parts.¹⁷

43. Hence the view that effulgence is purely a quality is refuted.

44. The effulgent is that fire which is qualified by effulgence. That this is of four kinds has already been stated. Fire possesses the attributes of sound, touch and colour.

45. The rasa-tanmātra is that particular substance which is in an intermediate state between fire and water.

४६. तस्मादापः । शीतस्पर्शवत्त्वं निर्गन्धत्वे सति विशिष्टरस-
वत्त्वम् इत्यादि अपां लक्षणम् । तासां शुक्लमधुरशीतैकस्वभावानाम्
आश्रयादिसंसर्गभेदात् रूपरसस्पर्शवैचित्र्यारोपः । ताः समुद्रसरिदादिरूपेण
बहुप्रकाराः । शब्दस्पर्शरूपरसवत्यश्च सेचनपिण्डीकरणादिहेतवः ।

४७. अप्पृथिव्योर्मध्यमावस्थाविशिष्टं द्रव्यं गन्धतन्मात्रम् ।

४८. तस्मात् पृथिवी । विशिष्टगन्धवत्त्वं रसवत्त्वे सति विशिष्ट-
स्पर्शवत्त्वमित्यादि पृथिवीलक्षणम् । सा सुरभिर्मधुरा कृष्णादिरूपा अनु-
ष्णाशीतस्पर्शवती च । पाकजभेदात्तु विचित्रवर्णा विचित्ररसा च । अस्याश्च

46. From that arises water. The definition of water is that it has cold touch, and possesses particular savour etc. without having smell. Though it is white, sweet and cool by nature, the manifold qualities of colour, savour and touch are superimposed on it owing to the difference of the contact of substratum etc. It is manifold in the form of ocean, river, etc. Water possesses (the attributes of) sound, touch, colour and savour, and is the means of sprinkling, clotting, etc.

47. The odour-tanmātra is that particular substance which is in an intermediate state between water and earth.

48. From that, arises earth. The definition of earth is that it has besides savour particular smell, particular touch, etc. It is fragrant, sweet, black-coloured, etc., and has touch which is neither hot nor cold. It has manifold colour and savour on account of the modification produced by heat. It is useful by

मनोघ्राणाप्यायकत्वेन उपकारकत्वम् । मृत्पाषाणान्नौषधादिबहुप्रकारवती शब्दस्पर्शरूपरसगन्धगुणका धारणहेतुश्च ।

४९. तमसः पृथिव्यामन्तर्भावस्तद्गुणत्वात् तदवस्थान्तरत्वाद्वा । अत एव आलोकाभावमात्रं द्रव्यान्तरं वा इत्यादिपक्षा निरस्ताः ।

५०. भूतेषु सर्वत्र पञ्चीकरणप्रक्रियया शब्दादीनां गुणानामुपलम्भः ।

५१. पञ्चीकरणप्रक्रिया तु—भगवान् भूतानि सृष्ट्वा एकैकमेव भूतं द्विधाकृत्य द्वयोर्भागयोः स्वभागमेकं निधाय भागान्तरं चतुर्धाकृत्य तैश्चतुर्भागान् भूतान्तरेषु चतुर्षु योजयति । एवं सर्वेषु भूतेषु क्रियमाणेषु

affording satisfaction to the mind and the sense of smell. It is manifold in the form of earth, stone, food, herbs, etc., possesses the attributes of sound, touch, savour and smell, and is the cause of support.

49. Tamas (darkness) is brought under (the category of) earth ; (for) it is an attribute or another state of it. Therefore the views that it is only the absence of light or that it is a distinct substance etc. are refuted.

50. The attributes such as sound etc. are perceived in all the elements on account of the process of quintuplication.

51. The process of quintuplication is thus : Bhagavān (the Supreme Person), having created the elements, divides each element into two ; of the two parts, reserving one part of its own nature, and then re-dividing the other part into four, (He) combines the four sub-parts with the four other elements. In this manner when all the elements are created,

एकैकस्य भूतस्य अर्द्धं स्वभागः, अर्द्धान्तरं चतुर्णां भूतानां भागसमुच्चय इति भवति । तथा च स्वभागस्य भूयस्त्वात् परभागस्याल्पीयस्त्वाच्च पृथिव्यादिव्यपदेशः ।

५२. वेदे त्रिवृत्करणोपदेशस्तु पञ्चीकरणस्याप्युपलक्षणम् । भूतैः साकं महदहङ्कारौ मिलित्वा सप्तीकरणमित्यप्याहुः ।

५३. एतेषु चतुर्विंशतिसङ्ख्याकेषु पञ्चभूतानि प्रकृतिमहदहङ्काराश्च शरीरोपादानानि । एकादशेन्द्रियाणि प्रत्येकमसङ्ख्यातानि प्रतिपुरुषं भिन्नानि, आभरणार्पितरत्नानीव शरीरमाक्रम्य तिष्ठन्ति ।

५४. शरीरं नाम चेतनं प्रति आधेयत्वविधेयत्वशेषत्वनियमैर-

one half of each element retains its own nature, while the other half is made up of the parts of the four elements. So there is the designation of 'earth' etc., since the portion of its own nature is more and that of other (elements) less.

52. The teaching of the tripartite process¹⁸ in the Veda refers synechdochically to the quintuplicative also. Others speak of the septempartite process by adding mahat and ahaṅkāra along with the (five) elements.

53. Of these twenty-four principles, the five elements, prakṛti, mahat and ahaṅkāra are the material cause of the body. The eleven indriyas, each of which is innumerable, are different in regard to every person. They enter the body and stay like gems laid in a jewel.

54. What is called body (śarīra) is that particular substance, which has inseparable relation with the sentient invariably as the ādheya (the supported), the vidheya (the controlled) and the s'eṣa (the subsidiary);

पृथक्सिद्धो द्रव्यविशेष इत्येकं लक्षणम् । नियमेन यदावेयं, नियमेन यद्विधेयं, नियमेन यच्छेषमिति लक्षणत्रयं वा योज्यम् । ईश्वरतज्ज्ञान-व्यतिरिक्तं द्रव्यं शरीरमिति वा तटस्थलक्षणम् ।

५५. एतेन चेष्टाश्रयं शरीरम्, इन्द्रियाश्रयं शरीरं, भोगायतनं शरीरं, शिरःपाणिपादादिमयं शरीरम् इत्यादीनि परोक्तानि शरीरलक्षणानि निरस्तानि ।

५६. शरीरं द्विविधं—नित्यमनित्यमिति । तत्र नित्यं त्रिगुण-द्रव्यकालजीवशुभाश्रयात्मकमीश्वरशरीरम् । नित्यसूरिणां स्वाभाविकगरुड-भुजगादिरूपं च ।

this is the single definition of the body. Or a three-fold definition may be made as (1) '(body is that) which is invariably supported (by the sentient)', (2) '(body is that) which is invariably controlled (by the sentient)' and (3) '(body is that) which is invariably subsidiary (to the seer, the sentient)'.¹⁹ Or, 'body is that substance which is different from Īśvara and His knowledge'—is the definition *per accidens*.²⁰

55. The definition of body given by others that 'body is the abode of activity',²¹ 'body is the abode of sense organs',²² 'body is the abode of enjoyment'²³ and 'body is made up of head, hands, feet, etc.'²⁴ are refuted (by our) definition.

56. The body is twofold: eternal and non-eternal. Of these, the eternal is the body of Īśvara which is of the nature of substance (prakṛti) made up of the three guṇas (i.e., sattva, rajas and tamas), time, the individual selfs and the divine, auspicious figure in Vaikuṇṭha. And the natural forms of Garuḍa,

५७. अनित्यं द्विविधम्—अकर्मकृतं कर्मकृतं चेति । प्रथम-
मीश्वरस्य महदादिरूपम् । तथा अनन्तगरुडादीनां च इच्छागृहीतं तत्तत्
रूपम् । कर्मकृतमपि द्विविधं—स्वसङ्कल्पसहकृतकर्मकृतं केवलकर्मकृतं चेति ।
पूर्वं महतां सौभरिप्रभृतीनाम्, उत्तरं चान्येषाम् ।

५८. पुनः सामान्यतो द्विविधं—स्थावरजङ्गमभेदात् । स्थावराः
शिलावृक्षगुल्मलतादयः । जङ्गमश्चतुर्धा—देवमनुष्यतिर्यङ्नारकिभेदात् ।

५९. उद्भिज्जस्वेदजजरायुजाण्डजादिभेदा अपि विभागजधर्माः ।
अयोनिजशरीराण्यपि सन्ति ।

S'eṣa and others, who belong to the class of the nitya-
sūris (are also eternal).

57. The non-eternal is twofold : non-karma-made
and karma-made. The first consists of the forms of
Īśvara, such as mahat etc. Likewise are the forms of
Ananta, Garuḍa, etc. assumed at their wish. The
karma-made is also twofold : karma-made assisted by
one's own will and purely karma-made. The former
is that of Saubhari²⁵ etc. and the latter that of others.

58. Again, there is a twofold general division,
because of the difference as non-ambulant and ambu-
lant. The non-ambulants are stones, trees, shrubs,
creepers, etc. The ambulants are of four kinds, because
of the difference as celestial being, human being, animal
and hell-denizen.

59. The distinctions such as sprout-born, sweat-
born, egg-born and womb-born are attributes arising out
of the (genetic) division of (beings). But there are also
bodies not produced in the ordinary course of generation.

६०. एवं पञ्चीकृतानां भूतानामेवाण्डोत्पादकत्वम् । अण्डोत्पादनात् पूर्वसृष्टिः समष्टिसृष्टिः, अनन्तरसृष्टिर्व्यष्टिसृष्टिः ।

६१. महदादीनामुत्पत्तिर्नाम तालीयपलाशताटङ्गन्यायेन अवस्थान्तरापत्तिरेव । सेनावनराश्यादिव्यवहारवत् ।

६२. पूर्वापरावस्थाविशेषसम्बन्धमात्रेण कार्यकारणभेदव्यवहारः । तत्र पूर्वावस्थाप्रहाणेन विजातीयावस्थान्तरप्राप्तौ तत्त्वान्तरव्यपदेशः पृथिवीपर्यन्त एव ।

६३. इत्थं प्रकृतिमहदहङ्कारैकादशेन्द्रियतन्मात्रपञ्चकभूतपञ्चकविभागेन चतुर्विंशति तत्त्वानि वर्णितानि ।

60. Thus from the quintuplicated elements there is the origination of the aṇḍa (cosmic sphere). The aggregate creation is the creation prior to that of the aṇḍa; (but) the individual creation is the creation posterior to that (of the aṇḍa).

61. The origination of mahat etc. is nothing but a change of state as illustrated by the maxim of the palm-leaf ear-ring.²⁶ (Or) like the usages of (words) such as army, forest, heap, etc.

62. The distinction of cause and effect in empirical life is due to mere having the particular anterior state and the particular posterior state. The designation of a new category right up to earth takes place when (an element) attains a different kind of state by abandoning its prior state.

63. In this way by the division of prakṛti, mahat, ahaṅkāra, eleven indriyas, five tanmātras, and five gross elements, the twenty-four categories are described.

६४. एतेन न्यूनाधिकसङ्ख्यातत्त्ववादिनो बाह्याः पाशुपताश्च निरस्ताः । परमाणुकारणत्ववादिनोऽपि निरस्ताः ।

६५. प्रकृत्यादय ईश्वरस्य जीवस्य च भोग्यभोगोपकरणभोगस्थानानि च भवन्ति । भोग्यं विषयाः । भोगोपकरणं चक्षुरादिककरणानि । भोगस्थानानि चतुर्दशभुवनान्तर्वर्त्यण्डजातानि ।

६६. अण्डं नाम कपित्थफलाकारं पञ्चीकृतपञ्चभूतारब्धं प्राकृतद्रव्यम् ।

६७. तद्यथा—पद्माकारा भूः । कर्णिकाकारो मेरुः । मेरोर्दक्षिणतो भारतकिम्पुरुषहरिवर्षाणि त्रीणि । उत्तरतस्तु रम्यकहिरण्यककुरु-

64. By this, Pās'upatas and others who are the upholders of a less or a greater number of categories are refuted. The Vais'eṣikas also who uphold the doctrine of monads constituting the cause (of the universe) are refuted.

65. Prakṛti and others become the objects, the means and the abodes of enjoyment for Īs'vara as well as the individual self. The objects are the material for the enjoyment. Eyes and other instruments are the means for enjoyment. The abodes of enjoyment are those hosts of aṇḍas included in the fourteen worlds.

66. What is called aṇḍa is that material substance which is of the shape of a wood apple and which has its origin in the quintuplicated five elements.

67. It is thus : Bhū is of the shape of a lotus. Meru is of the shape of the pericarp (of the lotus). To the south of Meru are the three continents of Bhārata, Kimpuruṣa and Hari. To the north are the

वर्षाणि त्रीणि । पुरतो भद्राश्ववर्षं, पश्चात् केतुमालाख्यं वर्षम् । मध्ये तु इलावृतम् ।

६८. एवं नववर्षयुक्तं जम्बूद्वीपं लक्षयोजनविस्तीर्णं समपरिमाणेन लवणसिन्धुनावृतम् । स सिन्धुर्द्विगुणेन सप्तवर्षात्मकेन प्लक्षद्वीपेन वेष्टितः । सोऽपि इक्षुसमुद्रेण । सोऽब्धिः शाल्मलिद्वीपेन । स पुनः सुरासमुद्रेण । स कुशद्वीपेन । स सर्पिःसमुद्रेण । सोऽपि क्रौञ्चद्वीपेन । स दध्यर्णवेन । सोऽपि शाकद्वीपेन वेष्टितः । स क्षीरार्णवेन । स वर्षद्वयविभाजकवल्याकारमानसोत्तरपर्वतसहितेन पुष्करद्वीपेन । स शुद्धजलार्णवेन । एवं द्वीपानामुत्तरोत्तरद्वैगुण्यं द्रष्टव्यम् ।

three continents of Rāmyaka, Hiraṇyaka and Kuru. In front is the continent of Bhadrās'va. Behind is the continent named as Ketumāla. In the centre is Ilāvṛta.

68. Thus Jambūdvīpa, comprising the nine continents, has the extension of one lac of yojanas,²⁷ encompassed by the salt sea of the same extent. This sea is encircled by Plakṣadvīpa of double that extent comprising seven continents. Even this is (begirt) by the sea of syrup. This sea (of syrup) by the S'ālmalīdvīpa. This again by the sea of liquor. This by Kuśadvīpa. This by the sea of clarified butter. This also by the Krauñcadvīpa. This by the sea of curd. This again is encompassed by the Śākadvīpa. This by the sea of milk. This by the Puṣkaradvīpa containing the bracelet-shaped mountain Mānasottara which divides two continents. This by the sea of pure water. Thus

६९. प्लक्षद्वीपादयश्च सप्तवर्षात्मकाः । सप्तद्वीपात्मकोऽयं
द्विगुणीकृतया काञ्चनभूम्यावृतः । काञ्चनभूमिस्तु लोकालोकपर्वतेन ।
पर्वतस्त्वन्धतमसा । तदन्धतमो गर्भोदकेन । तदण्डकटाहेन ।

७०. एवं भूमेरधः अतलवितलरसातलतलातलमहातलसुतल-
पातालभेदात् सप्तलोकाः । अधो नरकाः । ते च पापकर्मणां पापानुभव-
भूमयः । रौरवाद्या मुख्यतया एकविंशतिप्रभेदाः । ततस्तमः । ततो
गर्भोदकम् । अनन्तरमण्डकटाहः ।

७१. एवं भूमेरुपरि लक्षयोजनात् सूर्यमण्डलम् । तदेव

each following dvīpa is to be viewed as double in extent
(of the immediately precedent one.)

69. Plakṣa and other dvīpas contain seven continents. These seven dvīpas are encompassed by the land of gold twice its size. This land of gold by the mountain Lokāloka. This mountain by the blinding darkness. This blinding darkness by the uterine waters. This by the shell of the aṇḍa.

70. Thus below Bhū are the seven worlds, because of the difference as Atala, Vitala, Rasātala, Mahātala, Sutala, and Pātāla. Below are the infernal regions. These are the fields for the experience of (the fruits of) demerit of the sinful. Raurava and other (infernal regions) are mainly divided as twenty-one. Beyond that darkness. Then uterine waters. Then the shell of the aṇḍa.

71. Thus one lac of yojanas above Bhū is the

भुवर्लोकः । तदुपरि चन्द्रमण्डलम् । तस्मादुपरि नक्षत्रबुधशुक्राङ्गारक-
बृहस्पतिशनिसप्तर्षिमण्डलानि । तदुपरि ध्रुवः । सूर्यमण्डलमारभ्य ध्रुवलोक-
पर्यन्तं स्वर्लोकः । चतुर्लक्षादुपरि कोटियोजनोच्छ्रायो महर्लोकः । तस्मात्
द्विगुणो जनलोकः । ततश्चतुर्गुणस्तपोलोकः । तस्मात् द्वादशकोट्युच्छ्रायः
सत्यलोकः । ततस्तमो गर्भोदकम् अण्डकटाहश्च ।

७२. एवं तिर्यगूर्ध्वप्रमाणेन पञ्चाशत्कोटियोजनत्वं भूमेरुक्तं
भवति । शतकोटियोजनविस्तीर्णवादो मानभेदेन । अण्डकटाहस्तु कोटि-
योजनोच्छ्रायः । तदण्डं दशोत्तरावरणावृतम् । एतादृशानि अण्डानि

solar orb. That itself is Bhuvārloka. Beyond that
is the orb of the moon. Over that is the stellar sphere,
(planets such as) Budha, Śukra, Aṅgāraka, Br̥haspati,
Śani and the constellation *Ursa Major*. Beyond that
Dhruva. Beginning from the solar orb upto the world
of Dhruva, it is Svarloka. Beyond four lacs (of
yojanas), is Maharloka, one crore of yojanas in extent.
Twice that size is Janaloka. Then Tapoloka four
times to that (in extent). From that is Satyaloka, twelve
crores (of yojanas) in extent. Beyond that are dark-
ness, uterine waters and the shell of the aṇḍa.

72. In this manner the measurement of Bhū is
said to be fifty crores of yojanas horizontally and
longitudinally. The view that it is a hundred crore
of yojanas in extent is due to difference in measure-
ment. The shell of the aṇḍa is one crore of yojanas
in extent. That aṇḍa is surrounded by an enclosure
ten times to that in extent. Aṇḍas similar to this are

अनन्तानि जलबुद्बुदवत् । युगपदीश्वरसृष्टानि । ईश्वरस्य चतुर्मुखपर्यन्ता
सृष्टिरद्वारिका, तदनन्तरं सद्धारिकेति विवेकः । विस्तरस्तु पुराणरत्नादिषु
द्रष्टव्यः । इति प्रकृतिर्निरूपिता ।

इति श्रीवाधूलकुलतिलकश्रीमन्महाचार्यस्य प्रथमदासेन श्रीनिवासदासेन
विरचितायां यतीन्द्रमतदीपिकायां प्रकृतिनिरूपणं
नाम चतुर्थोऽवतारः ॥

infinite like bubbles. They are created by Īsvara simultaneously. Īsvara's creation upto the Four-faced (Brahmā) is 'immediate'; after that (*i.e.*, immediate creation), it is 'mediate'. For details (of cosmology) the *Gem among Purāṇas*²⁸ and others may be seen. Thus prakṛti has been explained.

Here ends the fourth 'avatāra' on prakṛti of Yatīndramatadīpikā composed by S'rīnivāsa, the foremost disciple of S'rīman Mahācārya, an ornament in the line of S'rī Vādhūlas

पञ्चमोज्वतारः

कालः

१. अथ अचिद्विशेषः कालो निरूप्यते । कालो नाम गुणत्रय-
रहितो जडद्रव्यविशेषः । स च नित्यो विभुश्च । भूतभविष्यद्वर्तमानभेदेन
त्रिविधः । युगपत्क्षिप्रचिरादिव्यपदेशहेतुः । निमेषकाष्ठाकलामुहूर्तदिवस-
पक्षमासऋतवयनसंवत्सरादिव्यपदेशहेतुश्च ।

२. मनुष्यमानेन मासः पितृणां दिनम् । तेषाम् अमावास्या तु

AVATĀRA V

KĀLA

1. Now, time, which is a particular kind of the non-sentient, is explained. What is called time is that particular inert substance which is devoid of the three guṇas.¹ It is eternal² and all pervasive³. It is divided into three kinds as past, present and future. It is the cause of the designation of such terms as 'simultaneous', 'immediate', 'long', etc. and 'nimīṣa',⁴ 'kāṣṭhā',⁵ 'kalā',⁶ 'muhūrta',⁷ 'day', 'fort-night', 'month', 'season', 'solstice', 'year', etc.

2. One month by human standard (measure) is a day of the manes; their midday is the day of

मध्याह्नम् । मनुष्यमानेन वत्सरो देवानां दिनम् । तेषामुत्तरायणमहः ।
दक्षिणायनं रात्रिः । एवं देवमानेन द्वादशवर्षसहस्रसङ्ख्याकं चतुर्युगमित्युच्यते ।

३. तत्र चतुःसहस्रवर्षसङ्ख्याकं कृतयुगम् । तत्र पूर्णो धर्मः ।
त्रिसहस्रवर्षसङ्ख्याकं त्रिपाद्धर्मवत् त्रेतायुगम् । द्विसहस्रवर्षपरिमितं द्विपाद्धर्म-
वत् द्वापरम् । सहस्रवर्षसङ्ख्याकम् एकपादधर्मसंयुक्तं कलियुगम् । एतेषां
सन्धिर्द्विसहस्रसङ्ख्याकः ।

४. एवं चतुर्युगसहस्राणि ब्रह्मणो दिवसप्रमाणम् । एवं रात्रिरपि ।

the new moon. One year by human standard is a day of the devas ; (the duration of) their daytime is the summer solstice. (The duration of) their night is the winter solstice. Twelve thousand years by divine standard is said to constitute the four yugas.

3. Of these, Kṛtayuga is that which has four thousand years (as its duration); in it dharma is full. Tretāyuga which consists of three feet (*i.e.*, three-fourths) of dharma has three thousand years (as its duration). Dvāparayuga which consists of two feet (*i.e.*, half) of dharma has a measure of two thousand years (as its duration). Kaliyuga with one foot (*i.e.*, one-fourth) of dharma has one thousand years (as its duration). The junction period of these (yugas) constitutes two thousand years.

4. Thus one thousand of such (set of) four yugas constitute the measure of Brahmā's day ; so the night also.

५. ब्रह्मणोऽहि चतुर्दश मनवो जायन्ते । इन्द्रा अपि तथैव । तथा सप्तर्षयश्च । एकैकमनोरेकसप्ततिचतुर्युगपरिमाणकालः । एवं ब्रह्मानेन ब्रह्मणः शतवर्षजीवित्वम् ।

६. एतत् सर्वं कालाधीनम् । एवं नित्यनैमित्तिकप्राकृताः प्रलया अपि कालाधीनाः । कालस्य स्वकार्यं प्रति स्वस्य उपादानत्वम् ।

७. अखण्डः कालो नित्यः । कार्यः पुनरनित्यः ।

८. एवम्भूतः काल ईश्वरस्य क्रीडापरिकरो भवति । लीला-विभूतौ ईश्वरः कालाधीन एव कार्यं करोति । नित्यविभूतौ तु कालस्य विद्यमानत्वेऽपि तस्य न स्वातन्त्र्यम् ।

5. Fourteen Manus take birth in a day of Brahmā. Like that (fourteen) Indras also (take birth) ; likewise the (fourteen) Saptarṣis. Each Manu has a measure of seventy-one (sets of) four yugas for his time. Thus by Brahmā's standard Brahmā's longevity is a hundred years.

6. All this is dependent on time. Likewise the nitya, naimittika and prākṛta dissolutions⁸ also are dependent on time. Time itself is the material cause in respect of its own effect.

7. Impartite time is eternal. The effect, again, is non-eternal.⁹

8. Time of such description becomes an instrument in the cosmic sport of Īśvara.¹⁰ In the 'sport-manifestation'¹¹ Īśvara functions indeed as dependent on time. In the 'eternal-manifestation', though time exists, it has no independence.

९. केचित्तु तत्र कालो नास्तीति वदन्ति । अन्ये तु तामसम-
हान् काल इति । उभयेषाम् आगमबाधः प्रत्यक्षबाधश्च । षडिन्द्रिय-
वेद्यः काल इत्याचार्याः । तेन अनुमेयवादनिरासः । इति कालो निरूपितः ।

इति श्रीवाधूलकुलतिलकश्रीमन्महाचार्यस्य प्रथमदासेन श्रीनिवास-
दासेन विरचितायां यतीन्द्रमतदीपिकायां कालनिरूपणं
नाम पञ्चमोऽवतारः ॥

9. Some say that time does not exist there ; others say that time is the tamas-predominant mahat. Both these views are opposed to Scripture and perception. The ācāryas say that time is cognizable by the six senses. By this, the view that it is an object of inference is refuted. Thus time has been explained.

Here ends the fifth 'avatāra' on kālā of Yatīndramatadīpikā
composed by Śrīnivāsa, the foremost disciple of Śrīman
Mahācārya, an ornament in the line of Śrī Vādhūlas

षष्ठोऽवतारः

नित्यविभूतिः

१. अथ नित्यविभूतिर्निरूप्यते । शुद्धसत्त्वधर्मभूतज्ञानजीवेश्वरसाधारणं लक्षणम् अजडत्वम् । अजडत्वं नाम स्वयम्प्रकाशत्वम् । तत्र शुद्धसत्त्वधर्मभूतज्ञानसाधारणं लक्षणं—पराक्त्वे सति अजडत्वम् । तत्तु स्वयम्प्रकाशत्वे सति परस्मा एव भासमानत्वम् ।

२. शुद्धसत्त्वं नाम त्रिगुणद्रव्यव्यतिरिक्तत्वे सति सत्त्ववत्त्वं ;

AVATĀRA VI

NITYAVIBHŪTI

1. Now the nityavibhūti is explained. Immateriality (ajaḍatva) is a general characteristic of s'uddhasattva,¹ dharmabhūtajñāna,² individual self and Īśvara. What is called immateriality is self-luminosity. Of these, the common characteristic of s'uddhasattva and dharmabhūtajñāna is thus: They possess the quality of immateriality while existing *for another*.³ They appear to (or are cognized by) others alone and are self-luminous.

2. What is called s'uddhasattva is a kind of

निःशेषाविद्यानिवृत्तिदेशविजातीयान्यत्वम् । सा विभूतिरूर्ध्वप्रदेशे अनन्ता । अधःप्रदेशे परिच्छिन्ना अचेतना स्वयम्प्रकाशा च । आनन्दावहत्वादानन्दनामिका । पञ्चोपनिषन्मन्त्रप्रतिपाद्यतया पञ्चोपनिषदात्मिका । अप्राकृत-पञ्चशक्तिमत्तया पञ्चशक्तिमयीति निगद्यते ।

३. सा विभूतिरीश्वरस्य नित्यानां मुक्तानां च ईश्वरसङ्कल्पात् भोग्यभोगोपकरणभोगस्थानरूपा च भवति । भोग्यमीश्वरशरीरादि । भोगोपकरणं चन्दनकुसुमवस्त्रभूषणायुधादीनि । भोगस्थानं तु गोपुरपुरप्राकार-मण्डपविमानोद्यानपद्मिन्यादिकम् ।

(spiritual substance) being different from the matter affected by the three guṇas and possessing sattva ; it is distinct from that which is different from the region where nescience is entirely got rid of. This 'manifestation' is infinite in the higher regions and finite in the lower regions ; and this is non-conscious and self-luminous. It is designated as 'bliss' since it conveys bliss. It is the embodiment of *Pañcopaniṣad* as explained by the hymns of *Pañcopaniṣad*. It is proclaimed to be of the nature of five powers, since it is made up of five immutable powers.¹

3. This 'manifestation' by the will of Īśvara assumes the form of objects, means and abodes of enjoyment for Īśvara, the eternal and the released self. The objects of enjoyment are the body of Īśvara etc. The means of enjoyment are sandal, perfume, flowers, raiments, ornaments, weapons, etc. The abodes of enjoyment are city-gates, ramparts, pavillions, aerial cars, gardens, lotus ponds, etc.

४. तत्र ईश्वरस्य नित्यानां च शरीराणि भगवन्नित्येच्छा-
सिद्धानि । मुक्तानां शरीराणि तेषां पित्रादिष्टुष्टिः युगपदनेकशरीरपरिग्रहा
इत्यादीनि भगवत्सङ्कल्पादेव भवन्ति ।

५. भगवतो व्यूहविभवार्चावतारशरीराण्यपि अप्राकृतमयानि ।
अर्चावतारेषु प्रतिष्ठानन्तरं प्रसादोन्मुखेश्वरसङ्कल्पाधीनम् अप्राकृतं शरीरमत्रा-
विर्भवति । प्राकृताप्राकृतसंसर्गः कथमिति न शङ्कनीयम् । रामकृष्णाद्य-
वतारशरीरवदिति प्रमाणानुसारेण परिहारो द्रष्टव्यः ।

६. मुक्तानां शरीरपरिग्रहस्तु वसन्तोत्सववेषपरिग्रहादिवत्
स्वामिनः कैङ्कर्यमेव ।

4. The bodies of Īśvara and the eternal are accomplished by the eternal wish of Bhagavān. The bodies of the released selfs, the creation of manes for them, the simultaneous assumption of many bodies etc. are brought about by the will of Bhagavān.

5. The bodies of Bhagavān in his aspects of vyūha, vibhava and arcāvatāra, are made up of non-material substance. In the case of arcāvatāras, after the consecration, the non-material body manifests itself, dependent on the will of Īśvara who is disposed to bless. Nor may it be doubted, 'How can there be contact between the material and the non-material?'; for it can be refuted on the basis of the evidence of the bodies of the incarnations like Rāma, Kṛṣṇa, etc.

6. The embodiment of the released individual selfs is only for the service of the Lord, like the disguise worn on the occasion of the spring festival.

७. ईश्वरशरीरस्य षाड्गुण्यमिति व्यवहारः षाड्गुण्यप्रकाश-
कत्वात् । नित्यनिरवद्यनिरतिशयौज्ज्वल्यसौन्दर्यसौगन्ध्यसौकुमार्यलावण्य-
यौवनमार्दवार्जवादयो दिव्यमङ्गलविग्रहगुणाः । तस्य व्यापकत्वं गीतादिषु
प्रसिद्धम् ।

८. मुक्तस्य शरीरं नास्तीति वचनं तु कर्मकृतशरीराभावपरम् ।
तत्रत्येन्द्रियाणां नित्यत्वात्, अत एव कार्यकारणभावाभावात् प्राकृतवन्न
तत्त्वान्तरव्यपदेशः ।

९. एतेन तत्र शरीरादिकं नास्तीति मतनिरासः । 'तमसः

7. The usage of the expression 'six attributed-
ness in connection with Īśvara's body' is due to the
manifestation by it of those six attributes.⁵ The
eternal, faultless and unsurpassable attributes of the
Divine Auspicious Figure are splendour, beauty,
fragrance, tenderness, loveliness, youthfulness, softness,
etc. The pervasiveness (of the Lord's body) is well
known in works such as the *Gīta*⁶ etc.

8. The passage, which states that the released
individual selfs have no embodiment, means that the
body determined by karma is absent. There the senses
are eternal; therefore there is not the relation of cause
and effect; hence (the non-material senses) are not
designated as separate categories like the material ones.

9. By this, the view that there are no bodies
etc. (in the state of release) is refuted. The opinion
of the disputant who maintains that (the nityavibhūti)

परस्तात्' इत्युक्त्या प्रकृत्येकदेशवादमतनिरासः । अप्राकृतशब्दस्पर्शरूप-
रसगन्धाश्रयत्वात् आकाशादिव्यावृत्तिः । ज्ञानात्मकत्वप्रतिपादनात् जडत्व-
मतनिरासः ।

१०. भगवतोऽप्राकृतदिव्यमङ्गलविग्रहस्तु अस्त्रभूषणाध्यायोक्त-
सर्वोपाश्रयः । तद्यथा—पुरुषस्य कौस्तुभाकारत्वं, प्रकृतेः श्रीवत्सरूपत्वं,
महतो गदारूपत्वं, सात्त्विकाहङ्कारस्य शङ्खरूपत्वं, तामसाहङ्कारस्य शार्ङ्ग-
रूपत्वं, ज्ञानस्य खड्गरूपत्वम्, अज्ञानस्य तदावरकरूपत्वं, मनसश्चक्र-
रूपत्वं, कर्मज्ञानेन्द्रियाणां शररूपत्वं, सूक्ष्मस्थूलभूतानां वनमालाकारत्वम् ।

is a portion of the prakṛti is also rejected, because of the passage 'Beyond the darkness'.⁷ Since (nityavi-
bhūti) is the locus of non-material sound, touch, colour, savour and odour, (the material) ether and others have been excluded. The view that it is non-sentient is repudiated, since it has been explained that it is of the nature of knowledge.⁸

10. That the non-material, divine and auspicious figure of Bhagavān is the repository of everything has been described in the chapter 'Weapons and Ornaments'.⁹ It is thus: puruṣa is in the form of kaustubha,¹⁰ prakṛti śrīvatsa,¹¹ mahat the club, sāttvikāhaṅkāra the conch, tāmasāhaṅkāra the bow, knowledge the sword, ignorance its sheath, mind the discus, sense and motor organs the arrows, subtle and gross elements the garland. In this connection (the following

‘चेतश्चक्रति चेतनासिरमतिस्तत्संवृतिर्मालिका

भूतानि स्वगुणैरहङ्कृतियुगं शङ्खेन शार्ङ्गायते ।

वाणाः खानि दशापि कौस्तुभमणिर्जीवः प्रधानं पुनः

श्रीवत्सः कमलापते तव गदामाहुर्महान्तं बुधाः ॥’

इति संगृह्योक्तं पद्यमनुसन्धेयम् ।

११. सा विभूतिः आमोदप्रमोदसम्मोदवैकुण्ठाख्यरूपेण चतुर्विधा पुनरनन्ता त्रिपाद्विभूतिपरमपदपरमव्योमपरमाकाशामृतनाकाप्राकृतलोकानन्दलोकवैकुण्ठायोध्यादिशब्दवाच्या च । एतस्यां विभूतौ द्वादश-वरणोपेतम् अनेकगोपुरप्राकारैरावृतं वैकुण्ठं नाम नगरम् । तत्र आनन्द-

verse) which states (this conception) in an abridged form may be referred to: ‘The wise say, “O Lord of Kamalā! Your discus is the mind, sword and its sheath are knowledge and ignorance (respectively), garland the elements, conch and bow the two forms of egoity made of guṇas, arrows the ten senses, kaustubha the individual self, s’rīvatsa the pradhāna, and club the mahat”’.

11. The (eternal) manifestation is of four kinds as āmoda, pramoda, sammōda and vaikunṭha; ¹² and again it is infinite. It is denoted by such terms as tripādvibhūti, paramapada, paramavyoma, paramākāśa, amṛta, nāka, aprākṛtaloka, ānandaloka, vaikunṭha, etc. The city of Vaikunṭha is situated in the (realm) of eternal manifestation with twelve enclosures, and surrounded

नामको दिव्यालयः । तदन्तः रत्नमयानेकस्तम्भसहस्रैर्विरचिता महामणि-
मण्डपाख्या सभा । तस्यां सहस्रफणामणितेजोविराजितोऽनन्तः । तस्मिन्
धर्मादिमयदिव्यसिंहासनम् । तदुपरि चामरहस्ताभिर्विमलादिभिः सेवितम्
अष्टदलात्मकं पद्मम् । तदुपरि प्रकृष्टविज्ञानधामा शेषः । तदुपरि वाचः
परमद्भुतम् । एवं नित्यविभूतिः निरूपिता ।

इति श्रीवाधूलकुलतिलकश्रीमन्महाचार्यस्य प्रथमदासेन श्रीनिवास-
दासेन विरचितायां यतीन्द्रमतदीपिकायां नित्यविभूतिनिरूपणं
नाम षष्ठोऽवतारः ॥

by many gates and ramparts. In this is the divine
abode known as ānanda ; within that is the hall known
as mahāmaṇimaṇḍapa constructed with thousands of
pillars made of jewels. In it is Ananta, lit up by the
lustre of the gems of his thousand hoods. On him is
the divine throne made of dharma etc.¹³ Over it is the
eight-petalled lotus, attended by Vimalā¹⁴ and others,
with chowries in their hands. On it is Śeṣa,¹⁵ the
abode of supreme knowledge. Over Śeṣa is the
transcendental (being) who is beyond speech. Thus
nityavibhūti has been explained.

Here ends the sixth 'avatāra' on nityavibhūti of Yatīndramatādi-
pikā, composed by Śrīnivāsa, the foremost disciple of Śrīman
Mahācārya, an ornament in the line of Śrī Vādhūlas

सप्तमोऽवतारः

धर्मभूतज्ञानम्

१. अथ क्रमप्राप्तं धर्मभूतज्ञानं निरूप्यते । स्वयम्प्रकाशा-
चेतनद्रव्यत्वे सति विषयित्वं, विभुत्वे सति प्रभावद्रव्यगुणात्मकत्वम्,
अर्थप्रकाशो बुद्धिः । इति तल्लक्षणम् ।

२. तद्धर्मभूतज्ञानं ईश्वरस्य नित्यानां च सर्वदा नित्यमेव

AVATĀRA VII

DHARMABHŪTAJNĀNA

1. Now, attributive consciousness, which comes next in sequence, is explained. It consists in being the subject (viṣayin *i.e.*, the objects are manifested by it) while it is a self-luminous,¹ unconscious² substance. It is of the nature of substance-attribute³ (dravya-guṇa) like light while it is all-pervasive. Consciousness is that which manifests the objects. These are the characteristics of the attributive consciousness.

2. Attributive consciousness is always eternal and all-pervasive in respect of Īśvara and the eternal.

विभु च । बद्धानां तिरोहितमेव । मुक्तानां पूर्वं तिरोहितम् अनन्तर-
माविर्भूतम् ।

३. ज्ञानस्य नित्यत्वे 'ज्ञानमुत्पन्नं ज्ञानं नष्टम्' इति
व्यवहारः कथम् ? इति चेत्, न । ज्ञानस्य सङ्कोचविकासावस्थामादाय
तत्सम्भवात् । दृतेः पात्राद्यथा उदकं क्षरति तथा ज्ञानमपि इन्द्रियद्वारा
निःसृत्य अर्थेन सन्निकृष्यते । अहिकुण्डलवत् सङ्कोचविकासौ ।

४. सर्वं ज्ञानं स्वत एव प्रमाणं स्वयम्प्रकाशं च । 'विप्रतिपन्ना
संवित् स्वगतव्यवहारं प्रति स्वाधीनकिञ्चित्करा, स्वजातीयसम्बन्धानपेक्ष-

It is obscured in the case of bound individual selfs.
In the case of liberated ones it is obscured at first,
(but) manifests later on.

3. 'If consciousness is eternal, how can there be
the empirical usage "consciousness is born, conscious-
ness is destroyed"?' If this be asked, no; for (the
apparent appearance and disappearance of conscious-
ness) is possible by virtue of its states of contraction
and expansion.⁴ Just as water goes out through the
hole of a leather-bag, consciousness issues through the
sense organs and contacts the objects. Contraction and
expansion (of consciousness) are like the coiling up
of a snake.

4. All consciousness, indeed, is self-valid and
self-luminous. (That consciousness is self-luminous is
inferred in the following manner): 'The conscious-
ness, it is disputed, with reference to its own empirical
usage, effects something independently, because it is
the cause of empirical usage independent of anything

व्यवहारहेतुत्वात्, अर्थेन्द्रियदीपवत्' । न च चक्षुरालोकयोः सजातीयत्वम्, आहङ्कारिकतैजसभेदाद्भेदः ।

५. अनेन ज्ञानस्य क्षणिकत्वं, त्रिक्षणावस्थायित्वं, प्रातिभासिकवत् व्यवहारस्य मिथ्यात्वं, परतः प्रामाण्यं, ज्ञानस्यैव आत्मत्वम् इत्यादिपक्षा निरस्ताः ।

६. 'स्तम्भः स्तम्भः' इत्यादिधारावाहिकज्ञानं तु एकमेव ।

७. ननु आगमबलात् ज्ञानस्य नित्यत्वाङ्गीकारे कथं जागर-सुषुप्त्यादिभेदसिद्धिः ? इति चेत्, न । यथा दाहकस्य बहेर्दाहसन्निधौ मण्यादिप्रतिबन्धके दाहाभावः तद्वत् ज्ञानस्य तिरोधायकतमोविशेषसन्निधाना-

in its own class, like an object, or a sense organ or a light.'⁵ Between sense of sight and light, there is no similarity of generic character ; for there is distinction (between them) because of the difference as that of ahaṅkāra and that of tejas.⁶

5. That consciousness is momentary, that it endures for three moments, that it is illusory in empirical life as in the phenomenal, that it has extrinsic validity, that consciousness itself is the self—these and similar other views are refuted by this.

6. The continuous stream of cognition in the form of 'pillar, pillar' and so on is but one.⁷

7. 'Now, on the strength of Scripture if the eternality of consciousness is admitted, how can the difference of states like waking, sleep, etc. be accounted for?' If this be asked, no ; just as fire which can burn (anything) loses its burning power owing to the obstruction of gem etc.⁸ in the proximity of a thing to

सन्निधानाभ्यां स्वापादिसिद्धिः । पुँस्त्वादिवच्च । पुँस्त्वादिकं बाल्ये तिरोहितं यौवने आविर्भवति ।

८. 'यो यदाश्रितस्वभावः स तस्य गुणः, विशेषणादिवत्' इति लक्षणलक्षितत्वात् ज्ञानं गुणः ।

९. यतः सङ्कोचविकासावस्थावत्, अतो द्रव्यमपि भवति । आत्मगुणभूतस्य ज्ञानस्य द्रव्यत्वं कथमिति न शङ्कनीयम् । प्रभावत् एकस्यैव द्रव्यत्वगुणत्वयोर्विरोधाभावात् । अवस्थाश्रयो द्रव्यमिति द्रव्य-लक्षणम् । स्वाश्रयादन्यत्र वर्तमानत्वमपि प्रभावत् एवोपपद्यते । प्रयोगश्च—

be burnt, similarly owing to the presence or absence of a particular kind of tamas which obscures consciousness, sleep and other states are produced. And it is like virility etc.; for virility and other powers are obscured in boyhood, but manifest themselves in youth.

8. Consciousness is of the nature of attribute, because of the characterization of the definition as 'whichever, by nature, is dependent on something, that (dependent thing) is the attribute (of the object on which it depends), like the attributes (of a substance)'.

9. Since consciousness possesses states like contraction and expansion, it becomes also a substance. It need not be doubted that how consciousness, an attribute of the individual self, could become a substance; for like a light there is no contradiction in the substance-attribute nature of the (same) object. The definition of substance is thus: substance is that which is the abode of states. The extension of consciousness beyond its substrate is possible like light. A syllogism

‘गुणभूता बुद्धिर्द्रव्यं, प्रसरणादिमत्त्वात्, प्रभावत्’ । ‘ज्ञानं द्रव्यं, संयोगा-
दृष्टान्यत्वे सति भावनाकारणत्वात्, आत्मवत्’ इति ।

१०. मुक्तज्ञानस्य युगपदनन्तदेहसंयोगो नयनसूर्यादितेजोवत्
सम्भवति ।

११. ज्ञानं मतिः प्रज्ञा संवित् विषणा धीः मनीषा शेमुषी
मेधा बुद्धिरित्येवमादयः शब्दा ज्ञानपर्यायाः । बुद्धिरेव उपाधिभेदात् सुख-
दुःखेच्छाद्वेषप्रयत्नरूपा । सुखादिजनकज्ञानातिरेके प्रमाणाभावात् । ‘इच्छामि
द्वेषमि’ इति व्यवहारस्य ‘स्मरामि’ इत्यादिवत् ज्ञानविशेषेणैवोपपत्तेः ।

may be made thus: ‘attributive consciousness is a substance, because it possesses (the attributes of) diffusion etc., like a luminous substance.’ (And further), ‘consciousness is a substance, because it is the cause of cognition (bhāvana), being different from the conjunction and the unseen effect (adr̥ṣṭa), like an individual self’.

10. The consciousness of the liberated can simultaneously contact infinite number of bodies like rays issuing from the eye, sun, etc.

11. Terms such as jñāna, mati, prajñā, saṁvit, dhiṣaṇā, dhī, manīṣā, s’emuṣī, medhā, buddhi and others are synonyms of consciousness. Consciousness itself owing to the difference of the limiting adjunct takes the form of happiness, sorrow, desire, hate, endeavour, etc. There is no evidence for the assumption of consciousness as distinct from and as a cause for generating happiness etc. The empirical usage ‘I desire’, ‘I hate’ is accounted as an attribute of consciousness like ‘I remember’ (which is also a different form of consciousness).

१२. ननु 'कामः सङ्कल्पो विचिकित्सा श्रद्धाश्रद्धा धृतिरधृति-
र्हीर्षीर्भीरित्येतत् सर्वं मन एव' इत्युक्तानां ज्ञानरूपत्वं कथम्? इति
चेत्, न । ज्ञानस्य मनस्सहकारित्वनियमात् मन एवेत्युपचारादुक्तमिति न
विरोधः ।

१३. एवं प्रत्यक्षानुमानागमस्मृतिसंशयविपर्ययभ्रमविवेकव्यव-
सायमोहरागद्वेषमदमात्सर्यधैर्यचापल्यदम्भलोभक्रोधदर्पस्तम्भद्रोहाभिनिवेश-
निर्वेदानन्दादयः सुमतिदुर्मतिसुप्रीतितुष्ट्युन्नतिशान्तिविरक्तिरतिमैत्रीदया-
मुमुक्षालज्जातितिक्षाविचारणाविजिगीषामुदिताक्षमाचिकीर्षाजुगुप्साभावना-

12. 'Now, it has been stated that desire, resolve, doubt, faith, want of faith, firmness, want of firmness, modesty, intelligence, fear and all these are but the mind⁹. (If they are such), how could they be of the nature of consciousness?' If this be asked, no; since mind, according to an invariable principle, is the associate of consciousness, it was figuratively said that the mind was all. Hence there is no contradiction in this.

13. Similarly perception, inference, verbal testimony, recollection, doubt, misapprehension, error, discrimination, effort, infatuation, attachment, hate, inebriety, envy, courage, fickleness, arrogance, covetousness, anger, pride, stupefaction, treachery, persistence, disgust, joy, etc., and good state of mind, bad state of mind, affection, contentment, exaltation, peace, non-attachment, enjoyment friendship, compassion, desire for liberation, modesty forbearance, enquiry, desire for victory, delight, forgiveness, desire to act, aversion,

कुहनासूयाजिघांसातृष्णादुराशावासनाचर्चाश्रद्धाभक्तिप्रपत्त्यादयश्च जीवगुणा अनन्ता धर्मभूतज्ञानावस्थाविशेषा एव ।

१४. एवं ज्ञानशक्तिबलैश्वर्यवीर्यतेजःसौशील्यवात्सल्यमार्दवार्जव-
सौहार्दसाम्यकारुण्यमाधुर्यगांभीर्यौदार्यचातुर्यस्थैर्यधैर्यशौर्यपराक्रमादयो भग-
वतोऽनन्तकल्याणगुणाः ज्ञानशक्त्योर्विततिभूताः ।

१५. तत्र ज्ञानं नाम सर्वसाक्षात्काररूपम् । शक्तिरघटितघटना-
सामर्थ्यम् । बलं धारणसामर्थ्यम् । ऐश्वर्यं नियमनसामर्थ्यम् । वीर्यम-
विकारित्वम् । तेजः पराभिभवसामर्थ्यम् । महतो मन्दैः सह नीरन्ध्रेण

reminiscent impression, hypocrisy, detraction of the qualities of others, desire to kill, inordinate hankering, cupidity, past impression, discussion, faith, devotion (to God), self-surrender (to God), etc. are the attributes of the individual self, which are innumerable ; they are but particular modes of the attributive consciousness.

14. Likewise knowledge, power, strength, splendour, prowess, lustre, excellence of disposition, love, softness, straightforwardness, friendliness, equality, compassion, sweetness, profundity, generosity, cleverness, steadiness, firmness, heroism, valour, and others are the infinite, auspicious attributes of Bhagavān ; they are the expansion of his knowledge and power.

15. Of these, what is called knowledge is of the nature of universal realization. Power is the capacity to accomplish what cannot be accomplished. Strength is the capacity to bear. Splendour is the capacity to rule. Prowess is immutability. Lustre is the power to vanquish others. Excellence of disposition is the natural

संश्लेषस्वभावत्वं सौशील्यम् । वात्सल्यं दोषेऽपि गुणत्वबुद्धिः, दोषादशित्वं वा । आश्रितविरहासहत्वं मार्दवम् । मनोवाक्कायैकरूप्यमार्जवम् । स्वसत्तान-
पेक्षतद्रक्षापरत्वं सौहार्दम् । जन्मज्ञानवृत्तगुणाद्यनपेक्षया सर्वैराश्रयणीयत्वं साम्यम् । स्वार्थानपेक्षपरदुःखनिराचिकीर्षा कारुण्यं, परदुःखासहिष्णुत्वं वा । क्षीरवत् उपाध्यभावेऽपि स्वादुत्वं माधुर्यम् । भक्तानुग्रहवदान्यत्वादेरामूलतो दुरवगाहत्वं गाम्भीर्यम् । अपरिमितं दत्त्वापि अतृप्तत्वमौदार्यम् । आश्रित-
दोषगोपनं चातुर्यम् । अकम्पनीयत्वं स्थैर्यम् । अभग्नप्रतिज्ञत्वं धैर्यम् ।

tendency of the high to contact the low without any difference.¹⁰ Love is the disposition to see virtue in spite of the existence of fault, or not finding fault at all. Softness is the inability to endure the separation of one's own dependents. Straightforwardness is oneness of thought, word and deed. Friendliness is readiness to save them (*i.e.*, dependents) even ignoring one's own existence. Equality means to become the refuge of all, irrespective of birth, knowledge, behaviour, qualities, etc. Compassion is the desire to alleviate the suffering of others without self-interest, or the incapacity to bear the suffering of others. Sweetness is to be dainty without any condition like milk. Profundity means the impossibility to thoroughly measure the depth of (God's) favour, munificence, etc. towards His devotees. Generosity is the sense of dissatisfaction even after conferring in abundance. Cleverness consists in hiding the faults of persons who have taken refuge. Steadiness is non-agitation. Firmness is the absence of

परबलप्रवेशनसामर्थ्यं शौर्यम् । तन्निराकरणं पराक्रमः इत्याद्युह्यम् ।

१६. ज्ञानविशेषभूतयोर्भक्तिप्रपत्त्योः स्वरूपं किञ्चिदुच्यते—
भक्तिप्रपत्तिभ्यां प्रसन्न ईश्वर एव मोक्षं ददाति । अतस्तयोरेव मोक्षोपायत्वम् ।

१७. मोक्षोपायत्वेन उक्तानां कर्मयोगज्ञानयोगप्रभृतीनां भक्ति-
द्वारैव साधनत्वम् ।

१८. कर्मयोगो नाम उपदेशात् जीवपरयाथात्म्यज्ञानवता शक्यनु-
सारेण फलसङ्गरहितानिषिद्धकाम्यनित्यनैमित्तिकरूपपरिगृहीतकर्मविशेषः । स

vascillation after solemn declaration. Heroism is the capacity to penetrate into the heart of the army ; the destruction of that (army) is valour. Likewise other (attributes) have to be inferred.

16. The essential nature of bhakti and prapatti, which are particular modes of consciousness, will (now) be briefly told: Īsvara alone grants release (from bondage) when He is propitiated by bhakti and prapatti. Hence these (two) alone are the means for the attainment of release.

17. Karmayoga, jñānayoga and other yogas, which are said to be the means for liberation, are the means (to mokṣa) through the medium of bhakti alone.

18. What is called karmayoga is a special kind of activity which a person possessing true knowledge of the individual self and the Highest (received) from the instructions of the preceptor, performs according to his capacity ; it is non-prohibited action without any regard for the fruits, and is in the shape of kāmya, nitya

तु देवार्चनातपस्तीर्थदानयज्ञादिभेदभिन्नः । अयं तु जीवगतकल्मषापनयनद्वारा ज्ञानयोगमुत्पाद्य तद्वारा साक्षाद्वा भवत्युत्पादको भवति ।

१९. ज्ञानयोगो नाम कर्मयोगान्निर्मलान्तःकरणस्य ईश्वरशेषत्वेन प्रकृतिवियुक्तस्वात्मचिन्ताविशेषः । एतस्य साक्षाद्भक्त्युपयोगित्वम् । एवं साधनान्तराणामपि भक्त्युपयोगित्वमूह्यम् ।

२०. भक्तियोगो नाम यमनियमासनप्राणायामप्रत्याहारधारणा-
ध्यानसमाधिरूपाष्टाङ्गवाँस्तैलधारावदविच्छिन्नस्मृतिसन्तानरूपः ।

and naimittika actions. It is divided into worship of God, penance, pilgrimage, charity, sacrifice, etc. This, by destroying the impurities of the individual self, generates jñānayoga, and through it or directly becomes the producer of bhakti.

19. What is called jñānayoga is a special kind of meditation on the (real nature) of one's own self as distinct from prakṛti and as existing for the purpose of Īśvara, after having attained purity of mind by the (discipline of) karmayoga. This is useful for the direct realization of bhakti. Likewise the manner in which other means also are useful for generating bhakti may be understood.

20. What is called bhaktiyoga is a continuous stream of remembrance (of God), uninterrupted like the flow of oil,¹¹ and is characterized by the eightfold limbs of yama, niyama, āsana, prāṇāyāma, pratyāhāra, dhāraṇā, dhyāna and samādhi.¹²

२१. स च विवेकविमोकाभ्यासक्रियाकल्याणानवसादानुद्धर्षरूप-
साधनसप्तकजन्यः ।

२२. तत्र विवेको नाम जात्याश्रयनिमित्तादुष्टादन्नात्कायशुद्धिः ।
विमोकः कामानभिष्वङ्गः । अभ्यासः पुनः पुनरालम्बनसंशीलनम् । शक्तिः
पञ्चमहायज्ञाद्यनुष्ठानं क्रिया । सत्यार्जवदयादानार्हिसानभिध्याः कल्याणानि ।
अनवसादो दैन्याभावः । अनुद्धर्षस्तुष्ट्यभावः । अतिसन्तोषश्च विरोधीत्यर्थः ।

२३. एवं साधनसप्तकानुगृहीता भक्तिः दर्शनसमानाकारा अन्ति-

21. It (bhaktiyoga) is generated by the sevenfold discipline of viveka, vimoka, abhyāsa, kriyā, kalyāṇa, anavasāda and anuddharṣa.¹³

22. Of these, what is called viveka (discrimination) is the purification of the body by food that has not become impure either on account of species or abode or adventitious cause.¹⁴ Vimoka (mental detachment) consists in non-attachment to desires.¹⁵ Abhyāsa (practice) is the continuous meditation of the Perfect Object.¹⁶ Kriyā (actions) means the performance of the five great sacrifices according to one's capacity.¹⁷ Kalyāṇas (virtues) are such as truthfulness, straightforwardness, compassion, liberality, non-violence and non-covetousness.¹⁸ Anavasāda (cheerfulness) is freedom 'from dejection.'¹⁹ Anuddharṣa (non-exultation) is the absence of exultation.²⁰ The meaning is that over-exultation is opposed (to meditation).

23. Then bhakti, favoured by the sevenfold discipline, attains the likeness of direct intuition ; it has ' final

मप्रत्ययावधिका च भवति । स चान्तिमप्रत्यय एतच्छरीरावसाने वा शरीरान्तरावसाने वा भवति ।

२४. वेदनध्यानोपासनादिशब्दवाच्या भक्तिः परभक्तिपरज्ञान-परमभक्तिरूपक्रमवती प्रपत्यङ्गिका च ।

२५. सा द्विविधा—साधनभक्तिफलभक्तिभेदात् । उक्तसाधन-जन्या साधनभक्तिः । फलभक्तिस्तु ईश्वरकृपाजन्या श्रीपराङ्मुखायाः शरीरादि-निष्ठा । 'मद्भक्तजनवात्सल्यम्' इत्यादिषु स्तुतिनमस्कारादिषु च भक्ति-शब्दप्रयोग औपचारिकः ।

realization' ²¹ as its limit. This 'final realization' may take place at the end of the present body or at the end of some other body. ²²

24. Bhakti, denoted by such terms as vedana, dhyāna, upāsana, etc. transforms itself into successive forms of parabhakti, parajñāna, and paramabhakti; it has prapatti (self-surrender) as a limb.

25. It is of two kinds because of the difference as, sādhanabhakti (bhakti engendered by spiritual exercises) and phalabhakti (spontaneous devotion). Sādhanabhakti is generated by the aforesaid means. Phalabhakti, as found in S'rī Parāṅkusa, Nātha, etc., is engendered by the grace of Īśvara. The use of the term 'bhakti' in (expressions such as) 'The love of those who are devoted to me' etc. and in praises and salutations, etc. is figurative.

२६. ननु वेदान्तेषु श्रवणमननयोरपि विधानात् कथं ध्यानमेव विधीयते? इति चेत्, उच्यते । अधीतसाङ्गवेदः पुरुषः प्रयोजनवदर्थवबोधित्वदर्शनात् तन्निर्णयाय स्वयमेव श्रवणे प्रवर्तते इति श्रवणस्य प्राप्तत्वात् अनुवादः । श्रवणप्रतिष्ठार्थत्वात् मननस्यापि अनुवादः । तस्मात् ध्यानमेव विधीयते इति न विरोधः ।

२७. ध्यानशब्दवाच्या भक्तिर्विद्याभेदात् बहुविधा । ताश्च विद्या द्विविधाः—ऐहिकफलाः मुक्तिफलाश्चेति । तत्रैहिकफला उद्गीथविद्यादयः ।

26. 'Now, when the Vedānta texts have laid down "hearing and reflection" (as means to salvation), how "meditation" alone is enjoined?' If this be asked, it is said in reply: A person who has studied the Veda with its limbs finds that it contains instruction regarding activities subserving particular purposes, and in order to ascertain it he applies himself to 'hearing'. Since 'hearing' is thus established, it becomes the anuvāda (*i.e.*, reference to what is already mentioned or known). (Likewise) 'reflection' is also an anuvāda, since it confirms what one has heard. Therefore (all the Vedānta texts) enjoin 'meditation' only;²³ thus there is no contradiction.

27. Bhakti, denoted by the term 'meditation' is manifold, because of the difference of vidyās²⁴ (*i.e.*, forms of meditation). And these vidyās are of two kinds: those that are the means for the attainment of ephemeral fruits and those that are useful for the attainment of liberation. Of these, udgīthavidyā and

मुक्तिफलास्तु अन्तरक्षिविद्या, दहरविद्या, भूमविद्या, सद्विद्या, मधुविद्या, उपकोसलविद्या, शाण्डिल्यविद्या, पुरुषविद्या, वैश्वानरविद्या, पञ्चामि-
विद्या इत्यादिकाः ब्रह्मविद्याः ।

२८. न्यासविद्या प्रपत्तिः । प्रपत्तिर्नाम—

‘आनुकूल्यस्य सङ्कल्पः प्रातिकूल्यस्य वर्जनम् ।

रक्षिष्यतीति विश्वासो गोप्तृत्ववरणं तथा ॥

आत्मनिक्षेपकार्पण्यम्’ इत्यङ्गपञ्चकयुक्ता । एतद्देहावसाने मोक्षपदा
सकृत्कर्तव्या न्यासः शरणागतिरित्यादिशब्दवेद्या ज्ञानविशेषरूपा । एषा
प्रपत्तिर्गुरुमुखाद्ग्रहस्यशास्त्रेषु सम्प्रदायतया वेदितव्येति इह बालबोधार्थं
प्रवृत्ते ग्रन्थे न प्रकाशयेति विरम्यते ।

others are the means for the attainment of ephemeral
fruits. Brahmayidyās such as antaraksividyā,²⁵ dahara-
vidyā,²⁶ bhūmayidyā,²⁷ sadvidyā,²⁸ madhuvidyā,²⁹
upakosalavidyā,³⁰ s’āṇḍilyavidyā,³¹ puruṣavidyā,³² vais’vā-
naravidyā³³ pañcāgnividyā,³⁴ etc. are the means for the
attainment of liberation.

28. Nyāsavidyā is self-surrender.³⁵ What is
called prapatti is ‘to conceive what is in conformity
(with the will of Īsvara), to reject what is dis-
agreeable (to Īsvara), to have firm faith as “He
will save me”, to seek Him alone as the protector,
and to surrender one’s self to Him in all meekness’.
Thus it has five constituents.³⁶ Nyāsa denoted by
‘s’araṇāgati’ and other terms, is that particular state
of consciousness which grants liberation at the *finis*
of this body and which is to be performed but once.³⁷
This (doctrine of) prapatti has to be known from
the mouth of the preceptor and esoteric works in the

२९. भक्तिप्रपत्त्योरेव मोक्षसाधनत्वेन स्वीकारात् परोक्तोपाय-
निरासः । यथा वेदवाह्यानां मध्ये केषाञ्चिन्मते देहातिरिक्तात्मनः अनङ्गी-
कारात् मोक्षप्रवृत्तिरेव न सम्भवति । अन्येषां मते ज्ञानस्य क्षणिकत्वात्,
तस्यैवात्मत्वात् कस्य प्रवृत्तिः ? । सन्तानस्येति चेत्, न । अन्यं प्रति अन्येन
यत्नो न कर्तव्य इति न प्रवृत्तिः । अपरेषां मते धर्माधर्मादिसप्तभङ्गीरीत्या
अनैकान्तवादात् न प्रवृत्तिः । वैशेषिकादिपक्षे पाषाणकल्पे मोक्षे प्रवृत्तिः

traditional manner; hence this (theme of discourse)
is closed without further elucidation as this work is
written for the enlightenment of the beginners.

29. Since bhakti and prapatti alone have been
admitted as means to liberation, the means enunciated
by others are rejected. For instance, among those
who are beyond the pale of the Vedas, since some³⁸
do not admit any 'self' different from the body, there
is no volitional disposition for release (in their system).
How can there be the exercise of will for release in
the system of others³⁹ who admit the momentariness
of consciousness which itself constitutes the self? If
it be said (that release may be posited) by the succes-
sion (of consciousness), no; for one (that has perished)
cannot exert over another (to bring about release).
Hence there cannot be the volitional inclination for
release. Nor can there be volitional disposition for
release in the system of another, since dharma and
adharma become variable owing to the method
of the seven paralogisms.⁴⁰ Nor can there be any
volitional exercise for liberation in the case of the

कस्यापि न सम्भवति । साङ्ख्यादिपक्षेषु ईश्वरानङ्गीकारात् पुरुषस्य प्रकृतेर्वा मोक्ष इति संशयात् न प्रवृत्तिः । मायिमते व्यावहारिकस्य वाक्यस्य पारमार्थिकामेदज्ञानाजनकत्वात् न प्रवृत्तिः । भास्करयादवयोस्तु कर्मज्ञानसमुच्चयवादोऽपि उक्तादेव निरस्तः । शैवमते तु पशुपतेः प्राप्यत्वस्वीकारात् वेदविरुद्ध-भस्मधारणादेः साधनत्वेन स्वीकाराच्च तन्निरासः । एवं मतिर्निरूपिता ।

इति श्रीवाधूलकुलतिलकश्रीमन्महाचार्यप्रथमदासेन श्रीनिवासदासेन
विरचितायां यतीन्द्रमतदीपिकायां धर्मभूतज्ञाननिरूपणं
नाम सप्तमोऽवतारः ॥

Vaiśeṣikas whose conception of release is nothing but petrification.⁴¹ In the system of Sāṅkhyas, since they do not admit Īśvara, there is doubt as to who attains release, whether the individual self or the prakṛti ; hence there is not the disposition for release. In the case of the Māyins,⁴² since the real, non-dual knowledge cannot arise from the empirical sentences (*i.e.*, scriptural texts), there is not the disposition for release. The doctrine of jñāna *cum* karma of Bhāskara and Yādava⁴³ is refuted by what has been said. The system of Śaivas is rejected owing to its acceptance of Paśupati as the end to be attained and smearing of ashes etc. opposed to the Vedas as the means.⁴⁴ Thus attributive consciousness has been explained.

Here ends the seventh 'avatara' on dharmabhūtajñāna of Yatīndra-matadīpikā composed by Śrīnivāsa, the foremost disciple of
Śrīman Mahācārya, an ornament in the line of Śrī Vādhūlas

अष्टमोऽवतारः

जीवः

१. अथ जीवो निरूप्यते । प्रत्यक्त्वचेतनत्वात्मत्वकर्तृत्वादीनि ईश्वरजीवसाधारणानि लक्षणानि । प्रत्यक्त्वं नाम स्वयमेव स्वस्मै भासमानत्वम् । चेतनत्वं ज्ञानाश्रयत्वम् । आत्मत्वं शरीरप्रतिसम्बन्धित्वम् । कर्तृत्वं सकृत्पञ्चज्ञानाश्रयत्वम् ।

२. एवं सामान्यलक्षणलक्षितस्य विशेषलक्षणानि उच्यन्ते—

AVATĀRA VIII

JĪVA

1. Now the individual self is explained. The common characteristics of the individual self and Īśvara are self-consciousness, sentiency, selfhood, agency, etc. What is called self-consciousness is to illumine oneself for oneself. Sentiency consists in being the locus of consciousness. Selfhood consists in having (invariable) relation with the body. Agency consists in being the locus of volitional consciousness.

2. The special characteristics (of the individual self), whose general attributes have been pointed out

अणुत्वे सति चेतनत्वं, स्वतः शेषत्वे सति चेतनत्वम् । एवम् आधेयत्व-
विधेयत्वपराधीनकर्तृत्वपरतन्त्रत्वादिकमूढम् ।

३. स देहेन्द्रियमनःप्राणादिभ्यो विलक्षणः । यथा 'मम
शरीरम्' इति प्रतीत्या देहात् व्यावृत्तः । 'चक्षुषा पश्यामि', 'श्रोत्रेण
शृणोमि', 'वाचा वदामि' इत्यादिप्रत्ययात् बाह्येन्द्रियभ्यो व्यावृत्तः ।
'मनसा जानामि' इति मनसो ज्ञानकरणत्वप्रतीतेः, 'मम प्राणा'
इति व्यतिरेकोक्तेः, 'जानामि अहम्' इति ज्ञानाच्च मनःप्राणज्ञानेभ्यो
व्यावृत्तः ।

in the above manner, are now set forth (as follows) :
while it is monadic, it is sentient. While it is sub-
sidiary by nature (to Brahman, the principal), it is
sentient.¹ Likewise the qualities of being supported
and controlled, dependency, subserviency have to be
inferred.

3. It (the jīva) is different from the body, the
sense organs, mind, vital breath, etc. It is different
from the body as seen in the perception, 'this is my
body'. It is distinct from the external sense organs
on account of the perception, 'I see with eyes, hear
with ears, speak with the organ of speech, etc'. It is
distinct from mind, vital breath and consciousness on
account of our perception of the mind being the
instrument of consciousness as, 'I know by mind',
on account of the distinguishing expression as, 'my
vital breath' and because of the consciousness as,
'I know'.²

४. स च अणुपरिमाणः । उत्क्रान्त्यादेः श्रवणात् प्रमाणा-
नुसाराच्च । अणुत्वे युगपदनेकविषयानुभवः कथमिति न शङ्कनीयम् ।
धर्मभूतज्ञानव्याप्त्या उपपत्तेः । एतेनैव सौभरिप्रभृतीनां मुक्तानां च युगपद-
नेकशरीरपरिग्रहोऽपि सम्भवति ।

५. स च नित्यः । पूर्वानुभूतार्थप्रतिसन्धानात् । नित्यश्चेत्
“जीव उत्पन्नो, जीवो नष्ट” इति प्रतीतिः कथम् ? इति चेत्, न । जीवस्य
देहसम्बन्ध उत्पत्तिः, तद्वियोगो नाश इति प्रतिपादनात् । जीवस्वरूपं
नित्यमेव ।

4. It is monadic in size, since Scripture declares its passing out³ etc., and (also) because it is in accordance with the sources of knowledge. Nor may it be doubted that how the individual self can simultaneously experience many objects if it were monadic; for it is possible by the pervasiveness of attributive consciousness.⁴ By this, the simultaneous assumption of many bodies by Saubhari etc. and the liberated self is possible.

5. It is eternal;⁵ for it recollects the objects experienced in the past. ‘If it (jīva) is eternal, how can the experience that the “individual self is born”, that the “individual self is destroyed” be accounted for?’ If this be asked, no; for it is established that what is called birth is the individual self’s connection with the body and the destruction is its severance from it.⁶ The essential nature of the individual self is, indeed, eternal.

६. स च प्रतिशरीरं भिन्नः । एकपरिमाणेषु अनेकेषु सुवर्ण-
घटेषु 'एको घट' इति प्रतीतिवत्, व्रीहिगणौ 'एको व्रीहिः' इतिवच्च
ज्ञानैकाकारतया एकत्वव्यवहारः । न तु स्वरूपैक्यं, प्रमाणविरोधात् ।

७. स्वतः सुखी, उपाधिवशात् संसारः । अयं च कर्ता भोक्ता
शरीरी शरीरं च भवति । प्रकृत्यपेक्षया शरीरी, ईश्वरापेक्षया शरीरम् ।
तस्य प्रत्यक्षश्रुतिभ्यां स्वयम्प्रकाशत्वं च सिद्धम् । प्रयोगश्च—'आत्मा
स्वयम्प्रकाशः, ज्ञानत्वात्, धर्मभूतज्ञानवत्' इति । ज्ञानत्वाणुत्वामलत्वादय
एतस्य स्वरूपनिरूपकधर्माः ।

6. It is different in each body. Just as there
is the usage (of the expression), 'one jar' when there
are many gold jars of a similar size, 'one grain' when
there is a heap of grains, so there is the usage of the
singular number (with reference to many individual
selves) on account of the oneness of consciousness.
But not they are identical in their essential nature,
since it contradicts evidence.⁷

7. It is blissful by nature. The empirical exist-
ence (of births and deaths) is due to the force of
limiting adjuncts.⁸ It becomes the agent,⁹ the enjoyer,
the embodied self and the body. It is the embodied
self viewed in relation to primordial matter (*i.e.*, the
physical body). It is the body for the sake of Īsvara.¹⁰
Its luminosity is established by the evidence of
perception and Scripture. The syllogism is as follows:
'The individual self is self-luminous, because it is
consciousness, like the attributive consciousness.' The
quality of being consciousness, monadness, stainless-
ness, etc. are the attributes which determine its
essential nature.

८. एतेन ज्ञानस्य क्षणिकत्वात् क्षणिकसन्तानरूप आत्मेति बौद्धपक्षः, भूतचतुष्टयात्मकत्वात् देहस्य देहावधिक आत्मेति चार्वाक-पक्षः, गजदेहे गजपरिमाणः पिपीलिकादेहे तत्परिमाणः अतो देहपरिमाण आत्मेति जैनपक्षः, कर्तृत्वभोक्तृत्वादिकं प्रकृतेरेव न तु पुरुषस्येति साङ्ख्यपक्षः, ब्रह्मांशो जीव इति यादवपक्षः, सोपाधिब्रह्मखण्डो जीव इति भास्करपक्षः, अविद्याकल्पित एकजीववादपक्षः, अन्तःकरणावच्छिन्नानेक-जीववादपक्ष इत्येवमादयो विरुद्धपक्षा निरस्ताः । विभुत्ववादपक्षोऽपि ।

8. By this (definition of the individual self), the (following) antitheses are refuted : The thesis of the Buddhists that the individual self is the succession of moments, since consciousness is momentary ; the views of the Cārvākas that, since body is composed of the four elements, the individual self is co-extensive with the body ; the opinion of the Jainas that the individual self is of the same size as that of the body, since it assumes the size of the elephant in elephant-body and the size of the ant in its body ; ¹¹ the argument of the Sāṅkhyas that the agency, enjoyment, etc. belong to prakṛti and not to the individual self ; the standpoint of Yādavaprakāśa that the individual self is a portion of Brahman ; the thesis of Bhāskara that the individual self is a division of the conditioned Brahman ; ¹² the single-self thesis that (the individual self) is a fabrication of avidyā ; ¹³ the multi-self view that (the individual self) is the internal-organ-limited consciousness ; etc. ¹⁴ (Likewise) the school which upholds the all-pervasiveness (of the individual self is also refuted).

९. ननु जीवस्य विभुत्वानङ्गीकारे अदृष्टजनितदेशान्तरफलोपलब्धिः कथम् ? इति चेत्, न । जीवस्य सम्बन्धाभावेऽपि अदृष्टवशादेव उपपद्यते । अदृष्टं नाम भगवत्प्रीत्यप्रीतिजनकजीवकर्तृककर्मविशेषजन्यो ज्ञानविशेषः । स विशेषो भगवत्सङ्कल्प एव विभुस्वरूपं भगवन्तमाश्रितः । अतः फलोपलब्धिरेवेति न विरोधः ।

१०. स जीवस्त्रिविधः—बद्धमुक्तनित्यभेदात् । तत्र बद्धा नाम

9. 'Now if the all-pervasiveness (of the self) is not admitted, how, in other regions, the acquisition of fruits engendered by *adr̥ṣṭa* (unseen effects of karma) is possible?' If this be asked, no; for though there is the absence of relation of the individual self (with other regions where it is absent), (the acquisition of fruits) is possible by the power of *adr̥ṣṭa* only. What is called *adr̥ṣṭa* is a special kind of consciousness,¹⁶ generated by a particular kind of action, performed by the individual self, and which produces love or dislike on the part of Bhagavān. This special kind of consciousness is verily the will of Bhagavān and depends on Him whose essential nature is all-pervasiveness. Therefore the acquisition of fruits is certainly possible (for the individual self); thus there is no contradiction.

10. That *jīva* is of three kinds, because of the difference as the bound, the freed, and the eternal. Of

अनिवृत्तसंसाराः । ते चतुर्दशभुवनात्मकाण्डकटाहवर्तिनो ब्रह्मादिकीट-
पर्यन्ताश्चेतनविशेषाः ।

११. श्रीमन्नारायणनाभिकमलात् उत्पन्नो ब्रह्मा । ब्रह्मणो रुद्रः ।
पुनर्ब्रह्मणः सनकादियोगिनो नारदादिदेवऋषयो वसिष्ठभृगवादिब्रह्मऋषयः
पुलस्त्यमरीचिदक्षकश्यपादिनवप्रजापतयो बभूवुः । तेभ्यो देवा दिक्पाला-
श्चतुर्दशेन्द्राश्चतुर्दशमनवः असुराः पितरः सिद्धगन्धर्वकिन्नरकिम्पुरुषविद्याधरा-
दयो वसवो रुद्रा आदित्या अश्विनौ च दानवयक्षराक्षसपिशाचगुह्यकादयः ।
एवं देवयोनयः ।

these, the bound are those who are not freed from the
empirical existence. They are those particular kinds
of sentient beings from Brahmā down to a worm,
who are in the shell of the cosmic sphere which
constitutes the fourteen worlds.

11. Brahmā originated from the navel-lotus of
Sṛīman Nārāyaṇa. From Brahmā, Rudra. Again from
Brahmā were born the yogins beginning with Sanaka,
the heavenly sages such as Nārada, the Brāhmaṇa sages
Vasiṣṭa, Bhṛgu, etc. and the nine Prajāpatis Pulastya,
Marīci, Dakṣa, Kaśyapa, etc. From these have
originated the devas, the guardians of the quarters, the
fourteen Indras, the fourteen Manus, the asuras, the
pitṛs, the siddhas, the gandharvas, the kinnaras, the
kimpuruṣas, the vidyādhara, etc. the Vasus, the
Rudras, the Ādityas, the (two) Aśvins, and the dānavas,
the yakṣas, the rākṣasas, the piśācas, the guhyakas, etc.
Thus the race of devas (has been explained).

१२. मनुष्या अपि ब्राह्मणक्षत्रियवैश्यशूद्रादिजातिभेदात् बहु-
विधाः । तिर्यञ्चोऽपि पशुमृगपक्षिसरीसृपपतङ्गकीटादिभेदात् बहुविधाः ।
स्थावरा अपि वृक्षगुल्मलतावीरुधतृणादिभेदात् बहुविधाः । वृक्षादीनां
जलाहरणोपयुक्तकिञ्चिज्ज्ञानसम्बन्धोऽस्त्येव । ‘अप्राणिमत्सु स्वल्पा सा’
इत्युक्तत्वात् । अतो देवमनुष्यतिर्यक्स्थावरभेदभिन्ना बद्धाः ।

१३. जरायुजाण्डजोद्भिज्जस्वेदजाश्च भवन्ति । देवमनुष्या जरा-
युजाः । तेषु ब्रह्मरुद्रादयः सनकादयश्च द्रौपदीधृष्टद्युम्नादयो भूतवेतालादयश्च

12. The human beings are also manifold, because of the difference of classes as brāhmaṇa, kṣattriya, vaiśya, sūdra, etc. The animals also are multifarious, because of the distinction as cattle, beasts, birds, serpents, moths, worms, etc. The non-ambulants are of various kinds, because of the difference as trees, thickets, creepers, bushes, grass, etc. Trees etc. do have some relation with consciousness which is useful for sucking up water ; for it has been said, ‘Amongst the non-sentients, it (*i.e.*, consciousness) is meagre’ (VP., VI, vii, 64). Therefore the bound are divided into groups as the human, the devas, the animals and the non-ambulants.

13. Again they are divided into womb-born, egg-born, sprout-born and sweat-born. The womb-born are devas and human beings. Of these, Brahmā, Rudra, etc., Sanaka and (other sages), Sītā, Draupadī, Dhṛṣṭadyumna, etc., bhūtas, vetālas, etc.

अयोनिजाः । तिर्यगादयश्च जरायुजा अण्डजाः स्वेदजाश्च भवन्ति ।
स्थावरादय उद्भिजाः ।

१४. एवम्भूना बद्धा बीजाङ्कुरन्यायेन विषमप्रवाहतया अनादि-
कालप्रवृत्ताविद्याकर्मवासनारुचिप्रकृतिसम्बन्धैः चक्रवत्परिवर्तमानैः गर्भजन्म-
बाल्ययौवनजागरस्वप्नसुषुप्तिमूर्च्छाजरामरणस्वर्गनरकगमनादिविविधविचित्रा-
वस्थावन्तः अनाद्यनन्तप्रकारातिदुःसहतापत्रयाभितप्ताः स्वतः प्राप्तभगव-
दनुभवविच्छेदवन्तश्च ।

१५. ते द्विविधाः—शास्त्रवश्याः तदवश्याश्चेति । तयोर्मध्ये

are not born of wombs. The animals etc., are born of
wombs, eggs and sweat. The sprout-born are the non-
ambulants etc.

14. By virtue of avidyā, karma, tendency, hanker-
ing and matter-contact, begun from time immemorial
which, in the form of an uneven stream and like the
unending cycle of seed and sprout, whirl like a wheel,
the bound individual selfs of such description are sub-
jected to the manifold and wonderful states of womb-
life, birth, infancy, youth, waking, dream, sleep, uncon-
sciousness, old age, death, attainment of heaven, hell,
etc.; they suffer the three kinds of unbearable afflictions
which are without beginning and of innumerable sorts,
and (consequently) are cut off from the experience of
Bhagavān—their natural acquisition.

15. They are (again) of two kinds : the scripture-
controlled and the scripture-free. Of these, the bound

करणायत्तज्ञानानां बद्धानां शास्त्रवश्यतास्ति । तिर्यक्स्थावरादीनां तन्नास्ति । शास्त्रवश्या द्विविधाः—भुबुक्षवो मुमुक्षवश्चेति । तत्र भुबुक्षवस्त्रैवर्गिक-पुरुषार्थनिष्ठाः पुरुषाः । ते द्विविधाः—अर्थकामपरा धर्मपराश्चेति । केवलार्थकामपरा देहात्माभिमानवन्तः । धर्मपराश्च—‘अलौकिकश्रेयःसाधनं धर्मः’, ‘चोदनालक्षणोऽर्थो धर्मः’ इति लक्षणलक्षितयज्ञदानतपस्तीर्थयात्रादि-निष्ठाः । ते च देहातिरिक्तात्मनः परलोकोऽस्तीति ज्ञानवन्तः । धर्मपरा द्विविधाः—देवतान्तरपरा भगवत्पराश्चेति । देवतान्तरपरा ब्रह्मरुद्रेन्द्राग्न्या-

selves, whose knowledge depends on the sense organs, are controlled by Scripture. That (knowledge) does not exist in animals and non-ambulants. The scripture-controlled are of two kinds : bubhukṣus (pleasure-seekers) and mumukṣus (liberation-seekers). Of these, the bubhukṣus are those who are intent on the three kinds of human goals (*i.e.*, dharma, artha and kāma). They are of two kinds : those engrossed in artha and kāma and those solely devoted to dharma. Mere devotees of artha and kāma are those (materialists) who think that the body is the self. The devotees of dharma are those who are intent on sacrifice, charity, austerity, pilgrimage, etc. as indicated by the definition, ‘Dharma is that which is the means for happiness not relating to this world’ and ‘Dharma is that which is indicated by the vedic injunction as means to welfare’ (*PMS.*, 1, i, 2). They are endowed with the knowledge that there is a future existence for the self, different from the body. The devotees of dharma are (again) of two kinds, as the devotees of other deities and the devotees of Bhagavān. The devotees of other deities

धाराधनपराः । भगवत्पराश्च—‘आतो जिज्ञासुरर्थार्थी’ इत्युक्ताधिकारिणः ।
आतो अष्टैश्वर्यकामः । अर्थार्थी तु अपूर्वैश्वर्यकामः ।

१६. मुमुक्षवो द्विविधाः—कैवल्यपरा मोक्षपराश्चेति । कैवल्यं
नाम ज्ञानयोगात् प्रकृतिवियुक्तस्वात्मानुभवरूपम् । सोऽनुभवः अर्चिरादि-
मार्गेण परमं पदं गतवत एव क्वचित् कोणे पतित्युक्तपत्नीन्यायेन भगवदनुभव-
व्यतिरिक्तस्वात्मानुभव इत्याहुः । केचित् अर्चिरादिमार्गेण गतस्य पुनरावृत्त्य-
श्रवणात् प्रकृतिमण्डल एव कचिद्देशे स्वात्मानुभव इत्यप्याहुः ।

are those who worship Brahmā, Rudra, Agni, Indra, etc. The devotees of Bhagavān are those qualified persons who are spoken of as ‘the distressed, the seeker of knowledge, the seeker of enjoyment’ (BG., VII, 16). ‘The distressed’ is he who longs to get back his lost fortune. ‘The seeker of enjoyment’ is he who hankers for fortune not possessed before.

16. The mumukṣus are of two kinds : the votaries of kaivalya (self-realization) and the votaries of mokṣa (release from saṃsāra). What is called kaivalya is of the nature of the realization of the self as distinct from prakṛti; (this realization is effected) by jñānayoga. They say that it is (a kind of) self-realization without the realization of Bhagavān—as in the case of a wife who has been deserted by her husband—experienced in some corner of the Highest Abode after reaching it by the Path of Light etc. Some others say that since Scripture¹⁶ does not declare the return of those who have gone there by the Path of Light, they (i.e., the votaries of kaivalya who are said

१७. मोक्षपराश्च द्विविधाः—भक्ता प्रपन्नाश्चेति । भक्ताः पुनरधीतसाङ्गसशिरस्कवेदाः पूर्वोत्तरमीमांसापरिचयात् चिदचिद्विलक्षणम् अनवधिकातिशयानन्दस्वरूपं निखिलहेयप्रत्यनीकं समस्तकल्याणगुणात्मकं ब्रह्म अवधार्य तत्प्राप्त्युपायभूतां साङ्गभक्तिं स्वीकृत्य तया मोक्षं प्राप्तुकामाः ।

१८. भक्तावधिकारस्त्रैवर्णिकानामेव । देवादीनामप्यस्ति । अर्थित्वसामर्थ्ययोः सम्भवात् ।

to return) experience self-realization in some portion of the physical realm itself.

17. The votaries of mokṣa are of two kinds: bhaktas (lovers of God) and prapannas (those who have completely resigned themselves to God). The bhaktas are those who have read the Veda together with its auxiliaries and the Upaniṣads, and who, from the knowledge of the earlier and the latter parts of the Mīmāṃsā, have determined the nature of Brahman as different from cit and acit; as essentially of the nature of bliss, infinite and unsurpassable; as opposed to all evil and as comprising in Himself all the auspicious qualities. (Having this firm knowledge) they accept bhakti with its limbs, which is the means for the attainment of Him, and by that (bhakti) conceive the desire for the attainment of release.

18. The qualification for the (path of) bhakti belongs to the (members of the) three varṇas¹⁷ only. The devas and the like also are qualified (for bhakti) on account of the possibility of supplication and capability in them.¹⁸

१९. न शूद्राधिकारः । अपशूद्राधिकरणविरोधात् ।

२०. भक्तिस्वरूपं तु बुद्धिपरिच्छेदे प्रतिपादितम् । भक्ता द्विविधाः—साधनभक्तिनिष्ठाः साध्यभक्तिनिष्ठाश्च । व्यासादयः साधन-भक्तिनिष्ठाः । श्रीपराङ्कुशादयः साध्यभक्तिनिष्ठाः ।

२१. आकिञ्चन्यानन्यगतिकत्वधर्मविशिष्टो भगवन्तमाश्रितः प्रपन्नः । सोऽपि द्विविधः—त्रैवर्गिकपरो मोक्षपरश्चेति । त्रैवर्गिकपरो नाम भगवत एव धर्मार्थकामाभिलाषी । मोक्षपरस्तु सत्सङ्गान्नित्यानित्यविवेके

19. The s'ūdras are not qualified, since (such qualification) is contrary (to the teachings of) the adhikaraṇa of 'the non-s'ūdras'.¹⁹

20. The essential nature of bhakti has already been explained in the chapter on buddhi (i.e., dharma-bhūtajñāna). The bhaktas are of two kinds, as those who are established in bhakti which is (of the nature of) means and those who are established in bhakti which is an end (in itself). Vyāsa and others were established in the bhakti which is (of the nature of) means. S'rī Parāṅkuśa and others were established in bhakti which is an end (in itself).

21. Prapanna is he who, being characterized by the attributes of 'being helpless and devoid of other refuge', resorts to Bhagavān.²⁰ He is also of two kinds, as one who is intent on the three ends of life and one who is intent on the release (the fourth end). The devotee of the three ends is he who appeals to Bhagavān alone for dharma, artha and kāma. The devotee of release,

सति संसारे निर्वेदात् वैराग्ये उत्पन्ने मोक्षेच्छायां जातायां तत्सिद्धयर्थम्
 'आचार्यो वेदसम्पन्न' इत्याद्याचार्यलक्षणलक्षितं गुरुं संश्रित्य तद्द्वारा
 पुरुषाकारभूतां श्रियं प्रतिपद्य भक्त्याद्युपायान्तरे अशक्तः, अत एवाकिञ्च-
 नानन्यगतिः, श्रीमन्नारायणचरणावेव उपायत्वेन यः स्वीकरोति स प्रपन्नः ।
 प्रपत्तिः सर्वाधिकारा ।

२२. स च प्रपन्नो द्विविधः—एकान्ती परमैकान्ती चेति । यो

possessing the discrimination of what is eternal and what is non-eternal by means of holy company, becomes dispassionate on account of his disgust for the trans-migratory existence ; (consequently) the desire for release arises in his (mind), and to attain that goal he takes recourse to a spiritual preceptor who is distinguished by the characteristics of an (ideal) teacher such as (stated in the text) 'the teacher is he who is well versed in the Veda' etc.; (and) through the instrumentality of that (teacher) he resorts to (the Divine Mother) S'rī who is the mediator²¹ (between him and the Lord); (then) being unable to follow other paths such as bhakti etc., and therefore feeling helpless and refugeless, he takes shelter at the feet of S'rīman Nārāyaṇa as the only means. He (who is of this description) is called prapanna. Everyone (irrespective of caste or profession) is qualified for self-surrender.

22. The prapanna is of two kinds, as the ekāntin (the one-pointed) and the parama-ekāntin (the

मोक्षफलेन साकं फलान्तराण्यपि भगवत एवेच्छति स एकान्ती । देवतान्तर-
शून्य इत्यर्थः । भक्तिज्ञानाभ्यामन्यत्फलं भगवतोऽपि यो नेच्छति स परमै-
कान्ती । स द्विविधः—दृप्त आर्तश्चेति भेदात् । अवश्यमनुभोक्तव्यमिति
प्रारब्धकर्म अनुभवन् एतद्देहावसानसमयमीक्षमाणो दृप्तः । जाज्वल्यमानाग्नि-
मध्यस्थितस्येव संसारावस्थितेरतिदुःसहत्वात् प्रपच्युत्तरक्षणमोक्षकाम आर्तः ।

२३. मुक्तो नाम उपायपरिग्रहणानन्तरं नित्यनैमित्तिकभगवदा-

extremely one-pointed). He is ekāntin who seeks from Bhagavān alone liberation along with other (worldly) fruits. The meaning is that to him other gods are simply non-existent. He is parama-ekāntin who does not desire any other fruits even from Bhagavān himself except devotion and knowledge. He is (again) of two kinds, because of the difference as being dṛpta (patient aspirant) and ārta (impatient aspirant). Dṛpta is he who experiences the fruits of his previous deeds (as expressed in the saying), 'necessarily it must be experienced'; and waits (patiently) for the casting off of this body (for the attainment of release). The ārta is he who conceives the longing for release immediately after the (act of) self-surrender, since he feels the state of transmigratory existence as extremely unbearable like one who is enveloped by blazing flames.

23. The liberated is one who, after accepting (prapatti) as the means, performs all nitya (regular) and naimittika (incidental) religious duties as ends in

ज्ञाकैर्द्वयैरूपाणि स्वयम्प्रयोजनतया कुर्वन्, भगवद्भागवतापराधंश्च वर्जयन्, देहावसानकाले सुकृतदुष्कृते मित्रामित्रयोर्निक्षिपन्, 'वाङ् मनसि' इत्यादि-प्रकारेण हार्दे परमात्मनि विश्रम्य मुक्तिद्वारभूतसुषुम्नाख्यनाड्यां प्रविश्य ब्रह्मरन्ध्रान्निष्क्रम्य हार्देन साकं सूर्यकिरणद्वारा अग्निलोकं गत्वा दिनपूर्वपक्षो-त्तरायणसंवत्सराभिमानिदेवताभिर्वायुना च पथि सत्कृतः, सूर्यमण्डलं मित्वा नभोरन्ध्रद्वारा सूर्यलोकं गत्वा अनन्तरं चन्द्रविद्युद्गुणेन्द्रप्रजापतिभिर्मार्ग-

themselves, since he regards them as consecrated service enjoined by Bhagavān; who refrains from committing offences against Bhagavān and the votaries of Bhagavān; who, at the moment of giving up the body, commits his merits and demerits to his friends and foes (respectively);²² who then, after reposing in the Paramātmā abiding in the heart as described in the text, 'The wise should merge the speech in the mind,' etc.²³ (*Kaṭha Up.*, III, 13), enters the artery called *suṣumnā*,²⁴ the gateway for release, and issues out (of the body) from the aperture in the crown of the head, called *Brahmarandhra*; who (then) together with the (*Antaryāmin*) abiding within the heart, reaches the world of *Agni* through the rays of the sun;²⁵ who (then) is hospitably received on the way by the presiding deities of the day, the first half of lunar month, the summer solstice and the year and also *Vāyu*; who (then) pierces the orb of the sun, and through the opening of the ether reaches the world of the sun; who thereafter, being conducted with great marks of hospitality by the *ātivāhika* guides such as the moon, lightning, *Varuṇa*, *Indra*, *Prajāpati*,

दर्शिभिः आतिवाहिकगणैः सोपचारैः सह तत्तल्लोकानतीत्य प्रकृतिवैकुण्ठ-
सीमपरिच्छेदिकां विरजां तीर्त्वा सूक्ष्मशरीरं विहाय अमानवकरस्पर्शात् अप्रा-
कृतदिव्यविग्रहयुक्तः, चतुर्भुजो ब्रह्मालङ्कारेणालङ्कृतः, इन्द्रप्रजापतिसंज्ञक-
नगरद्वारपालकाभ्यनुज्ञया श्रीवैकुण्ठाख्यं दिव्यनगरं प्रविश्य गरुडानन्तयुक्त-
पताकालङ्कृतदीर्घप्राकारसहितगोपुरमतीत्य ऐरम्मदाख्यामृतसरः सोमसवना-
ख्याश्चत्थं च दृष्ट्वा 'शतं मालाहस्ता' इत्युक्तपञ्चशतदिव्याप्सरोगणैरुप-
चरितः, ब्रह्मगन्धादिभिरलङ्कृतः, तत्रस्थानन्तगरुडविष्वक्सेनादीन् प्रणम्य

etc., passes through their respective worlds; who (then), having crossed the river Virajā, defining the boundary line between prakṛti and Vaikuṇṭha,²⁶ shakes off the subtle body; who (then), by the touch of the amānava²⁷ (a non-human person), assumes a non-material, divine figure with four arms and is adorned with Brāhmic decorations; who (then), with the permission of the city gate-keepers named Indra and Prajāpati enters the divine city known as S'rī Vaikuṇṭha, who, after entering a towered gate having tall ramparts and decorated with banners bearing the ensigns of Garuḍa and Ananta, beholds the lake of nectar named Airammada and the asvattha tree known as Soma-savana; who (then) is received by five hundred nymphs (in groups of hundred) as described in the text, 'a hundred with garlands in their hands',²⁸ and is adorned with Brāhmic perfume etc.; who (then), having offered his obeisance to the residents of that place such as Ananta, Garuḍa, Viṣvaksena, etc., and being greeted

तैर्वहुमतः, महामणिमण्डपमासाद्य पर्यङ्कसमीपे स्वाचार्यान् प्रणम्य पर्यङ्क-
समीपं गत्वा तत्र धर्मादिपीठोपरिकमले अनन्ते विमलादिभिश्चामरहस्ताभिः
सेव्यमानं श्रीभूनीलासमेतं शङ्खचक्रादिदिव्यायुधोपेतं जाज्वल्यमानकिरीट-
मकरकुण्डलग्रैवेयहारकेयूरकटकश्रीवत्सकौस्तुभमुक्तादामोदरबन्धनपीताम्बर-
काञ्चीगुणनूपुराद्यपरिमितदिव्यभूषणभूषितम् अपरिमितोदारकल्याणगुणसागरं
भगवन्तं दृष्ट्वा तत्पादारविन्दयुगले शिरसा प्रणम्य पादेन पर्यङ्कमारुह्य तेन
स्वाङ्के स्थापितः, 'कोऽसि' इति पृष्ठः, 'ब्रह्मप्रकारोऽस्मि' इत्युक्त्वा तेन

by them in turn, approaches (the hall known as) Mahāmaṇimaṇḍapa and offers his obeisance to his spiritual teacher near the couch ; who goes up to the couch and beholds, together with (His divine consorts) S'ri, Bhū and Nīlā, Bhagavān, seated on Ananta who is upon the lotus and which (again) is on the throne made up of dharma etc., served by Vimalā and others with chowries in their hands, endowed with the divine weapons of conch and discus, adorned with the innumerable divine ornaments such as the shining crown, fish-shaped ear-rings graiveyahāra, keyūra, kaṭaka, S'rīvatsa, Kaustubha, muktādāmodara-bandhana, pitāmbara, kāñcigūṇa, nūpura, etc., and the ocean of auspicious attributes which are boundless and generous ; who then salutes the lotus-feet of Bhagavān with his head, ascends the couch, and is received into the very lap of Bhagavān ; who when questioned, ' Who art thou ? ' replies, ' I am a mode of Brahman ' ; who (then) is blessed by the glances

कटाक्षितः, तदनुभवजनितहर्षप्रकर्षात् सर्वदेशसर्वकालसर्वावस्थोचितसर्वविध-
कैङ्कर्यरतिः, आविर्भूतगुणाष्टकः, उत्तरावधिरहितब्रह्मानुभववान् यः स मुक्त
इत्युच्यते ।

२४. मुक्तस्य ब्रह्मसाम्यापत्तिश्रुतिस्तु भोगसाम्यमाह । जगद्व्या-
पारवर्जनस्य प्रतिपादनात् । तस्य नानात्वं सर्वलोकसञ्चरणं च सम्भवति ।

२५. ननु मुक्तस्य अनावृत्तित्वप्रतिपादनात् अस्मिँल्लोके
सञ्चारः कथमिति न शङ्कनीयम् । कर्मकर्तृत्वस्यैव निषेधात् स्वेच्छया

of Bhagavān; who, by virtue of that excellent bliss engendered by the communion with Brahman, solely becomes devoted to the diverse service of Bhagavān suited to all places, all times and all states; in whom (then) the eightfold qualities²⁹ become manifest; and who becomes established in the communion with Brahman which is devoid of any subsequent limit: such a person is said to be the liberated.

24. (The statement of Scripture)³⁰ that the released individual self attains equality with Brahman³¹ means that it has equality (with Brahman) in the enjoyment (of bliss only); for it has been declared (in the *Vedāntasūtras*) that (the power of the released self) is devoid of cosmic functions.³² He can assume manifold forms and wander all over the worlds.

25. 'Now, how the (individual self) can wander in this world, since it has been declared that the liberated does not return?'³³ This need not be doubted; since the 'return' due to karma is said not to occur, the roaming according to one's own will, becomes possible.

सञ्चरणोपपत्तेः । अतो मुक्तो भगवत्सङ्कल्पायत्तस्वेच्छया सर्वत्र सञ्चरति ।

२६. नित्या नाम कदाचिदपि भगवदभिमतविरुद्धाचरणाभावेन ज्ञानसङ्कोचप्रसङ्गरहिता अनन्तगरुडविष्वक्सेनादयः । तेषामधिकारविशेषा ईश्वरस्य नित्येच्छयैव अनादित्वेन व्यवस्थिताः । एतेषामवतारास्तु भगवदवतारवत् स्वेच्छया । एवं बद्धमुक्तनित्यभेदभिन्नो जीवो निरूपितः ।

इति श्रीबाधूलकुलतिलकश्रीमन्महाचार्यस्य प्रथमदासेन श्रीनिवास-
दासेन विरचितायां यतीन्द्रमतदीपिकायां जीवनिरूपणं
नाम अष्टमोऽवतारः ॥

Therefore the liberated individual self by his own will, which is in harmony with that of Bhagavān, roams everywhere.

26. The eternal is Ananta, Garuḍa, Viṣvaksena, etc. whose consciousness is devoid of contraction, inasmuch as their activities are never opposed to the will of Bhagavān. Their special duties have been fixed up from time without beginning by the eternal will of Īśvara. The incarnations of these (eternals) are determined by their own will³⁴ like the incarnation of Bhagavān. Thus the individual self, which is divided into (three) groups as the bound, the liberated and the eternal, has been explained.

Here ends the eighth 'avatāra' on jīva of Yatīndramatadīpikā composed by Śrīnivāsa, the foremost disciple of Śrīman Mahācārya, an ornament in the line of Śrī Vādhūlas

नवमोऽवतारः

ईश्वरः

१. अथ ईश्वरो निरूप्यते । सर्वेश्वरत्वं सर्वशेषित्वं सर्वकर्मा-
ध्यत्वं सर्वफलप्रदत्वं सर्वाधारत्वं सर्वकार्योत्पादकत्वं स्वज्ञानस्वेतरसमस्त-
द्रव्यशरीरत्वम् इत्यादीनि ईश्वरलक्षणानि ।

२. अयमीश्वरः सूक्ष्मचिदचिद्विशिष्टवेषेण जगदुत्पादानकारणं

AVATĀRA IX

ĪSVARA

1. Now Īsvara is explained. The characteris-
tics of Īsvara are that He is the controller of all, the
principal of all, the worshipped in every (religious) act,
the bestower of all fruits, the sustainer of all, the cause
of all effects and has everthing except Himself and His
consciousness as His body.

2. Īsvara ¹ becomes the material cause ² of the
universe by virtue of His nature as qualified by the
sentient and the non-sentient in their subtle state. (He)

भवति ; सङ्कल्पविशिष्टवेषेण निमित्तकारणं भवति ; कालाद्यन्तर्यामिवेषेण सहकारिकारणं च ।

३. कार्यरूपेण विकारयोग्यं वस्तु उपादानम् । कार्यतया परिणामयितुं निमित्तम् । कार्योत्पत्त्युपकरणं वस्तु सहकारि । यद्वा उत्तरोत्तरावस्थाविशिष्टस्वरूपापेक्षया तदनुगुणनियतपूर्वभाव्यवस्थाविशिष्टम् उपादानम् । यथा घटत्वावस्थाविशिष्टमृद्व्यापेक्षया पिण्डत्वावस्थाविशिष्टं तदेव द्रव्यम् । परिणामौन्मुख्यातिरेकेण आकारेण अपेक्षितं कारणं निमित्तम् । अस्मिन् पक्षे सहकारिकारणस्य निमित्ते अन्तर्भावः ।

becomes the efficient cause by virtue of His nature as qualified by his will and also the co-operant cause by virtue of His nature as the Immanent in time etc.

3. Material cause is that object which is competent to undergo modification in the form of effect. The efficient cause is that which brings about the modification in the form of effect. The co-operant cause is that object which is helpful in the production of effect.³ Or, with reference to the essential form (of a substance) qualified by a subsequent state, the material cause is that (same substance) qualified by an appetent constant antecedent state; for instance, the earth-substance qualified by the state of clod (is the material cause) with reference to that same substance qualified by the (consequent) state of pot. The efficient cause is that which is required by a form (e.g., a pot) different from the substance which is on the point of modification. In this case, the co-operant cause is brought under the efficient cause.

४. एवं त्रिविधकारणपक्षे कारणद्वयपक्षे च कारणलक्षणलक्षितत्वात् अखिलजगत्कारणत्वं भगवतो नारायणस्यैव सम्भवति ।

५. ननु कथं नारायणे कारणत्वपर्यवसानम्? इति चेत्, उच्यते । न्यायसहितवेदान्तवाक्यविचारेण एवं पर्यवस्यति । तद्यथा—आदौ तावत् प्रकृतेः जगत्कारणत्वं नोपपद्यते । ईक्षितृत्वाद्यभावात् । छान्दोग्ये तावत् सदाकाशप्राणशब्दवाच्यानां जगत्कारणत्वं प्रतीयते । वाजसनेयके ब्रह्मशब्दवाच्यस्य कारणत्वं प्रतीयते । सर्वशाखाप्रत्ययन्यायेन कारणवाक्यानाम्

4. Thus in the case of the threefold cause as well as the twofold cause, since the definition of causality is applicable to Bhagavān Nārāyaṇa alone, He becomes the cause of the entire universe.

5. 'Now, how can causality rest finally in Nārāyaṇa?' If this be asked, it is said (in reply): (That Nārāyaṇa is the cause) is determined by the examination of Vedānta texts along with reason. It is as (follows): In the first place prakṛti cannot become the cause of the universe, because of the non-existence of thinking etc.⁴ In *Chāndogya*, indeed, that which is expressed by the terms, sat, ākāśa and prāṇa is perceived to be the cause of the universe. In the *Vājasaneyaka*, that which is expressed by the term 'Brahman' is seen to be the cause. In accordance with the canon 'that all the branches (of the Veda) convey the same doctrine', the passages which indicate the cause must be explained as pointing out one object only.

एकविषयत्वे प्रतिपादयितव्ये छागपशुन्यायेन सामान्यवाचकानां सदादि-
शब्दानां विशेषे ब्रह्मणि पर्यवसानं वक्तव्यम् ।

६. एवम् उक्तन्यायेन ब्रह्मशब्दवाच्यस्य तैत्तिरीयोक्त आत्म-
शब्दवाच्ये पर्यवसानम् । आत्मशब्दवाच्यः क इत्याकाङ्क्षायां श्रुतिप्रसिद्ध
इन्द्रो वा, तथा प्रसिद्धोऽग्निर्वा, उपास्यत्वेन प्रसिद्धः सूर्यो वा, कारणत्वेन
उक्तः सोमो वा, अभीष्टफलप्रदत्वेन उक्तः कुबेरो वा, यमो वा, वरुणो वेति
विशये, एतेषां कर्मवश्यत्वपरिच्छिन्नैश्वर्यवत्त्वसंहार्यत्वश्रवणात् न एते जगत्-
कारणभूताः, किन्तु श्वेताश्वतरे शिवस्य कारणत्वं भासत इति भाति ।

(Similarly) it must be said that the terms such as sat
etc. which denote generality must terminate in the
(particular) category 'Brahman' after the analogy of
Chāgapas'u.⁵

6. In the aforesaid manner that which is
denoted by the term 'Brahman' ends in that which
is denoted by the term 'Ātman', spoken of in the
Taittirīya. 'Now, what is that which is denoted by
the term, Ātman?' If this (question) is asked, the
(following) doubts may arise : Is that Indra, celebrated
in the Vedas ? Or, the equally famous Agni ? Or, Sūrya,
well-known as the object of meditation ? Or, Soma, spoken
of as the cause ? Or, Kubera, said to be the bestower
of any desired fruit ? Or, Yama ? Or, Varuṇa ? (But)
these (deities) cannot become the cause of the universe,
since Scripture declares them to be subject to karma,
possessing limited sovereignty and liable to destruction.
But in the *S'vetāsvatara*, it appears that S'iva seems
to be the cause (of the universe). Likewise in the

एवमथर्वणशाखायां शम्भुशब्दवाच्यस्य ध्येयत्वं कारणत्वं भासते । तथैव अथर्वशिरसि रुद्रशब्दवाच्यस्य सर्वात्मकता उच्यते । तैत्तिरीये हिरण्यगर्भस्य जगत्कारणत्वं प्रतीयते । अत्रापि सामान्यविशेषन्यायात् शिवशम्भुरुद्रादि-शब्दानां हिरण्यगर्भशब्दवाच्यविशेषे पर्यवसानं युज्यते । शिवशब्दस्य 'शिवमस्तु सर्वजगतां', 'शिवं कर्मास्तु', 'पन्थानः सन्तु ते शिवाः' इत्यादिभिर्मङ्गलवाचकत्वम् । रुद्रशब्दस्य अग्निवाचकत्वम् । एवं महेश्वर-शम्भवादिसामान्यशब्दा अपि अवयवशक्त्या चतुर्मुखे पर्यवस्यन्ति ।

Atharvaṇas'akha that which is denoted by the term S'ambhu seems to be the object of meditation and the cause. Similarly in the *Atharvas'iras*, that which is denoted by the term Rudra, is said to be Self of all. In the *Taittirīya*, Hiranyagarbha is known to be the cause of the universe. Even here, because of the canon (of interpretation) known as 'sāmānyavis'eṣa' ⁶ it is but proper that all the (general) terms such as S'iva, S'am-bhu, Rudra, etc., should terminate in the particularity, denoted by the term, Hiranyagarbha. (Philologically) the term S'iva expresses auspiciousness as illustrated (in the following passages): 'May good befall all the worlds', 'May the work be good,' 'May you have a good journey', etc. (Likewise) the term Rudra expresses Agni. In this manner general terms such as Mahes'vara, S'ambhu, etc., terminate in (the particular term) Caturmukha owing to the denotative power of the component parts (of those words).

७. कारणवाचिशिवादिशब्दानां मुख्यवृत्त्या रुद्रपरत्वं वा किन्न स्यात् इति न शङ्कनीयम् । रुद्रस्य चतुर्मुखादुत्पत्तिश्रवणात् अनपहतपाप्मत्व-श्रवणाच्च न रुद्रस्य कारणत्वम् । अतो हिरण्यगर्भप्रजापतिस्वयम्भ्वादि-शब्दवाच्ये चतुर्मुखे शिवादिशब्दाः पर्यवस्यन्ति । एवमपि महोपनिष-न्नारायणोपनिषत्सुबालोपनिषन्मैत्रायणीयपुरुषसूक्तनारायणानुवाकान्तर्यामि-ब्राह्मणादिषु नारायणस्यैव परमकारणत्वसर्वशब्दवाच्यत्वमोक्षप्रदत्वजगच्छरी-रित्वादेः प्रतिपादनात् स्वयम्भूहिरण्यगर्भप्रजापतिशब्दानां नारायणे पर्यव-सानं युक्तम्, इति नारायण एव अखिलजगत्कारणं सर्वविद्यावेद्यश्च ।

7. 'Why should not the terms such as S'iva etc., which denote the cause, refer to Rudra by the primary force (of the word)?' Such doubt need not arise, since according to Scripture Rudra had his origin from Caturmukha and is not free from sin. (Hence) causality cannot belong to Rudra. Therefore terms such as S'iva etc., terminate in Caturmukha who is expressed by such terms as Hiranyagarbha, Prajāpati, Svayambhū, etc. In this manner, since Nārāyaṇa is declared in *Mahōpaniṣad*, *Nārāyaṇōpaniṣad*, *Subālopaniṣad*, *Maitrāyaṇīya (Upaniṣad)*, *Puruṣasūkta*, *Nārāyaṇānurvāka*, *Antaryāmibrahmaṇa*, etc., to be the Supreme Cause, the Entity whom all terms denote, the Bestower of liberation and the Constitutor of the world as His body, it is but fit that terms such as Svayambhū, Hiranyagarbha and Prajāpati should refer to Nārāyaṇa. Thus Nārāyaṇa alone is the cause of the entire universe and the knowable (object) of all meditations.

८. ननु अन्तरादित्यविद्या रुद्रपरेति शङ्का न कर्तव्या । तस्या विष्णुपरत्वस्यैव बहुप्रमाणेषु सिद्धत्वात् । भर्गश्शब्दस्य सकारान्तत्वप्रतिपादनाच्च ।

९. तर्हि दहरविद्यायाम् आकाशशब्दवाच्यनारायणान्तर्यामितया रुद्रस्य प्रतिपादनात् दहरविद्या रुद्रपरा इति न शङ्कनीयम् । नारायणान्तर्वर्तिगुणजातस्यैव उपास्यत्वेन तत्राभिधानात् । एवं सर्वविद्यास्वपि ऊह्यम् । अतः समस्तकल्याणगुणात्मकं प्रकृतिपुरुषाभ्यां भिन्नं ताभ्यां विशिष्टं परं ब्रह्म जगत्कारणं नारायण एव ।

१०. ननु अद्वैतश्रुत्या ब्रह्मैकमेव सत्यं निर्गुणं च । तदन्यत्

8. 'Now, does not antarādityavidyā refer to Rudra?' such doubt need not be entertained; for it is established by valid means that it refers only to Viṣṇu. And (in that vidyā) the term 'Bhargā's is declared to be terminating in 's' (sakāra).

9. 'But then, since it is explained that Rudra constitutes the indwelling Self of Nārāyaṇa, who is denoted by the term ākāś'a in the daharavidyā, daharavidyā refers to Rudra;' this doubt need not arise, for what is mentioned there is a host of (perfect) attributes immanent in Nārāyaṇa as objects of meditation. Likewise all the meditations have to be construed. Therefore Nārāyaṇa, the Supreme Brahman, Who is the embodiment of all auspicious qualities, Who is different from the prakṛti and the individual selves and Who is qualified by them, is alone the cause of the universe.

10. 'Now,' on account of non-dualistic S'ruti texts Brahman alone is real and is devoid of attributes;

ज्ञातृज्ञेयादिकं तस्मिन्नेव परिकल्पितं सर्वं मिथ्या । ब्रह्म अविद्यया संसरति । तत्त्वमसीत्यभेदज्ञानं तन्निवर्तकम् । तस्मान्निर्विशेषचिन्मात्रे ब्रह्मणि वेदान्तानां तात्पर्यमिति मतान्तरस्थैः प्रतिपादनात्, कथं नारायणे तात्पर्यं तस्य समस्तकल्याणगुणाकरत्वादिकथनं च? इति चेत्, उच्यते । कारणत्वप्रतिपादकश्रुतिभिर्नारायणस्य कारणत्वे सिद्धे, भेदाभेदश्रुत्योर्घटकश्रुत्या विषयभेदेन विरोधे परिहृते, निर्गुणप्रतिपादकश्रुतीनां हेयगुणनिषेधकत्वात्, ज्ञातृ-ज्ञेयादिकल्पकाविद्याया एव अप्रामाण्यात् ब्रह्मकार्यस्य सत्यत्वात्, अविद्यया

everything else, namely, the knowing subjects, objects of knowledge, etc. which are different from That, is imagined in That (*i.e.*, Brahman) itself and is unreal. Brahman itself owing to nescience is involved in empirical existence. The non-dual knowledge derived from the passages like "That Thou art" (*Chā. Up.*, VI, 7ff) removes nescience. (Therefore) when adherents of the other school maintain that the import of the Vedānta passages is undifferentiated pure Consciousness, how can Nārāyaṇa be the import (of such texts), and how can the description that He is the mine of all auspicious qualities be maintained? If this be asked, it is said (in reply): Nārāyaṇa is proved to be the cause (of the universe) from the scriptural texts which treat of causality; the apparent contradiction between the dualistic and the non-dualistic texts is harmonized by means of the mediating texts⁸ since the subject-matter is different; the scriptural texts, which define Brahman as devoid of attributes,⁹ deny (only of Brahman) the evil qualities; since it is not proved that the knowing subjects, objects of knowledge, etc. are imagined by means

संसारे जीवगतदोषाणां ब्रह्मण्यपि सम्भवात्, तन्निवर्तकान्तरस्य वक्तुम-
शक्यत्वात् । अतोऽद्वैतवादस्यासम्भवात् न निर्विशेषचिन्मात्रब्रह्मसिद्धिः ।
अतो नारायणस्यैव जगत्कारणत्वमोक्षप्रदत्वादिगुणयोगः सम्भवतीति सवि-
शेषमेव ब्रह्म ।

११. सूक्ष्मचिदचिद्विशिष्टं ब्रह्म कारणं, स्थूलचिदचिद्विशिष्टं ब्रह्म
कार्यमिति कारणादनन्यत् कार्यमिति विशिष्टाद्वैतवेदान्तिनां सम्प्रदायः ।

of nescience, the effects produced from Brahman are real. If it is supposed that Brahman itself owing to nescience is involved in empirical existence (as jiva), the imperfections connected with the individual self will exist in Brahman also ; and it will not be possible to state a third category which will remove the imperfections from Brahman ! Therefore, as it is impossible to accept the non-dualistic doctrine, Brahman, which is undifferentiated Consciousness, is not proved. Since the existence of attributes *i.e.*, the causality of the universe, the bestowal of release, etc., is possible only for Nārāyaṇa, Brahman is distinguished by difference (*i.e.*, Brahman possesses attributes).

11. The traditional teaching of the Vedāntins of the school of Viśiṣṭādvaita is thus : Brahman is the cause of the universe as qualified by the sentient and the non-sentient in their subtle state ; Brahman is the effect as qualified by the sentient and the non-sentient in their gross state ; and (therefore) the effect is non-different from the cause.

१२. एवम् ईश्वराङ्गीकारात् निरीश्वरसाङ्ख्यमीमांसकादिमत-
निरासः । तस्यैव उपादानत्वस्वीकारात् योगपाशुपतनैयायिकानां मतनिरासः ।
तैः निमित्तमात्रेश्वराङ्गीकारात् । ईश्वरस्य कार्यं प्रति उपादानत्वनिमित्तत्ववत्
कर्तृत्वप्रेरकत्वनियन्तृत्वप्रकाशयितृत्वसहकारित्वोदासीनत्वादिकमपि उपपद्यते ।

१३. बाल्ययौवनावस्थादयो दोषा यथा शरीरगताः, न
तु शरीरिणि जीवे; एवं चिदचिच्छरीरिणः परमात्मनोऽपीति न
निर्विकारश्रुतिविरोधः । नियमेन आधेयत्वविधेयत्वशेषत्वादेः शरीर-

12. Thus, since Īśvara is admitted, the views of the followers of the schools of atheistic Sāṅkhya, Mīmāṃsā, etc., are refuted. Since material causality is admitted (by us in respect of Īśvara), the views of the followers of the schools of Yoga, Pāśupata and Nyāya are refuted; for Īśvara is admitted by them with reference to efficient causality only. Just as in respect of the effect (*i.e.*, creation) Īśvara is the material and the efficient cause, so also it is possible for Him to become the agent, the impeller, the controller, the revealer, the helper, the unconcerned, etc.

13. Just as the imperfections of the states of childhood, youth, etc., adhere to the body (only) and not to the embodied self, similarly (the imperfections of the cit and the acit do not extend to) the highest Self Who has the sentient and the non-sentient as His body;¹⁰ thus there is no contradiction with the scriptural texts which declare the immutability (of Brahman). Since it is observed in ordinary experience that the

लक्षणस्य जगति विद्यमानत्वात् जगच्छरीरी ईश्वरः तद्गतदोषैरसंसृष्टश्च ।

१४. स च ईश्वरो विभुस्वरूपः । विभुत्वं नाम व्यापकत्वम् । तच्च त्रिधा—स्वरूपतो धर्मभूतज्ञानतो विग्रहतश्च । स चानन्त इत्युच्यते । अनन्तो नाम त्रिविधपरिच्छेदरहितः । त्रिविधः परिच्छेदस्तु देशतः कालतो वस्तुतः ।

१५. सत्यत्वज्ञानत्वानन्दत्वामलत्वादय ईश्वरस्य स्वरूपनिरूपक-धर्माः । ज्ञानशक्त्यादयो निरूपितस्वरूपधर्माः । सर्वज्ञत्वसर्वशक्तित्वादयः सृष्ट्युपयुक्ता धर्माः । वात्सल्यसौशील्यसौलभ्यादय आश्रयणोपयुक्ता

characteristics of the body consist in being invariably supported, controlled, subordinated, etc., Īśvara ensouling the universe is untouched by the imperfections adhering to the universe.

14. And Īśvara is essentially of the nature of vibhu. What is called vibhu is all-pervasiveness. And this (all-pervasiveness) is of three kinds : (pervasiveness) by His essential nature, (pervasiveness) by the attributive consciousness and (pervasiveness) by His body. And He, it is said, is infinite. What is called infinite is to be free from the three kinds of limitations. The threefold limitation consists in being determined by space, time and object.

15. Truth, consciousness, bliss, purity, etc., are the attributes which determine the essential nature of Īśvara. Knowledge, power, etc., are the attributes of the essential nature so determined. Omniscience, omnipotence, etc., are the attributes which are useful for the act of creation. Love, excellence of disposition,

धर्माः । कारुण्यादयो रक्षणोपयुक्तधर्माः । एतेषां स्वरूपं बुद्धिपरिच्छेदे निरूपितमिति इह न प्रपञ्च्यते ।

१६. अयमीश्वरः अण्डसृष्ट्यानन्तरं चतुर्मुखदक्षकालादिषु अन्तर्यामितया स्थित्वा सृष्टिं करोति । विष्णवताररूपेण मनुकालाद्यन्तर्यामिरूपेण च स्थित्वा रक्षको भवति । रुद्रकालान्तकादीनाम् अन्तर्यामितया संहारमपि करोति । अतः सृष्टिस्थितिसंहारकर्ता च भवति ।

१७. एवम्प्रकार ईश्वरः परव्यूहविभवान्तर्याम्यर्चावताररूपेण पञ्चप्रकारः ।

easiness of attainment, etc., are the attributes which are useful for providing refuge (to the devotees.) Compassion and others are the attributes which are useful for the protection (of the good). Since the essential nature of these (attributes) has already been explained in the chapter on 'Consciousness' it will not be here further explained.

16. The Īśvara, thus set forth, after creating the cosmic sphere, abides in Caturmukha, Dakṣa, time, etc. as the immanent and creates (further). Incarnating as the forms of Viṣṇu and abiding in Manu, time, etc., in the form of the immanent, He becomes the Saviour. As the immanent in Rudra, time and God of Death He destroys even. Therefore He (Nārāyaṇa) is the creator, the protector and the destroyer (of the universe).

17. The Īśvara of such description abides in a fivefold form as Para, Vyūha, Vibhava, Antaryāmin and Arcāvatāra.

१८. तत्र परो नाम त्रिपाद्विभूतौ कुमुदकुमुदाक्षपुण्डरीकवामनः
 शङ्कुकर्णसर्वनेत्रसुमुखसुप्रतिष्ठितादिभिः दिव्यायुधभूषणपरिजनपरिच्छदा-
 न्वितैः दिव्यनगरपालकैः परिरक्षिते श्रीमद्वैकुण्ठाख्ये पुरे चण्डप्रचण्डभद्रसुभद्र-
 जयविजयधातुविधातुप्रभृतिभिः द्वारपालकैः उपेतैः श्रीमद्विव्यालये श्रीमहा-
 मणिमण्डपे धर्माद्यष्टपादविरचितसिंहासने शेषपर्यङ्के दिव्यमङ्गलविग्रहविशिष्ट-
 श्वतुर्भुजः, श्रीभूनीलासहितः, शङ्खचक्रादिदिव्यायुधोपेतः, श्रीमत्किरीटादि-
 दिव्यभूषणभूषितः, अनन्तगरुडविष्वक्सेनादिभिर्नित्यैः सामगानपदैः अन्यैर्भु-

18. What is called Para is Nārāyaṇa, who is ex-
 pressed by such terms as Parabrahman, Paravāsudeva,
 Who is qualified by the infinite, auspicious attri-
 butes such as knowledge, power, etc., Whose (presence)
 is being enjoyed by the eternal such as Ananta,
 Garuḍa, Viṣvaksena, etc. and other Sāma-singing
 liberated selfs, Who is the possessor of a divine,
 auspicious figure, Who is four-armed, Who is
 accompanied by Śrī, Bhū and Nīlā, Who is equipped
 with the divine weapons such as conch, discus, etc.,
 Who is adorned with divine ornaments such as crown
 etc., Who is seated on Śeṣa who is upon the throne
 composed of eight legs such as dharma etc. in the
 mahāmaṇimaṇḍapa within the divine abode, attended
 by the gate-keepers such as Caṇḍa, Pracaṇḍa, Bhadrā,
 Subhadra, Jaya, Vijaya, Dhātṛ, Vidhātṛ, etc. in
 the divine city called Vaikuṇṭha, within Tripādvī-
 bhūti, protected by the city-watchers such as Ku-
 muda, Kumudākṣa, Puṇḍarika, Vāmana, Śaṅkukarṇa,

कैश्च अनुभूयमानः, ज्ञानशक्त्याद्यनन्तकल्याणगुणविशिष्टः, परब्रह्मपरवासु-
देवादिशब्दवाच्यो नारायणः ।

१९. व्यूहो नाम पर एव उपासनार्थं जगत्सृष्ट्याद्यर्थं च
वासुदेवसङ्कर्षणप्रद्युम्नानिरुद्धभेदेन चतुर्द्वाविस्थितः । तत्र षड्गुणपूर्णः
श्रीवासुदेवः । ज्ञानबलाभ्यां सङ्कर्षणः । ऐश्वर्यवीर्याभ्यां प्रद्युम्नः । शक्ति
तेजोभ्याम् अनिरुद्ध इति गुणविभागः ।

२०. एतेषु चतुर्षु प्रत्येकं त्रयस्त्रयोऽवतीर्णाः केशवादयो व्यूहा-
न्तराणि द्वादशमासानां द्वादशादित्यानां च अधिदैवतानि । ऊर्ध्वपुण्ड्रेषु
तेषामेव स्थानं विधीयते ।

Sarvanetra, Sumukha, Supratiṣṭhita, etc., who are
equipped with the divine weapons, ornaments, attendants
and other paraphernalia.

19. What is called Vyūha¹¹ is the highest
Brahman Himself abiding in a fourfold form as Vāsu-
deva,¹² Saṅkarṣaṇa,¹³ Pradyumna¹⁴ and Aniruddha¹⁵
for purposes of meditation (by the devotees) and
for creation of the universe. Of these, S'rivāsudeva
is replete with the six qualities. Saṅkarṣaṇa is filled
with knowledge and strength. Pradyumna possesses
in the highest degree lordship and virility. Aniruddha
has consummate potency and splendour. Thus the
(six) qualities are distributed.

20. Each one of these four (Vyūhas) descends into
three sub-vyūhas such as Keśava¹⁶ etc. who are
the presiding deities of the twelve months and the
twelve Ādityas.¹⁷ Their locations are represented
(literally ordained or fixed up) in the perpendicular
marks (on the body of the devotees, which are twelve).

२१. तत्र कनकप्रभः केशवश्चतुश्चक्रधरः । श्यामो नारायण-
श्चतुःशङ्खधरः । मणिप्रभामो माधवश्चतुर्गदाधरः । चन्द्रामो गोविन्दश्चतुः-
शार्ङ्गधरः । पद्मकिङ्कलकसन्निभो विष्णुश्चतुर्हलधरः । अब्जामो मधुसूदन-
श्चतुर्मुसलधरः । अग्निवर्णस्त्रिविक्रमश्चतुःखड्गधरः । बालसूर्यामो वामन-
श्चतुर्वज्रधरः । पुण्डरीकामः श्रीधरश्चतुष्पट्टीशधरः । तडित्प्रभो हृषीकेश-
श्चतुर्मुद्गरधरः । सूर्याभः पद्मनाभः पञ्चायुधधरः । इन्द्रगोपनिभो दामोदर-
श्चतुष्पाशधरः ।

२२. विभवो नाम तत्तत्सजातीयरूपेण आविर्भावः । स
दशधा—ते च मत्स्यादयोऽवतारविशेषाः ।

21. Of these, Kes'ava, shining like gold, bears four discuses. The dark-complexioned Nārāyaṇa bears four conches. Mādhava, who is bright like sapphire, bears four maces. Govinda, who shines like moon, bears four bows. Viṣṇu, who resembles lotus-blossom in complexion, bears four ploughs. The lotus-complexioned Madhusūdana bears four clubs. The fire-complexioned Trivikrama bears four swords. Vāmana, who is effulgent like the rising sun, bears four vajras. Śrīdhara, who resembles a white-lotus in complexion, bears four spears. Hriṣīkeśa, who is refulgent like lightning, bears four maces. Padmanābha, who is radiant like the sun, bears five weapons. Dāmodara, who is red-complexioned like Indragopa-insect, bears four cords.

22. What is called Vibhava is the descent (of Iśvara among beings) by means of forms similar to that genus. It is of ten kinds ;^{1b} they are those particular avatars such as Matsya etc.

२३. तत्र वेदापहारिदैत्यनिरसनद्वारा ब्रह्मणे प्रमाणप्रदत्वार्थम् अवतीर्णो मत्स्यावतारः । देवानाम् अजरामृतिहेत्वमृतोत्पादने मन्दराधारत्वेन अवतीर्णः कूर्मावतारः । संसारसागरोन्मग्नजनोंद्धर्तुकामः स्वमहिषीभूम्युद्धर-
णार्थम् अवतीर्णो वराहावतारः । आश्रितसंरक्षणार्थं महासुरं हन्तुं स्तम्भे अवतीर्णो
नृसिंहावतारः । त्रिविक्रमो भूत्वा स्वपादारविन्दोद्धवेन जलेन जगत्पापहरणेन
तद्रक्षणार्थम् अवतीर्णो वामनावतारः । दुष्टक्षत्रियनिरसनार्थं अवतीर्णः परशु-
रामावतारः । शरणागतसंरक्षणधर्मस्थापनार्थम् अवतीर्णः श्रीरामावतारः ।

23. Of these, the avatar of Matsya was assumed for restoring the Vedas (pramāṇas) to Brahmā through the defeat of the demons who had stolen them. By supporting the mountain Mandara, the Kūrma-
avatar descended for generating nectar which was the means for the non-decay and immortality of the devas. The Varāha-avatar was manifested with a view to protect His own consort, Bhūmi, and with the desire to save humanity sunk in the ocean of phenomenal existence. The Nṛsiṃha-avatar was assumed within the pillar for the destruction of the great giant (Hiraṇya-
kaśipu) and for the purpose of saving him who had taken shelter.¹⁰ The Vāmana-avatar was taken for the protection of the world by cleansing its sins with the water (Gaṅgā) arising from His lotus-feet when He became Trivikrama. Paras'urāma-avatar was assumed for the annihilation of the wicked Kṣatriyas. Śrīrāma-
avatar was undertaken for the protection of those who had surrendered (to Him) and for the establishment of

प्रलम्बादिनिरसनार्थं अवतीर्णो बलरामावतारः । मोक्षोपायदर्शनार्थम् अवतीर्णः श्रीकृष्णावतारः । अधर्मिष्ठान्निरस्य पूर्णधर्मोत्पादनार्थं कलिनिर्मोचनार्थं कल्क्यवतारः ।

२४. एवम् एकैकावतारेषु अनन्तप्रकाराः सन्ति । षट्त्रिंशद्भेदभिन्नाः पद्मनाभादयोऽपि । पुनर्दधिभक्तहयग्रीवनरनारायणादयोऽपि । एवं मुख्य-गौणपूर्णांशवेशाद्यवतारा बहुप्रकाराः । तेषु उपास्यानुपास्यविभागो द्रष्टव्यः ।

२५. अवताराणामिच्छैव हेतुः, न तु कर्म । प्रयोजनं तु दुष्कृति-विनाशपूर्वकं साधुपरित्राणमेव ।

the dharma. Balarāma-avataar was accepted for the destruction of Pralamba etc.²⁰ S'rikṛṣṇa-avataar was assumed for pointing out (to humanity) the means for liberation. The Kalki-avataar (will descend) for the establishment of dharma in its entirety by the destruction of the unrighteous, and for liberating (the world) from Kali.

24. Thus there are infinite modes in each one of these (ten) avatars. The thirty-six modes such as Padmanābha etc. are also (Vibhavas).²¹ Further, (there are manifold incarnations) such as Dadhibhakta,²² Hayagrīva,²³ Naranārāyaṇa,²⁴ etc. In this way the avatars are many, such as the primary, the secondary, the full, the partial, the possessed, etc.²⁵ Among these, the division as those that are worthy of worship and those that are not worthy of worship should be noted.²⁶

25. The cause for the descent is (Īśvara's) will only,²⁷ and not karma. The fruit is, verily, the protection of the good and the destruction of the wicked.²⁸

२६. अन्तर्यामित्वं नाम स्वर्गनरकाद्यनुभवदशायामपि जीवात्मनः सुहृत्त्वेन योगिभिर्द्रष्टव्यतया हृदयप्रदेशावस्थितं रूपम् । जीवेन साकं विद्यमानोऽपि तद्गतदोषैः असंस्पृष्टो वर्तते ।

२७. अर्चावतारो नाम देशकालविप्रकर्षरहित आश्रिताभिमत-द्रव्यादिकं शरीरतया स्वीकृत्य तस्मिन्नप्राकृतशरीरविशिष्टः सन् अर्चकपरा-धीनस्नानभोजनासनशयनस्थितिः सर्वसहिष्णुः परिपूर्णो गृहग्रामनगरप्रशस्त-देशशैलादिषु वर्तमानो मूर्तिविशेषः ।

२८. स च स्वयंव्यक्तदैवसैद्धमानुषभेदात् चतुर्विधः ।

26. What is called Antaryāmin is that form (of Īśvara) which abides in the region of the heart, which stays with the individual self as its friend in its states of experience such as heaven, hell, etc., and which is perceptible to the yogins. (Though Īśvara in the form of Antaryāmin) co-exists with the individual self, He is untouched by the taints inherent in it (i.e., the individual self).

27. What is called Arcāvatāra is that special form which, without remoteness of space and time,²⁹ accepts for its body (any) substance chosen by the devotees, and 'descends' into it with a non-material body; (He) becomes dependent on the worshipper for bath, food, sitting, sleeping, etc.; (He) bears everything and is replete (with knowledge and other attributes); (He) is present in houses, villages, towns, sacred places, hills, etc.

28. He is fourfold, because of the difference as svayaṁvyakta (self-manifest), daiva (consecrated by the divine beings), saiddha (consecrated by sages) and mānuṣa (consecrated by human beings).

२९. एवम् उक्तासु पञ्चावस्थास्वपि श्रीविशिष्ट एव भगवान् वर्तत
इति श्रुत्या प्रमाणसिद्धोऽर्थः । एतेन एकायनोक्तनिःश्रीकवादो निरस्तः ।
एवम् ईश्वरो निरूपितः ।

इति श्रीवाधूलकुलतिलकश्रीमन्महाचार्यस्य प्रथमदासेन श्रीनिवास-
दासेन विरचितायाम् यतीन्द्रमतदीपिकायाम् ईश्वरनिरूपणं
नाम नवमोऽवतारः ॥

29. Even in all these aforesaid fivefold states
Bhagavān is ever present with S'rī; this import is
established by Scripture and other means of knowledge.
By this, the Ekāyana-view that He is alone and
without S'rī is refuted. Thus Īśvara has been explained.

Here ends the ninth 'avatāra' on Īśvara of Yatīndramatadīpikā,
composed by S'rīnivāsa, the foremost disciple of S'rīman
Mahācārya, an ornament in the line of S'rī Vādhūlas

दशमोऽवतारः

अद्रव्यम्

१. एवं द्रव्यनिरूपणानन्तरं क्रमप्राप्तम् अद्रव्यं निरूप्यते ।
संयोगरहितम् अद्रव्यम् । तत् अद्रव्यं च सत्त्वरजस्तमांसि शब्दस्पर्शरूप-
रसगन्धाः संयोगः शक्तिरिति दशप्रकारमेव ।

२. तत्र प्रकाशसुखलाघवादिनिदानमतीन्द्रियं शक्त्याद्यतिरिक्तम्

AVATĀRA X

ADRAVYA

1. Thus after the treatment of (the category of) 'substance', the non-substance, which comes next in sequence, is explained. Non-substance is that which is devoid of conjunction. And this non-substance is only tenfold : sattva,¹ rajas, tamas, sound, touch, colour, taste, smell, conjunction and potency.

2. Of these, sattva is that non-substance which is the cause of illumination (of objects), happiness, lightness, etc., which is non-perceptible by the senses and

अद्रव्यं सत्त्वम् । तत् द्विविधं—शुद्धसत्त्वं मिश्रसत्त्वं चेति । रजस्तमः-
शून्यद्रव्यवर्ति सत्त्वं शुद्धसत्त्वम् । तन्नित्यविभूतौ उपचारात् तत्प्रवर्तकेश्वरे
च । रजस्तमःसहवर्ति सत्त्वं मिश्रसत्त्वम् । तत् त्रिगुणे तत्सम्बन्धिनि जीवे
च उपचारात् इति ज्ञेयम् ।

३. लोभप्रवृत्त्यादिनिदानमतीन्द्रियं शक्त्याद्यतिरिक्तम् अद्रव्यं
रजः ।

४. प्रमादमोहादिनिमित्तमतीन्द्रियं शक्त्याद्यतिरिक्तम् अद्रव्यं
तमः ।

which is different from potency etc. It is thus twofold :
pure sattva and mixed sattva. Pure sattva is that
sattva which abides in a substance devoid of rajas and
tamas. It exists in the nityavibhūti ; (hence) Is'vara, who
is its prompter, is figuratively spoken of (as having the
pure sattva). Mixed sattva is that sattva which exists
along with rajas and tamas. It abides (in the substance)
characterized by the three guṇas ; (hence) it should be
understood that the individual self, which is associated
with that, is figuratively spoken of (as having mixed
sattva).

3. Rajas is that non-substance which is the
cause of avarice, activity, etc., which is non-perceptible
by the senses and which is different from potency etc.

4. Tamas is that none-substance, which is the
cause of infatuation, inertia, etc., which is non-percepti-
ble by the senses and which is different from potency,
etc.

५. त्रीण्यपि एतानि यावत्प्रकृतिव्याप्तानि, प्रकृतिवश्यपुरुष-
सम्बद्धानि, अनित्यानि, नित्यसन्तानानि, प्रलयदशायां समानि, सृष्ट्यादौ
विषमाणि, सृष्टिस्थितिसंहारोपयुक्तानि, ईश्वरसङ्कल्पादिसहकारिभेदात् परस्पर-
राभिभवोद्भवकराणि इत्येतानि साधारणानि ।

६. सत्त्वगुणस्तु सम्यग्ज्ञानसुखादिहेतुः मोक्षप्रदश्च । रजो-
गुणस्तु रागाद्यात्मकः कर्मसङ्गदुःखादिहेतुः स्वर्गाद्यामुष्मिकप्रदः । तमो-
गुणस्तु अज्ञानरूप आलस्यादिहेतुर्नरकप्रदश्च । अतः सत्त्वादयो गुणा न
द्रव्यरूपाः ।

5. These three (guṇas) in their turn pervade the entire prakṛti and belong to the individual self controlled by matter ; they are non-eternal. They are in a state of continuous flow ; they become equipoised in the state of dissolution and are disturbed at the beginning of creation ; they are conducive to (the cosmic functions of) creation, sustentation and dissolution ; they bring about the rise of the one by the fall of the other two, on account of the difference of co-operant causes such as Īśvara's will etc. .

6. Sattvaguna is the cause of true knowledge, bliss, etc., and bestows liberation. Rajoguna which is of the nature of passion, is the cause of attachment to work, sorrow, etc., and bestows other-worldly fruits such as heaven etc. Tamoguna which is of the nature of ignorance, is the cause of idleness etc. ; it leads one to hell. Therefore the guṇas such as sattva etc., are not of the nature of substance.

७. अस्मदादिश्रोत्रग्राह्यः पञ्चभूतवर्ती शब्दः । स च द्विविधः—
वर्णात्मकः अवर्णात्मकश्चेति । अकचटतपयादिपञ्चाशदक्षरात्मको वर्णा-
त्मकः । स देवमनुष्यादीनां ताल्वादिव्यङ्ग्यः । भेर्यादिजन्यः अवर्णात्मकः ।
एवम्भूतः शब्दः श्रोत्रेन्द्रियेण गृह्यते । श्रोत्रेन्द्रियगमनाद्वा व्यञ्जकवाय्वाग-
मनात् वा शब्दग्रहः ।

८. ननु श्रुत्या शब्दस्य द्रव्यत्वं प्रतीयते । अद्रव्यत्वं कथम् ?
इति चेत्, न । अकारादेः प्रणवोत्पादकत्वं वाच्यद्वारा सम्भवतीति
परिहारात् अद्रव्यत्वमुपपद्यते । इति शब्दः ।

7. Sound is that which is grasped by our sense of hearing and which abides in all the five elements. It is of two kinds: *varṇa* (vocal sound) and *avarṇa* (non-vocal sound). *Varṇa* is that which comprises the fifty letters such as a, ka, ca, ṭa, ta, pa, ya, etc. Among divine and human beings, it manifests through the palate etc. *Avarṇa* is that sound which is produced by drum etc. Sound, so described, is apprehended by the sense organ of hearing. The apprehension of sound takes place either by the going-out of the sense of hearing or by the incoming of the air which manifests (the sound).

8. 'Now, since the substantiveness of sound is known from Scripture, how can the non-substantiveness be attributed to (sound)?' If this be asked, no; for the producibility of the *Pranava* (*i.e.*, the syllable Om) by the sounds 'a' etc. is possible through 'express sense'; on account of this reply it is possible to hold (that sound) is a non-substance². Thus sound (is explained).

९. अस्मदादिस्पर्शनेन्द्रियग्राह्यविजातीयव्यावृत्तम् अद्रव्यं स्पर्शः । स च त्रिविधः—शीतोष्णानुभयात्मकभेदात् । अप्सु शीतस्पर्शः । तेजसि उष्णस्पर्शः । क्षितिपवनयोः अनुष्णाशीतस्पर्शः । स च पुनर्द्विविधः—पाकजः अपाकजश्चेति । पृथिव्यां पूर्वः, इतरेषु त्रिषु इतरः । तत्र अमृत-गरलतूलोपलगोब्राह्मणचण्डालादिस्पर्शविशेषाः पाकजभेदाः । इति स्पर्शः ।

१०. अस्मदादिचक्षुरिन्द्रियैकग्राह्यविजातीयव्यावृत्तम् अद्रव्यं रूपम् । तच्चतुर्धा—श्वेतरक्तपीतकृष्णभेदात् । तत्र सलिलकलधौतशङ्खशुक्ति-

9. Touch is that non-substance which is perceived by our tactual sense organ and different from other dissimilar (non-substances like sound etc.). It is three-fold, because of the difference as cool, hot and lukewarm. The cool touch is in water, the hot touch in fire and the lukewarm touch in earth and air. And again it is twofold, as pākaja (produced by baking) and apākaja³ (not-produced by baking). The former belongs to earth; the latter belongs to the other three (i.e., water, fire and air). Of these, the varieties of touch belonging to nectar, poison, cotton, stone, cow, brāhmaṇa, caṇḍāla, etc. are various forms of pākaja. Thus the touch (is explained).

10. Colour is that non-substance which is perceived only by our sense organ of vision and different from other dissimilar (non-substances). It is fourfold, because of the difference as white, red, yellow and black. Of these, the particular colours found in water, silver, conch, mother-of-pearl, moon, etc. belong to the

शशाङ्कादीनां रूपविशेषाः श्वेतभेदाः । हुतवहजपादाडिमबन्धुजीवविद्रुमपद्म-
 रागादीनां तु रूपविशेषा रक्तभेदाः । काञ्चनहरितालहरिद्रादीनां पीतभेदाः ।
 मरकतमधुकरजलधरतिमिरतमालदूर्वादीनां कृष्णभेदाः । पीतमपि रक्तावान्तर-
 भेदं केचिदिच्छन्ति, श्रुत्यनुसारात् । प्रकारान्तरेण रूपं द्विविधं — भास्व-
 राभास्वरभेदात् । तेजोगतं भास्वरम् । क्षितिसलिलगतम् अभास्वरम् । एवं
 चत्वार्येव रूपाणि । तेन चित्रं नाम पञ्चमं रूपमिति मतनिरासः । अत
 एव चित्रगन्धस्पर्शरसानामपि निरासः । इति रूपम् ।

white-kind. The particular colours found in fire, China-rose, pomegranate, bandhujīva (*pentaptes phoenicea*), coral, ruby, etc. belong to the red-kind. The particular colours found in gold, yellow-coloured pigeon, turmeric, etc. belong to the yellow-kind. (The particular colours) found in emerald, bee, black-cloud, night, tamāla (*xanthochymus pictorius*), Dūrvā-grass, etc. belong to the black-kind. Some, following Scripture, regard yellow as a different kind included in red.⁴ According to another way, it is of two kinds, because of the difference as the brilliant and the non-brilliant. The brilliant is that which exists in luminous (objects). The non-brilliant is that which exists in earth and water. Thus colour is four only. By this, the view that there is a fifth colour known as the 'variegated'⁵ is refuted. Therefore the views of varied smell, (varied) touch and (varied) taste are also rejected. Thus colour is explained.

११. अस्मदादिजिह्वैकग्राह्यविजातीयेतरो रसः । स षोढा—
मधुराम्ललवणकटुकषायतिक्तभेदात् । तत्र इक्षुक्षीरगुडादिरसा मधुरभेदाः ।
चूतचिञ्चामलकादिरसा आम्लाः । सैन्धवोषरविकारा लवणभेदाः ।
किम्पाकनिम्बादिरसाः कटुभेदाः । हरीतकीविभीतकचूताङ्कुरादिरसाः
कषायभेदाः । शुण्ठीमरीचीसर्षपादिरसाः तिक्तभेदाः । इति रसः ।

१२. अस्मदादिघ्राणग्राह्यविजातीयेतरः अद्रव्यविशेषो गन्धः । स
द्विविधः—सुरभिः असुरभिश्चेति । पाटीरमृगमदघुसृणचम्पकादिगन्धाः

11. Taste is that (non-substance) which is perceived only by our sense organ of taste and different from other dissimilar (non-substances). It is sixfold, because of the difference as sweet, sour, salt, bitter, astringent and pungent. Of these, the tastes of sugar-cane, milk, molasses, etc. belong to the sweet-kind. The tastes of mango, tamarind, myrobalan, etc. belong to the sour-kind. The tastes of salt and other saline modifications belong to the salt-kind. The tastes of kimpāka (*tricho santhes palmata*), margosa, etc. belong to the bitter-kind. The tastes of yellow myrobalan, vibhitaka (*terminalia belenica*), mango-sprout, etc. belong to the astringent-kind. The tastes of ginger, pepper, mustard, etc. belong to the pungent-kind. Thus taste (has been explained).

12. Smell is that particular non-substance which is perceived by our sense organ of smell, and different from other dissimilar (non-substances). It is of two kinds, as the fragrant and the non-fragrant. The odours of sandal, musk, saffron, campaka, etc., belong

सुरभिभेदाः । अयं च गन्धः पृथिव्येकवर्ती पाकभेदात् भिन्नः । पवन-
सलिलादिषु गन्धोपलब्धिः पार्थिवसंसर्गात् अयो दहतीतिवत् औपचारिकी ।

१३. पञ्चीकरणप्रक्रियया सर्वभूतेषु सर्वगुणानां विद्यमानत्वेऽपि
प्राधान्याभिप्रायेण उक्तमिति न विरोधः । पाकात् गुणान्तरोत्पत्तिः । स्वा-
श्रयनाशाभावादेव उपपत्तेः पीलुपाकवादिमतनिरासः । इति गन्धः ।

१४. संयुक्तप्रत्ययनिमित्तं संयोगः । स च सामान्यगुणः षड्-

to the fragrant-variety. And this smell is found in earth only, and becomes manifold by the application of fire (*i.e.*, according to its evolutionary changes). The perception of smell in air, water, etc. is due to their contact with the earth ; (their possession of smell) is figurative like 'iron burns'.

13. Owing to the process of quintuplication, though the qualities of all the elements abide in all the elements, (the specification of a special attribute to a particular element) is spoken of on account of the preponderance (of that particular attribute) ; thus there is no contradiction. Other qualities arise owing to the application of fire ; it is possible because of the absence of the destruction of its own locus. Thus the view of Pīlupākavādin⁶ is refuted. Thus smell (has been explained).

14. Conjunction is that (non-substance) which is the cause of the knowledge of external relation (of substance). It is a generic attribute and is found in

द्रव्यवृत्तिः । अस्य च स्वाभावसादेश्यम् उपलभ्यमानम् अंशभेदप्रयुक्ततया न विरोधावहम् । स कार्याकार्यभेदात् द्विविधः । पूर्वः परिमितानाम् उभयप्रेरणात् । यथा मेषयोर्मल्लयोर्वा । कचित् अन्यतरप्रेरणात् । यथा स्थाणु-
 श्येनयोः संयोगः । केचित् संयोगजसंयोगमपि वदन्ति । हस्तपुस्तक-
 संयोगात् कायपुस्तकसंयोग इति । तन्न । हस्तसंयोगादेव कायसंयोगस्य
 जातत्वात् । एतेन विभागजविभागो निराकृतः । विभागोऽपि संयोगाभाव
 एव, न पृथग्गुणः ।

all the six substances.⁷ And the preception of its negation and existence (in the same locus) is due to the difference of parts (in the same locus); hence it brings on no contradiction.⁸ It is of two kinds, because of the difference as the effected (non-eternal), and the non-effected (eternal). The former exists in limited objects owing to the impelling (force) of both (objects); as between two rams or two wrestlers. In some cases it is due to the impulse in either of them; as conjunction between a falcon and a post. Some speak of conjunction being produced from (another) conjunction; for instance, the contact which arises between one's body and the book owing to the contact between hand and the book. It is not so; for the contact of the hand itself engenders the contact of the body.⁹ By this, the disjunction originating from (another) disjunction is rejected; disjunction is nothing but the non-existence of conjunction, and not a distinct quality.¹⁰

१५. अकार्यसंयोगस्तु विभुद्रव्ययोः । अजद्रव्यसंयोगः श्रुत्या अङ्गीक्रियते । अनुमानादपि अजसंयोगसिद्धिः । यथा—‘विभुद्रव्यं विभुद्रव्यसंयोगवत्, द्रव्यत्वात्, घटवत्’ । ‘विभुद्रव्यम् ईश्वरसंयुक्तं, द्रव्यत्वात्, घटवत्’ । ‘ईश्वरः कालादिसंयुक्तः, द्रव्यत्वात्, घटवत्’ इत्यादिभिः विभुसंयोगसिद्धिः ।

१६. अथ शक्तिः । सर्वकारणानां कारणत्वनिर्वाहकः कश्चित् अद्रव्यविशेषः शक्तिः । तर्कागमाभ्यां तत्सिद्धेः । प्रतिबन्धकमणिमन्त्रादिसन्निधौ स्वरूपसहकारिवैकल्याभावेऽपि यदुपरोधात् दहनो न दहति सा

15. The non-effected variety of conjunction is between all-pervasive substances.¹¹ The conjunction of non-effected substances is accepted by Scripture.¹² The non-effected variety of conjunction is established by inference also: as, (1) ‘An all-pervasive substance has conjunction with an all-pervasive substance, because it is a substance like the pot’; (2) ‘An all-pervasive substance is connected with Īśvara, because it is a substance like the pot’; (3) ‘Īśvara is connected with time etc., because He is a substance like the pot’. By such (syllogisms) the conjunction of all-pervasive substances is established.

16. Now potency (is explained). Potency is that particular non-substance which is the effecting agent (nirvāhaka) of causation among all causes. This is established both by reason and by Scripture. The super-sensuous potency is that by the obstruction of which the fire, in the immediate vicinity of counter-agents such as gem, sacred-formulae, etc., does not burn,

ह्यतीन्द्रिया शक्तिः । अयस्कान्तादिषु तत्प्रसिद्धिः । सा शक्तिः षडद्रव्य-
वृत्तिः । भगवन्निष्ठत्वं पुराणरत्नादिषु प्रसिद्धम् । एवं सर्वत्रापि इति शक्तिर्नाम
धर्मविशेषः सिद्धः ।

१७. ननु चतुर्विंशतिप्रकारा गुणा इत्युक्तत्वात् कथं दशैवेति
निर्दिश्यते ? इति चेत्, उच्यते । जीवात्मविशेषगुणानां बुद्धिसुखदुःखेच्छा-
द्वेषप्रयत्नानां षण्णां ज्ञानविततिरूपत्वेन ज्ञानान्तर्भावस्य उक्तत्वात् । धर्मा-
धर्मयोरपि ईश्वरप्रीत्यप्रीतिरूपत्वेन ईश्वरज्ञाने अन्तर्भावात् । भावनाख्य-
संस्कारस्य ज्ञानविशेषरूपत्वात् । वेगोत्पादकहेतोरेव वेगाख्यसंस्कारोपपत्तेः ।

though there is not the non-existence of its essential nature and co-operant agents. (The presence of) that (potency) is well-known in magnet etc. The potency exists in all the six elements. The existence (of potency) in Bhagavān is established in *Viṣṇupurāṇa*¹³ etc. In this manner it is established that the special quality known as potency exists everywhere.

17. 'Now, when the qualities have been enumerated as twenty-four,¹⁴ how could they be determined as ten only?' If this be asked, it is said in reply : As has been already said the six special attributes of the individual self such as consciousness, pleasure, pain, desire, dislike and volition are brought under consciousness, since they are modes of consciousness. Merit and demerit, which are of the nature of like and dislike of Īśvara, are classed under the 'Consciousness of Īśvara'. The tendency known as, 'reminiscent impression'¹⁵ (is included under consciousness), since

संयोगमादाय स्थितिस्थापकस्यापि सम्भवात् । शब्दस्पर्शरूपरसगन्धानां पञ्चानां प्रत्यक्षसिद्धत्वेन अङ्गीकारात् । विभागपृथक्त्वयोरपि संयोगाभावमादाय उपपत्तेः । परत्वापरत्वयोः देशकालसंयोगविशेषमादाय उपपत्तेः । सङ्ख्यापरिमाणद्रवत्वस्नेहानां तत्तद्द्रव्यस्वरूपमादाय उपपत्तेः । गुरुत्वस्य शक्त्यन्तर्भावस्य वक्तुमुचितत्वाच्च दशैवेति सुष्ठूक्तम् ।

१८. सत्त्वरजस्तमांसि प्रकृतिगुणाः तत्सम्बन्धिजीवगुणाश्च ।
'सत्त्वरूपं ज्ञानम्', 'सात्त्विकः कालः' इत्यादिप्रतीतिः उपाधिवशात्

it is a particular form of consciousness. The cause which produces speed is itself the tendency known as speed. The tendency known as elasticity is possible on account of conjunction. The five (qualities of) sound, touch, colour, taste and smell are admitted, since they are established by perception. Disjunction and separateness are explicable by the absence of conjunction. Remoteness and proximity are explainable by the particular kind of conjunction with space and time. Number, size, fluidity and vicidity are accounted for by the essential nature of the substance to which they belong. Since it is proper to include weight under potency, it has been rightly said that (the qualities) are ten only.¹⁶

18. Sattva, rajas and tamas are the attributes of the prakṛti as well as the individual self which is related to it (i.e., the prakṛti). The usages such as 'knowledge is of the nature of sattva', 'time is sattvic'

औपचारिकी । शब्दादयः पञ्च प्रकृतिकार्यपञ्चमहाभूतगुणत्वेन प्रसिद्धाः । शुद्धसत्त्वं तु त्रिपाद्विभूत्यां तत्प्रवर्तकेश्वरे च । संयोगशक्तिरूपौ गुणौ षड्रव्यसाधारणौ इति विवेकः । इति अद्रव्यं निरूपितम् ।

१९. एवं द्रमिडभाष्य-न्यायतत्त्व-सिद्धित्रय-श्रीभाष्य-दीप-सार-वेदार्थ-सङ्ग्रह-भाष्यविवरण-सङ्गतिमाला-षडर्थसंक्षेप-श्रुतप्रकाशिका-तत्त्वरत्नाकर-प्रज्ञापरित्राण-प्रमेयसङ्ग्रह-न्यायकुलिश-न्यायसुदर्शन-मानयाथात्म्यनिर्णय-न्यायसार-तत्त्वदीप-तत्त्वनिर्णय-तत्त्वमुक्ताकलाप-सर्वार्थसिद्धि-न्यायपरिशुद्धि-न्यायसिद्धाञ्जन-परमतभङ्ग-तत्त्वत्रयचुलुक-तत्त्वत्रयनिरूपण-तत्त्वत्रय-

are figurative on account of the limiting adjuncts. The five (qualities) of sound etc., are well known as the qualities of the five elements which are the effects of the prakṛti. The pure matter exists in Tripādvibhūti as well as in Īsvara, its prompter. The qualities of conjunction and potency are common to all the six substances. Thus non-substance has been explained.

19. Thus, after collecting the tenets (or contents) which are to be known, in accordance with the treatises¹⁷ of the former teachers such as *Dramiḍabhāṣya*,¹⁸ *Nyāyatattva*,¹⁹ *Siddhitraya*,²⁰ *Sribhāṣya*,²¹ *Vedāntadīpa*,²² *Vedāntasāra*,²³ *Vedārthasaṅgraha*,²⁴ *Bhāṣyavivaraṇa*,²⁵ *Sāṅgati-mālā*,²⁶ *Ṣaḍarthasaṅkṣepa*,²⁷ *Srutapra-kāśikā*,²⁸ *Tattvaratnākara*, *Prajñāparitrāṇa*,²⁹ *Prameyasāṅgraha*,³⁰ *Nyāyakulisa*,³¹ *Nyāyasudarsana*,³² *Manayathātmyanirṇaya*,³³ *Nyāyasāra*, *Tattvadīpa*,³⁴ *Tattvanirṇaya*,³⁵ *Tattvamuktakalāpa*,³⁶ *Sarvārthasiddhi*,³⁷ *Nyāyaparīśuddhi*,³⁸ *Nyāyasiddhāñjana*,³⁹ *Paramatabhaṅga*,⁴⁰ *Tattvatrayacūluka*,⁴¹ *Tattvatraya-*

चण्डमारुत-वेदान्तविजय - पाराशर्यविजयादिपूर्वाचार्यप्रबन्धानुसारेण ज्ञात-
व्यार्थान् सङ्गृह्य बालबोधार्थं यतीन्द्रमतदीपिकाख्यशारीरकपरिभाषायाम्
अस्याम् एते अर्थाः प्रतिपादिताः ।

२०. अध्यात्मशास्त्राणां तत्त्वहितपुरुषार्थप्रतिपादकत्वात् तत्सारे
अस्मिन्नपि प्रकृतिजीवेश्वरपरिच्छेदैः तत्त्वस्य निरूपितत्वात्, बुद्धिपरिच्छेदे
उपायस्य निरूपणात्, नित्यविभूतिपरिच्छेदे ईश्वरपरिच्छेदे च पुरुषार्थस्य
निरूपणाच्च तत्त्वहितपुरुषार्था निरूपिता इति निरवद्यम् ।

२१. एकं तत्त्वम् इति प्रतिपादयन्ति सूरयः । 'आत्मा अनात्मा'
इति विभज्य द्वेधा निरूपयन्ति ऋषयः । श्रुत्यनुसारात् भोक्तृभोग्यनियन्तृ-
nirūpana,⁴² *Tattvatraya*,⁴³ *Caṇḍamāruta*,⁴⁴ *Vedānta-
vijaya*,⁴⁵ *Parāśaryavijaya*,⁴⁶ etc., they (i.e., the tenets)
have been set forth in this (work), *S'ārīrakaparibhāṣā*,
known as *Yatīndramatadīpikā* for the instruction of
the beginners.

20. Since tattva (Reality), hita (means to the
end) and puruṣārtha (ends of human endeavour) are
propounded in the works pertaining to the Divine, in
this work also which is the essence of that, tattva has
been explained in the chapters on 'Prakṛti', 'Jīva' and
'Īśvara'; upāya (means) has been explained in the
chapter on 'Buddhi' and puruṣārtha in the chapters
on 'Nityavibhūti' and 'Īśvara'. Thus tattva, hita,
and puruṣārtha have been explained here, and (there-
fore) no fault attaches (to this exposition.)

21. (Some) sages declare that Reality is one.
The ṛṣis explain It to be two, dividing (the Reality)
as self and non-self. The ācāryas, on the basis of

रूपं तत्त्वत्रयम् इति प्रतिपादयन्ति आचार्याः । हेयं, तस्य निवर्तकम्, उपादेयं, तस्योपायं इति चतुर्धा विभज्य अनुसन्दधते केचिदाचार्याः । प्राप्यं प्राप्ता उपायः फलं विरोधि इति पञ्चधा निरूपयन्ति अपरदेशिकाः । अर्थपञ्चकमेव सम्बन्धेन साकं षोढा परिगणय्य वर्णयन्ति अन्ये गुरवः । एतेषां तत्तद्विभाजकधर्ममादाय अनुसन्धानम् उपपद्यते ।

२२. वस्तुतस्तु वेदान्तानां चिदचिद्विशिष्टाद्वैतम् एकमेव ब्रह्म इति तात्पर्यम् । अत एव चिदचिद्विशिष्टं ब्रह्म एकमेवेति मत्वा भगवान् बादरायणः 'अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा' इति उपक्रम्य तदेव सप्रकारं निरूपि-

Scripture, teach the threefold character of the Reality as the enjoyer, the objects of enjoyment and the controller. Some ācāryas ascertain (the Reality) by making a fourfold division as heya (what deserves to be avoided), its removal, upādeya (what deserves to be attained) and its means. Other teachers explain (the same) in a fivefold manner as prāpya (end), prāptā (seeker), upāya (means), phala (fruit) and virodhi⁴⁷ (obstacles to the end). Other teachers enumerate and describe in a sixfold manner the very same fivefold principles by adding 'relation'⁴⁸ to them. The determination of these become possible on the basis of the respective attributes which divide them.⁴⁹

22. But in fact, the purport of the Vedānta is that the non-dual Brahman, qualified by the sentient and the non-sentient, is the only Reality. Therefore, Revered Bādarāyaṇa realizing Brahman as the only Reality, qualified by the sentient and the non-sentient, began the enquiry, 'Then, therefore, the investigation

तवान् । अतः चिदचिद्विशिष्टः ब्रह्मशब्दवाच्यः विष्णुवाक्यः परवासुदेवो नारायण एवैकं तत्त्वम् इति विशिष्टाद्वैतवादिनां दर्शनम् इति सिद्धम् ।

इति श्रीबाधूलकुलतिलकश्रीमन्महाचार्यस्य प्रथमदासेन श्रीमद्वेङ्कट-
गिरिनाथपदकमलसेवापरायणस्वामिपुष्करिणीगोविन्दाचार्य-
सूनुना श्रीनिवासदासेन विरचिता यतीन्द्रमत-
दीपिकाख्या शारीरकपरिभाषा समाप्ता ॥

into Brahman', ⁵⁰ and explained that very Brahman as having modes. Thus Nārāyaṇa, the Supreme Vāsudeva—known by the name of Viṣṇu, expressed by the term 'Brahman' and qualified by the sentient and the non-sentient—is the only Reality; that this is the philosophy of the adherents of Viśiṣṭādvaita is (hereby) established.

Here ends S'ārīrakaparibhāṣā called Yatindramatadīpikā composed by S'rīnivāsa, the foremost disciple of S'rīman Mahācārya, an ornament in the line of S'rī Vādhūlas and son of Svāmipuṣkarinī Govindācārya devoted to the lotus-feet of S'rī Veṅkaṭagirinātha ⁵¹

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AVATĀRA ONE

PRATYAKṢA

1. Śrīnivāsa, the presiding deity of Tirupati (Chittoor District, Madras Presidency).
2. A hillock on which the shrine of Śrī Devarāja is situated in modern Kāñcīpuram.
3. Modern Sholinghur (North Arcot District, Madras Presidency).
- 4 & 6. Śrī Rāmānujācārya.
5. It is quite probable that Kṛṣṇa is identical with Śrī Yāmunācārya, the grand spiritual preceptor of Śrī Rāmānuja.
7. Śrī Veñkaṭanātha (or Vedāntadeśika), a great philosopher, poet, leader and expounder of Viśiṣṭādvaita who was born in 1269 A.D. at Tuppil near Kāñcīpuram.
8. Śrī Mahācārya *alias* Doḍḍayyācārya, the preceptor of Śrīnivāsa, the author of the present book.
9. Śrī is Lakṣmī. Śrī and Nārāyaṇa are inseparably united; this dual form of the Godhead constitutes the highest Brahman, the Father-Mother principle of the universe. The mutual relation of Śrī and Nārāyaṇa, in the language of the Pāñcārātras, is one of avinābhāva like that of dharma and dharmin, ahaṇtā and aham, light and luminosity, sun and sunshine, etc. Though they are regarded as distinct, there is no difference in their functions or tastes. The so-called dualism is kept up for cosmic functions and redemption of the jīvas. As Śrīrīvatsāṅkamīśra puts it in his *Śrīstava* even Bhagavān is guided by Śrī in His cosmic functions as well as redemptive acts. If Nārāyaṇa represents the principle of justice, as the Father of the universe, Lakṣmī, as the

Mother of all, is the embodiment of dayā or kṛpā. She mediates on behalf of the bound jīva and bestows upon him salvation.

10. According to Viśiṣṭādvaita liberation is not identity with Brahman. When the mukta gives up his physical body, he reaches Vaikuṇṭha, the spiritual realm made of bliss itself. In this noumenal realm he is lost in the bliss of Brahman, experiencing sālōkya, sāmīpya, sārūpya and sāyujya.

11. The composer of the *Vedāntasūtras*.

12. The famous Vṛttikāra of *Pūrva-* and *uttara-mīmāṃsā-sūtras*, known also as Upavarṣa and Kṛtakṣi.

13. Known also as Ṭaṅkācārya. He wrote 'Vākya' on *Chāndogyopaniṣad*.

14. Dramiḍācārya wrote his famous commentary on the 'Vākya' of Ṭaṅka.

15. The famous Nammālvār also known as S'aṭhakopa.

16. Nāthamuni was the first ācārya among the Viśiṣṭādvaitins.

17. Yāmunācārya, the grand spiritual preceptor of S'ri Rāmānuja, was the grandson of Nāthamuni.

18. S'ri Rāmānuja.

19. The preceptor of S'rīnivāsa.

20. One of the most important doctrines of Viśiṣṭādvaita is that Brahman is the s'arīrin while cit and acit form the s'arīra. And for this reason Vedānta is known as S'ārīrakas'āstra. This manual which discourses in technical phraseology on the inner relation between Brahman and the world of cit and acit is called *S'ārīrakaparibhāṣā* or the philosophy of pan-organismalmonism.

21. Literally it means 'The Light of the System of Yatipati or Rāmānuja'.

22. The Cārvākas accept only one pramāṇa, viz., perception: the Bauddhas and Vaiśeṣikas accept two pramāṇas, viz., perception and inference; the Sāṅkhyas accept three, viz., perception, inference and verbal testimony; the Naiyāyikas accept four, viz., perception, inference, comparison and verbal testimony: the

Prābhākaras accept five, *viz.*, perception, inference, comparison, verbal testimony and postulation: the Bhāṭṭas and the Advaitins accept six, *viz.*, the five above *pramāṇas* and non-cognition: the Paurāṇikas accept eight *pramāṇas*, *viz.*, the above six *pramāṇas* and *sambhava* and *aithya*: the Viśiṣṭādvaitins like the Sāṅkhyas accept only three *pramāṇas*, *viz.*, perception, inference and verbal testimony. Later on it will be shown under appropriate heads why *smṛti*, *pratyabhijñā*, *anupalabdhi*, *ūha* and *saṁśaya* are brought under *pratyakṣa*, and *upamāna* and *arthāpatti* under *anumāna*.

23. According to Vedānta cosmology, the *acit* differentiates itself into the successive forms of the twenty-four categories of *prakṛti*, *maḥat*, *ahaṁkāra*, the eleven *indriyas*, the five *tanmātras* and the five *bhūtas*. Thus the evolutionary process of *sadvidyā* teaches the non-difference between Brahman and the universe.

24. Past, present and future.

25. Seeker of sense-pleasures here or hereafter.

26. The neophyte who desires to get rid of all the bondages of mind and matter.

27. Near Trichinopoly in Madras Presidency.

28. Tirupati.

29. A small hillock in Kāñcīpuram.

30. Modern Sholinghur.

31. It is difficult to bring out the full import of the word 'vyavahāra'. It is not mere conduct or behaviour. *Vyavahāra* stands for the test of practical needs of life in their proper perspective. Prof. M. Hiriyanna has translated *vyavahārānugūṇa* as 'adapted to practical interests of life'. Knowledge is true not only when it agrees with outside reality, but also when it satisfies the practical interests of life. Truth is that which is both experientially and experimentally verified.

32. To cognize a nacre as a piece of silver.

33. *E.g.*, the definition 'that is a cow which possesses horns' applies to buffaloes also which are not intended to be defined.

34. Previously it was stated that instrument (*karāṇa*) of valid knowledge is *pramāṇa*. Here the meaning of *karāṇa* is explained.

35. A section of the Advaitins themselves do not accept the view of valid knowledge as consisting in having for its content a thing that is not already known (anadhigata).

36. If wrong knowledge is generated owing to defective sense organ, it cannot be defined as 'that knowledge which is adapted to practical interests of life as they really are'. And consequently owing to the absence of proper instrument of pramā, the evidence becomes invalid.

37. What was indefinite and devoid of specific judgement in the nirvikalpaka perception becomes definite and determinate in the savikalpaka perception. In Advaita epistemology the savikalpaka apprehends relatedness whereas the nirvikalpaka does not apprehend any relation (saṁsarga). If the latter is absolutely non-relational there arises some difficulty in determining its perceptibility. Hence in Viśiṣṭādvaita the nirvikalpaka is called 'prathamapiṇḍagrahaṇa' or the cognition of the individual for the first time in which the generic character of the object alone is apprehended. The second is called 'dvitiyapiṇḍagrahaṇa' or the cognition of the individual for the second time in which what was already known becomes explicit. It may be noted that both perceptions are saviseṣa and *not* nirviseṣa.

38. A substance comes into contact with visual sense along with its colour which is connected with the jar through the relation of 'ās'rayaṇa'. This sense-relation which causes perceptual knowledge is known in Viśiṣṭādvaita as 'saṁyuktās'rayaṇasambandha'.

39. According to Naiyāyikas 'samavāya' or inherence is one of the causes that brings about perceptive cognition.

40. Here Viśiṣṭādvaita follows the Nyāya theory of smṛti. According to Annambhaṭṭa, smṛti is the knowledge which is caused only by the saṁskāra. A saṁskāra is nothing but a reminiscent impression derived from a prior experience. When such an 'impression' dependent on a prior experience becomes the cause of memory, it cannot claim to be a separate way of knowing.

41. The famous shrine of Śrī Rāṅganātha is situated in Śrīraṅgam.

42. According to Bhāṭṭas and Advaitins, *pratyabhijñā* is a cognitive complex consisting of *pratyakṣa* and *smṛti*. But the Naiyāyikas would account for it by including in *pratyakṣa* of a particular type without recognizing any such parts. The Viśiṣṭādvaitin, to keep up consistency, would have to bring *pratyabhijñā* under *pratyakṣa*, as *smṛti* itself is included in *pratyakṣa*. For *pratyabhijñā* is nothing but perceptual experience arising through the contact of the sense organ with some object.

43. This is a vexed question among the different schools of Indian philosophy. The Advaitins along with the Bhāṭṭas accept *abhāva* as the sixth *pramāṇa*. The Naiyāyikas do not admit it as a distinct *pramāṇa*, though they hold it as a distinct category. The Viśiṣṭādvaitins along with the Prābhākaras refute the theory that *abhāva* is a distinct category, and equate it with the 'mere floor' (or *kevalādhikaraṇa*) in the absence of a jar on the floor.

44. Cf. *Sṛībhāṣya* (I, i, 1): 'Those who understand the Veda hold that all cognition has for its object what is real; for *śruti* and *smṛti* alike teach that everything participates in the nature of everything else'. In the scriptural account of evolution it is said that each of these elements was made tripartite. For instance, the red colour in fire comes from the primal fire, white colour from water and the black colour from earth. In the same way all things are composed of elements of all things. The Vedānta theory of *pañcīkaraṇa* says that all things are composed of all the five elements in varying degrees. But the thinghood of every object is largely shaped by the preponderant element. We find some similarity between nacre and silver owing to intermixture of common component parts. In the nacre-silver illusion, owing to ocular defect, the percipient picks up a nacre mistaking it for silver though the silver-content is insignificant. When the percipient's vision is free from any defect, he apprehends the nacre-content, and there is no illusion for him. Hence the cognition of silver in nacre is true though the silver-content has no economic value. Likewise when one cognition is being sublated by another, the disillusionment is explained on the basis of preponderant element

in its constitution. So whenever we apprehend the preponderant element of an object, the cognition becomes more true, the fragmentary perception becomes less true. There is no illusion in the Viśiṣṭādvaita epistemology in its literal sense.

45. There are five theories of illusion : ātmakhyāti, asatkhyāti, akhyāti, anyathākhyāti and anirvacanīyakhyāti. These theories of bhrama are accepted by Yogācāras, Mādhyamikas, Prābhākaras, Naiyāyikas and Advaitins respectively.

The Vijñānavāda school of Buddhism, otherwise known as the Yogācāra school, explains bhrama as subsisting in the 'ātman' (consciousness) which externalizes itself in the form of objects like silver in the silver-nacre illusion. This theory of error is called ātmakhyāti. Viśiṣṭādvaita refutes the theory of ātmakhyāti in which, cognition arising without a corresponding object produces silver and makes it its object; for this khyāti fails to explain not only the production of the effect, but also contradicts an admitted principle according to which there are four causes that bring out a cognition: they are the adhipati-cause, the sahakāri-cause, the ālambana-cause, and the samanantara-cause. According to Yogācāras, cognitions perish absolutely, and do not possess any permanency. On the basis of this principle it is difficult to prove that the form of subsequent cognition is due to the action of the previous cognition independent of external object. For, it cannot be maintained how in the midst of a series of cognitions of red colour, there arises immediately the cognition of another colour. Therefore the conclusion is that the manifoldness of cognitions is due only to the manifoldness of objects.

The Sūnyavādins explain bhrama as consisting in the cognition of *asat* (non-being). In the case of a wrong cognition 'this is silver', which arises in the absence of silver, the object of cognition is 'asat'. On the basis of such experience, even *asat* becomes competent as an object of cognition. This theory of error is known as *asatkhyāti*.

Viśiṣṭādvaita strongly repudiates the theory of the Mādhyamikas who state that there is nothing save a universal void. If it

is stated that 'Nothing is the only Reality', the *Vedāntasūtra* replies, 'And on account of its being unproved in everyway' (II, ii, 30). If these nihilists are asked whether they hold that everything is existence, or non-existence, or anything else, they cannot establish nothingness on any of these views; for, the ideas of existence and non-existence have reference only to particular states of *really existing things*. Hence any theory of nothingness would imply the acceptance of the reality of things. Moreover, if one wants to establish the doctrine of *sūnya*, he must attempt it only with the help of some means of knowledge, the reality of which he must admit. On the contrary, if he does not acknowledge the validity of the means of knowledge, everything becomes real. The conclusion is that *asat* cannot be established in any way.

The *Prābhākara*s accept the reality of two cognitions, the perceived nacre as 'this' (*idam*) and the recollection of silver seen elsewhere. At the time of cognition, the percipient is unable to identify the recollection of silver as recollection since he merely apprehends it as cognition. The object of recollection, silver, enters into his consciousness, divested of its association with a particular place or time. In other words, when two cognitions of silver and nacre arise, the percipient misses their difference owing to his non-discrimination consequent on the visual defect. So there arises *pravṛtti* (volition) on his part to pick up the so-called silver. When he finds that there is no silver at all, the disillusionment comes with the conviction that his activity was in vain. Even this theory is imperfect as it cannot adequately account for the mental decision on the part of the percipient to pick up silver when there is no silver at all. Nor is mere non-discrimination between the recollection of silver and the present perception sufficient to induce *pravṛtti* leading to activity.

The *Nyāya* theory of *bhrama* is known as *anyathākhyāti*. According to this *khyāti* when one thing, nacre, is wrongly perceived as silver the erroneous cognition takes the form 'this is silver'. Here 'this' stands for nacre which is not perceived as nacre owing to some ocular defect. This visual perception of

nacre as 'this' arises in the usual way by the contact of the sense with the object. Only the silverness which is the property of some silver existing elsewhere is presented to the perception as belonging to nacre as 'this'. But how could there be a perception of silver when there is no sense-relation between the silver and the sense of sight? So, to get over this difficulty the Naiyāyikas hold that the real silver is connected with the sense of sight through a super-normal type of sense-relation (alaukika-sannikarṣa). Though the Naiyāyika contends that sat alone is being presented to the consciousness, he confounds the theory by trying to bring an absent reality within the range of the sense through supernormal relation; otherwise he cannot explain how bhrama consists in wrongly perceiving the nacre as silver which is elsewhere.

The Advaita theory of anirvacanīyakhyāti holds that bhrama is neither real nor unreal, nor both, and is therefore inexplicable. According to Advaita (*vide Vedāntaparibhāṣā*) the silver-nacre illusion takes place in the following manner: When the defective sight of a person comes in contact with an object (nacre), a vṛtti of the internal-organ which has the form of 'this' and the form of brightness arises; and in that vṛtti, Caitanya limited by 'this' is reflected. Then owing to out-going vṛtti, the Caitanya limited by 'this', the Caitanya limited by the vṛtti and cognizer-consciousness become one. Then avidyā, which is present in viśayacaitanya identical with pramāṇacaitanya, which has nacreness for its mode, and helped by the saṃskāra of silver, kindled up by the similarity between the object seen as 'this' and silver, transforms itself into an object with the appearance of silver and into an apparent cognition of silver. In this state of false superimposition the experience is real as long as the cognition lasts, and then becomes unreal when true knowledge dawns.

Of all the theories of bhrama, none has been subjected by Śrī Rāmānuja to such a thorough examination as the theory of avidyā. This classical refutation is known as 'saptavidha-anupapatti', viz., ās'rayānupapatti, tirodhānānupapatti, svarūpānupapatti, anirvacanīyatvānupapatti, pramāṇānupapatti, nivartakānupapatti

and nivṛtṭyanupapatti. In explaining the anirvacanīyatvānupapatti, it is asked : what is meant by the anirvacanīyatā of avidyā. If anirvacanīyatva is defined as the difference of avidyā from sat and asat, it would be actually inexplicable, since no means of knowledge can enable us to understand it. In our experience we find that the whole host of objects is arranged according to our states of consciousness (pratiti), and each state of consciousness presents itself in the form of sat or asat. If, therefore, we have to assume that of states of consciousness, which are in the form of sat or asat, the object is neither sat nor asat, then anything might be the object of any state of consciousness.

46. A piece of nacre cannot serve the purpose of silver.

47. The knowledge of silver in nacre.

48. ' There are no chariots in that state, no horses, no roads ; then He creates chariots, horses and roads. There are no delights, no joys, no bliss ; then He creates delights, joys and bliss. There are no tanks, no lakes, no rivers ; then He creates tanks, lakes and rivers. For he is the Maker ' (*Br. Up.*, IV, iii, 10).

49. When the dreaming person wakes up, all the dream-perceptions vanish.

50. Only the dreaming person perceives chariots etc., and not others.

51. The eyes become yellow owing to certain diseases like jaundice. This is called ' pitta ' supposed to be caused by excess of bile.

52. For, the colour of the crystal is overpowered by the brilliant red of the China-rose.

53. Water always exists in conjunction with light and earth ; but owing to the ocular defect of the percipient and the adṛṣṭa, the light and earth are not cognized, while the water is alone cognized.

54. As a matter of fact, the direction is one. By a sort of artificial division, the direction is divided into east, west, south, north, etc. A village which is to the east of one is to the west of another.

55. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realists, *dik* is a distinct substance. Later on it will be stated in the fourth *avatāra* that *dik* need not be admitted as a distinct category inasmuch as it is derivable from the connection of the apparent motion of the sun with the sky.

56. This is analogous to the cognition of a real wheel; but in the case of a real wheel no intervals are cognized as there are none, while in the case of a firebrand none are cognized owing to the rapidity of the movement.

57. Similar reflecting surfaces.

58. One *sāmagrī* cognizes the moon in her real place. The other *sāmagrī* moving somewhat obliquely cognizes at first a spot near the moon, and then the moon herself who appears a little removed from her original position. Although there is only one moon qualified by connection with two spots simultaneously, the affection of the eye gives rise to difference in the *sāmagrī*, which in turn to a double apprehension, and the latter again to the doubleness of the moon.

59. It is not possible to apprehend any object devoid of all difference; for instance, a cow devoid of attributes and configuration. It has been already stated that even the non-determinate perception apprehends only objects marked with difference.

60. All states of consciousness have for their object something that is qualified by difference as appears in the case of judgement like 'this is a jar'. When a jar is apprehended, it is so apprehended as different from all other objects such as book, table, etc. Difference there means nothing but jariness. But in the perception 'this is a jar', it is comprehended not as difference but as jariness alone. When it is to be comprehended as difference, it requires a counter-entity; and so comprehended it is responsible for the saying 'jar is different from cloth'.

61. *Viśiṣṭādvaitā* does not admit these two faults; for the only objects of perception are those that are qualified by generic character etc., which, as relative things, give rise to the judgement revealing the difference between themselves and the things in

which they inhere. Moreover, as soon as a perceptive cognition takes place, we at once apprehend on the one hand, the generic character which is the basis of difference from everything else, and on the other, the essential nature of the thing itself. Just as consciousness manifests itself as well as the object known, the difference also reveals itself as well as the things which differ.

62. Ten persons crossed a river. One amongst them, desiring to know whether all of them had reached the other shore safely, counted all from one to nine except himself. All of them were in a great fix as the tenth person could not be traced. A Nestor came to their rescue and counted them all from one to nine and declared the tenth person as 'thou art the tenth'.

63. Dharma is not an object of perceptive cognition.

64. This is the Advaita theory of perceptual cognition.

65. Tatra niṣprakāraṇam jñānam nirvikalpakaṁ. (*Tarkasāgraha*.)

66. Akṣapāda Gautama, the author of the *Nyāyasūtras*.

67. Otherwise known as Ulūka and Kāśyapa, the composer of the *Vaiśeṣikasūtras*.

68. The celebrated Sanskrit grammarian who is said to have obtained his knowledge of grammar from Lord Śiva himself.

69. Cf. the atomic theory of the *Vaiśeṣikas* refuted in the fourth avatāra.

70. If Indra and other gods are corporeal, they must be non-eternal also. Consequently the vedic words denoting the vedic deities also become non-eternal. Secondly, from the Scripture we understand that many mantras have 'makers'; for instance, 'Reverence to the ṛṣis who are the makers of the mantras', 'That is Agni; this is a hymn of Viśvāmitra', etc. From all this it may be assumed that the Vedas have personal origin only. This view is refuted by Viśiṣṭādvaita. For, vedic words such as Indra and others, unlike the word Devadatta which denotes a particular individual, denote by their own power particular species of beings, like the word 'cow' which denotes particular species of animals. Therefore, when an individual belonging to Indra-class has perished,

the Creator, on the basis of the vedic word 'Indra' which is being presented to his mind creates another Indra possessing the same attributes. Hence Vedas cannot be non-eternal owing to corporeality of the gods.

Now, as regards the authorship of the Vedas ; the creation of Vasiṣṭa and other ṛṣis, who denote classes is preceded by their being presented to Prajāpati's mind through those words ; then He creates them endowed with the very same characteristics and appoints them to 'see' the very same 'kāndas' and 'mantras'. These ṛṣis, being endowed thus, undergo the proper discipline and finally 'see' the mantras in their very sounds and accents, declared by the Vasiṣṭas and other ṛṣis of former aeons. The vedic mantras have a personal origin only in such a relative sense.

71. The Infinite Being beyond all contact with the senses is not an object of perception or inference. In the first place, perception being based either on the sense organs or on yogic powers is incapable of apprehending that which transcends all relations. Nor does Brahman fall within the sphere of inference either of the kind which proceeds from the *vis'eṣa* or of the kind based on *sāmānya*. The former one is inadmissible, for such inference is not related to anything beyond the range of the senses. Nor is it of the latter kind, since we do not see any *liṅga* that is invariably connected with a Supreme Self who is capable of creating the universe. A persistent ratiocination still cannot show us a way to infer the Supreme Self. The teleological and cosmological arguments cannot prove Him as the world-architect or the first cause that exists *per se*. There is no proof to show that the earth, mountains and oceans though created, were emanated from one Creator. Nor could it be proved that all the effected things have a homogeneous character like a jar, because we see many effects are qualified by the difference of time of production etc. Nor by inference can any one maintain that the highest Self with infinite power alone can create ; for even individual beings by means of extraordinary power acquired by religious merit can create. Hence Scripture is the only means for knowing Brahman, the highest Reality.

72. According to Viśiṣṭādvaita the jīva is atomic in size. Cf. eighth avatāra.
73. Cf. fourth avatāra where the categories are refuted.
74. Cf. second avatāra.
75. Cf. last avatāra.

AVATĀRA TWO

ANUMĀNA

1. What is necessary is that the vyāpaka must be more extensive than the vyāpya. When one knows that smoke is pervaded by fire, he obtains the knowledge of the vyāpaka, namely, fire. For, there may be fire without smoke as in the case of a red-hot iron ball, but where there is smoke, fire is invariably present. Thus when the vyāpya is first ascertained, then the knowledge of the vyāpaka is also obtained.

2. It is interesting to note that Śrīnivāsa describes vyāpti as an invariable relation not due to connection with any adventitious circumstance, i.e., that it is nirupādhika and not aupādhika. For instance, that smoke is pervaded by fire is an unconditioned relation not brought about by any adventitious circumstance. Per contra, in the proposition, 'Fire is pervaded by smoke', vyāpti is not an unconditioned relation, since it depends upon the adventitious contact of wet fuel with fire. Here our author follows the earlier writers on Nyāya who define vyāpti as anupādhikaḥ sambandhaḥ. See *Primer of Indian Logic*, pp. 262-63.

3. Some Naiyāyikas criticize the view that the relation of vyāpti is known through repeated observation (bhūyodarsana). According to Dharmarāja, a great thinker of the Advaita school, vyāpti is ascertained by the perception of concomitance (sahacāradarsana) when there is no cognition of inconstancy. Since what is determinative is sahacāradarsana, it matters little whether the perception is a single one or repeated. This view may be thus examined: All admit that the cognition of vyāpti is obtained in experience. A single experience cannot establish the universal

pervasion, as one is not sure of the non-existence of the opposite. Granting that a genuine exception stultifies all the previous experiences, how is one to know whether the so-called exception is genuine or apparent? Hence to make sure that a certain type of relation is actually *vyāpti*, or the contrary experience is a genuine one, one has to eliminate all dubitative conditions by repeated observation. Hence the need for *bhūyodars'ana*.

4. In the proposition, 'The mountain has smoke, because it has fire', contact with wet fuel is the *upādhi*. The *upādhi* is pervasive of the *probandum*, as contact with wet fuel is found wherever there is smoke. But contact with wet fuel is not found in every place where there is fire: for instance, a red-hot iron ball: hence the *upādhi* is non-pervasive of the *probans*.

5. *Pāpārabdha* pervades only 'the cause of sorrow' which is the *probandum*, and not 'service' which is the *probans*, since every kind of service is not produced by sin.

6. All the three words imply *probans*, reason or mark.

7. *Pakṣadharmatā* consists in the presence of the invariable concomitant in the subject like a mountain.

8. *Dharmin* is that in which certain attributes are conceived as inhering.

9. *Pakṣa* is that in which the presence of the *probandum* is doubted, and is yet to be established; as a mountain, when smoke is taken as the *probans*.

10. *Sapakṣa* is that in which the *probandum* is known for certain.

11. *Vipakṣa* is that in which the absence of the *probandum* is known for certain.

12. *Bādhita* is that which is advanced to establish a *probandum* whose absence is proved by another powerful instrument of knowledge. In the syllogism, 'Lake has fire', the *probandum* 'has fire' is sublated by its opposite 'has no fire' by the existence of water there.

13. In *satpratipakṣa* the *probans* admits of being neutralized by another counter-*probans* which may be advanced to prove the

non-existence of the *probandum*. For instance, in the proposition, 'Sound is eternal, because it is audible like sound-ness', the counter-*probans* is 'kāryatva' as in the proposition, 'Sound is non-eternal, because it is an effect like a jar'. In an instance like this two counter-*probans* neutralize each other and prevent the inference. The absence of such counter-*probans* is *asatpratipakṣa*.

14. The *anvayavyatirekin probans* has both positive and negative concomitance with the *probandum*.

15. The bare *anvayin probans* has positive concomitance alone. For instance, 'Brahman is expressible by word, because it is a thing like a jar'. Here the negative pervasion is not possible as there is no counter-instance in which the non-existence of the *probandum* could be known for certain. Moreover, in this syllogism, negative pervasion cannot be predicated between word-expressibility and thingness as all things are expressible by words.

16. The *kevalavyatirekin probans* is that which has negative concomitance alone. For instance, 'Earth is different from the rest, because it possesses smell; whatever is not different from the rest has no smell, as water; this earth is not so; therefore it is not without difference from the rest'. In a proposition like this there is no instance of positive co-presence in the form, 'Whatever has smell is different from the rest', since earth is only the *pakṣa* which possesses smell.

17. The *Naiyāyikas* recognize three kinds of *probans*, *viz.*, *anvayavyatirekin*, *kevalānvayin* and *kevalavyatirekin*. According to *Advaitins* this *anumāna* is of the nature of *anvayin* alone. They along with the *Mīmāṃsakas* bring the *vyatirekin* under a distinct *pramāṇa* called *arthāpatti*. It is interesting to note that our author recognizes *kevalānvayin* and *anvayavyatirekin* and altogether repudiates *kevalavyatirekin*.

18. It causes one's own *anumiti*. A person may understand the relation of *vyāpti* between smoke and fire from his repeated observation at kitchen and other places, and make out the generalization in the form, 'Wherever there is smoke there is fire'.

19. A person after inferring fire from smoke for himself, uses this syllogism of five members in order to enable another person to have the same inferential cognition.

20. The Advaitins also along with the Mīmāṃsakas maintain that either pratijñā, hetu and udāharaṇa, or udāharaṇa, upanaya and nigamana are sufficient.

21. A follower of Sugata or Buddha. Philosophic Buddhism is divided into four schools: Mādhyamika, Yogācāra, Sautrāntika and Vaibhāṣika.

22. Śrinivāsa along with the Saugatas reduces the syllogism to two propositions *viz.*, udāharaṇa and upanaya. Pervasion between fire and smoke and the presence of *probans* in the subject are sufficient to make out a valid inference. Since these two essential conditions are established by udāharaṇa and upanaya, the other propositions are considered to be superfluous.

23. Also known as savyabhicāra.

24. Also called satpratipakṣa.

25. This is the same as the bādhita.

26. Here the *probans* 'visible' is fallaciously assumed in the subject as visibility cannot be established in respect of jiva.

27. Here the 'sky-lotus' which is the locus of *probans* being fictitious, the *probans* 'lotus' has no *locus standi*.

28. When a person repeatedly observes the pervasion between smoke and fire at kitchen and other places, it acts as a means to arrive at the generalization, 'Wherever there is smoke there is fire'. In the given example the perceiver had no occasion to observe that the existents are momentary, and consequently he has not the help of such *pramāṇa* to grasp the pervasion.

29. In this syllogism, the prohibition of demeritorious actions is the *upādhi*. Since prohibition comes into force whenever demeritorious actions are performed, it is pervasive of the *probandum*. But there is no prohibition in every place where slaying is done as in the case of immolation involved in *kratu*. Here the *upādhi* is non-pervasive of the *probans*.

30. Here 'producibility' does not establish the eternality of matter, but its contrary, the non-eternality; for whatever is produced is non-eternal.

31. The Naiyāyikas recognize a third kind of *savyabbicāra* known as *anupasaṃhārin* (non-conclusive). *Vide TS.*, the chapter on *anumāna*.

32. In this instance, the reason 'knowability' is equally related to eternal as well as non-eternal things. Since all knowable things are not universally eternal, we cannot predicate eternality to sound, because it is knowable. As Annambhaṭṭa puts it: *sādhāraṇa* is one which is present in a place where the *probandum* is absent, as in the syllogism, 'The mountain has fire, because it is knowable'. Here knowability is found in a tank where fire is absent.

33. The quality of earth is found in earth only which has smell as its attribute, and not anywhere, either in eternal objects or in non-eternal objects. Since we do not know whether earthness is pervasive of eternal or non-eternal objects, the reason is doomed to fail.

34. When two opposite reasons counteract each other, they leave us in doubt without establishing any conclusion.

35. Mm. S. Kuppusvāmi Sāstrin has translated 'atidesāvākya' as assimilative proposition.

36. An animal of the bovine species.

37. Śrīnivāsa refutes the view of *upamāna* as a distinct means of knowledge. He analyses *upamāna* into three discrete parts, each of which is subsumed under *pratyākṣa*, *anumāna* and *śabda*. When a person who is ignorant of the meaning of the word 'gavaya' learns from a forester that 'gavaya' resembles cow, it is an example of knowledge derived from the sense of sentences. Secondly, when he goes to a forest and recollects the meaning of *atidesāvākya* on seeing the figure qualified by cow-similarity, it is purely a perceptual cognition, since recollection is derived from *saṃskāra* which again is caused by a prior experience. And finally, when the knowledge of the figure, qualified by cow-similarity, as 'gavaya' arises in him, it is evidently a cognition based on *vyāpti* in the form, 'Cow resembles gavaya, because it is the

counter-correlate of resemblance existing in a gavaya; when something is the counter-correlate of resemblance existing in another, the former resembles the latter: as the left hand, which is the counter-correlate of resemblance existing in the right hand, resembles the right hand'.

38. Viśiṣṭādvaita along with Nyāya, Sāṅkhya and other schools refuses to recognize arthāpatti as a distinct means of knowledge, since its purpose is served by inference: for instance, in the syllogism, 'Devadatta eats at night, because he is fat without eating by day', 'eating' is the pervasive concomitant of 'fatness', since whenever fatness is seen, there must be eating also. As it is known that Devadatta is not eating by day, the inference is that he must be eating at night.

39. It is of three kinds: vākchala, sāmānyachala and upacārachala (NS., I, ii, 52). It is called vākchala when a term is deliberately taken in a wrong sense. For instance, when someone says, 'This boy is navakambala' (possessing a new blanket), a quibbler objects, 'He is not navakambala' (possessed of nine blankets). Sāmānyachala consists in taking the individual for the whole class; for instance, when someone says, 'This brāhmaṇa is learned', another objects, 'This brāhmaṇa is not learned, since many brāhmaṇas are not learned'. Upacārachala consists in taking the meaning of an expression literally while it was used metaphorically; for example, when a person says, 'The scaffolds cry out', a quibbler objects, 'Scaffolds cannot cry out as they are inanimate objects'. Here the term 'scaffold' means the people standing on the scaffolds.

40. Jāti is of twenty-four kinds. (NS., V, 1.)

AVATĀRA THREE

ŚABDA

1. The importance of śabda as a distinct pramāṇa cannot be minimized. Since Brahman does not fall within the province of pratyakṣa or anumāna, śabda in its aspect of śruti alone can

claim the position of the authoritative means of knowledge with regard to Brahman.

2. Errors arising from the defect of sense organs.

3. Brahman or Prajāpati.

4. This is the position of the pūrvapakṣin (*i.e.*, the follower of Pūrvamīmāṃsā): The means of determining the power of words to express things is to watch the speech and actions of people. Speech and action always mean that certain things ought to be performed. No word, therefore, can have for its purpose an accomplished thing inasmuch as it is the means of knowledge only with reference to things that ought to be performed. Hence vedic texts cannot claim to be a distinct means of knowledge of Brahman, as Brahman is an existing entity and not a thing to be effected. Moreover the Vedas teach that mere works have eternal results. (For instance, akṣayyaṁ ha vai cāturmāsyayājinaḥ sukṛtam bhavati.) Hence an inquiry into Brahman is without any purpose when works alone grant eternal results.

5. Ato vedāntāḥ pariniṣpannam parambrahma, tadupāsanaṁ ca aparimitaphalam bodhayantīti tannirṇayaphalo brahmavicāraḥ kartavyaḥ. (*Sṛībhāṣya*: I, i, 1.)

6. Even statements of facts such as 'Your father is doing well', and 'This is not a snake but a rope' evidently have some purpose; namely, such and such terms express such and such meanings. Hence it is baseless to maintain that words have meaning only with reference to things that ought to be done.

7. This is how a child learns the connection of words and meanings. The child, while observing that words give rise to ideas in its mind, finds out that the application of a particular word to a particular thing is based upon the expressive power of the word. Thus the theory that words and actions have implication only with reference to the things-that-ought-to-be-done is unjustified.

8. *Abhicāraśāstra* is the name of a treatise on thaumaturgy regarded as a part of the *Atharvaveda*. If it could be demonstrated that certain mantras have power with reference to the things of the world, it may convince even an unbeliever to have faith

in the efficiency of the mantras in relation to the attainment of heaven etc.

9. According to Vṛttikāra Bodhāyana 'this s'āriraka is connected with Jaimini's work as contained in sixteen chapters ; this establishes that the two Mīmāṃsās constitute one science'. Just as each half of *Pūrvamīmāṃsāsūtras* consisting of six chapters is separate, and each chapter is separate, the *Pūrvā-* and *Uttara-mīmāṃsās* also are separate only in so far as the subject-matter treated in them differs. Hence the whole of the *Mīmāṃsā-sāstra* beginning with the aphorism 'Now therefore the inquiry into dharma' and ending with the aphorism 'There is no return on account of scriptural statement' constitutes one body of doctrine owing to its continuous character of contents and order of succession.

10. Ṛk is that mantra which is divided into pādas each of which consists of a definite number of syllables : for instance, gāyatrī etc. Yajus is that mantra where there is no division into pādas and which is not set to music. When a mantra is set to music it is called sāman. Atharva contains hymns, prayers and invocations either for the safety or destruction of beings.

11. The definition of mantra is a vexed problem in vedic literature. According to *Pūrvamīmāṃsāsūtras* (II, i, 32), mantras are those texts which express mere assertion. The previous sūtra (II, i, 31) has already declared that the mantras are not injunctive. So Śabarasvāmin comments 'that it is only while the sacrifice is being performed that the mantra functions ; if it enjoined the act, its functioning would come before the commencement of the performance' (*Śabarahāṣya*, trs. pp. 200-201). But Laugakṣi-bhāskara defines that mantras are those which recall to memory objects connected with sacrificial performance (*prayogasamavetār-thasmārakā mantrāḥ*).

12. Arthavāda is a declamatory text containing either praise or blame. Though it does not convey any primary meaning of its own, it is connected with some text which is directly injunctive. When a declamatory text is construed with an injunctive text it

serves the purpose of eulogising what is enjoined or blaming what is prohibited. For instance, the declamatory text 'Vāyu, verily, is the swiftest deity' is connected with the injunctive text 'He who is desirous of prosperity shall sacrifice a white animal to Vāyu'. This text recommends the act of sacrifice by praising Vāyu. And when a declamatory text says 'He howled', the statement is made with reference to the prohibitory passage 'Silver shall not be given upon the sacrificial grass'. Thus condemnation is expressed of what is prohibited in the injunction. Again, arthavāda is of three kinds. The first kind is called guṇavāda, when there is contradiction; as, 'The sun is the sacrificial post'. The second is called anuvāda, when repetition is made of an already established thing; as, 'Fire is a remedy against cold'. The last kind is called bhūtārthavāda, when it is devoid of contradiction or accomplishment; as, 'Purandara who bears the thunderbolt in his hand'.

13. Apūrvavidhi is that injunction which establishes what is not established by any other means of knowledge. In the injunction 'Desiring heaven one should sacrifice', the attainment of heaven is not made known by any other evidence than this injunction. The sacrificer brings into existence a power called apūrva which leads the performer to heaven by means of the sacrifice. Similarly water-sprinkling produces in the grain an apūrva which is not otherwise possible.

14. Viśiṣṭavidhi is but a form of apūrvavidhi. The *Chāndogyopaniṣad* (III, 14) states the attributes of Brahman as 'He who consists of mind, whose body is breath, whose form is light' etc. 'Made of mind' means: Brahman can be cognized by a mind purified by meditation through the means of sādhanasaptaka such as viveka, vimoka, etc.

15. Parisaṅkhyāvidhi is that injunction which excludes one of the two alternatives simultaneously established. In the injunction 'This rope (the ancients) took up' etc., there is not the purpose of establishing the seizing of the horse's rope, since that is already established. But it is an injunction of exclusive specification purporting to exclude the holding of a donkey's rope.

16. The classical definition of *niyamavidhi* is thus : ' Restrictive injunction is one which restricts the course of an action to one particular alternative (instrument) when several alternatives being possible any other of which, without the *vidhi*, would equally likely be resorted to ' (*Arthasaṅgraha*, translated by D. V. Gokhale, p. 28). According to our author here the injunction restricts the conduct of the student who intends to approach the preceptor for knowledge. The *śrutis* and *smṛtis* direct the student to seek the teacher in a particular manner ; for instance, *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* (I, ii, 12) says, ' To know that, he, with sacrificial fuel in hand, must approach a guru who is well versed in the Vedas and absolutely established in the realization of Brahman '.

17. *Vide Pūrvanīmāṃsāsūtras*, I, xiv, 17.

18. A Soma sacrifice typical of a whole class of some sacrificial ceremonies.

19. It may be noted here that *Yājñavalkyasmṛti* is divided into three chapters called ' Ācāra ', ' Vyavahāra ' and ' Prāyas'citta '.

20. The original authorship of the *Yogasāstra* is attributed to Hiraṇyagarbha, also known as Prajāpati and Caturmukha. Patañjali and others are only later expounders.

21. Śrī Rāmānuja says : ' Hiraṇyagarbha himself is only an individual soul, and hence liable to be overpowered by the inferior *guṇas*, i.e., passion and darkness ; and hence the *Yoga-smṛti* is founded on error, no less than the *Purāṇas* promulgated by him, which are founded on *rajas* and *tamas*. The Yoga cannot therefore be used for the support of *Vedānta*. ' (*S.B.E.*, Vol. XLVIII, p. 413.)

22. The origin of Sāṅkhya philosophy is attributed to Kapila.

23. Though Kapila is referred to as a model of consummate wisdom, he is not accepted entirely owing to his anti-vedic views such as holding *pradhāna* to be the universal material cause etc., which run counter to the *Vedānta* doctrine of Brahman being the sole cause of the universe etc. Likewise is *Yogasāstra* first propounded by Hiraṇyagarbha. Yoga also admits *pradhāna* to be the independent material cause and *Īśvara* as a mere operative cause.

Secondly, the Yoga conception of meditation is also of anti-vedic character, since the two objects of meditation, namely the individual self and Īśvara are independent entities, the jīva not having its self in Brahman and Brahman not being the material cause of the world. The conclusion is that such views of Kapila and others which contradict the vedic doctrines of *Manusmṛti*, *Bhagavadgītā*, *Mahābhārata* and *Viṣṇupurāṇa* are rejected. But unlike the systems of Jina and Sugata, Yoga and Sāṅkhya are not absolutely rejected, since certain points in all these doctrines are accepted. For instance, the Sāṅkhyan conception of twenty-five principles and the Yoga method of mental concentration are admitted.

24. Traditional history like the *Rāmāyaṇa* and *Mahābhārata*.

25. Legendary stories.

26. Since Vedānta texts are concerned with Brahman lying beyond the range of pratyakṣa and other pramāṇas, ordinary men with an imperfect knowledge of the Veda can hardly determine the meaning of Vedānta passages without the help of a smṛti instituted by a competent and trustworthy person. But, while choosing the help of a smṛti one must be very careful as many a smṛti contains doctrines opposed to the Veda. Hence one should follow such smṛti which does not contradict the Veda.

27. The most celebrated epic poem consisting of eighteen books. The authorship is attributed to Vyāsa or Kṛṣṇadvaipāyanā. It gives the history of Bharata's descendants along with numerous episodes which are small epics by themselves.

28. The *Rāmāyaṇa* is a favourite epic of the Hindus composed by the sage Vālmīki. It contains about 24,000 verses in seven cantos and describes the ideal life of Śrī Rāmacandra, the hero of that epic.

29. According to the *Padmapurāṇa*, the purāṇas are divided into three kinds. The division is as follows: *Viṣṇu*, *Nāradya*, *Bhāgavata*, *Garuḍa*, *Padma* and *Varāha* are called sāttvika-purāṇas; *Brahmāṇḍa*, *Brahmavaivarta*, *Mārkaṇḍeya*, *Bhaviṣya*, *Vāmana*, and *Brahma* are called rājasa-purāṇas; while *Matsya*,

Kūrma, *Līṅga*, *Siva*, *Skanda* and *Agni* come under the *tāmasa* class.

30. A *purāṇa* treats of five topics as declared in the following verse :

Sargaś'ca pratisargāś'ca vaṁso manvantarāṇi ca
Vaṁśānucaritam caiva purāṇam pañcalakṣaṇam.

31. The doctrines of *Kāpālas*, *Kālāmukhas*, *Pāśupatas*, etc., have to be disregarded owing to their peculiar theory of Reality and strange practices not warranted by the *Veda*. They maintain the distinction of material and instrumental causes, and hold *Pas'upati* to be the instrumental cause of the world. But if *Pas'upati* is regarded as the highest Brahman constituting the Self of all, there will be no difficulty in adopting the essential doctrine of the *Pāśupatas*.

32. 'Mantra' is found in the place of 'divya' in *S'rī Vedānta-desika's Pāñcarātrarakṣā*.

33. The origin of *Pāñcarātrāgama* is attributed to *S'rīman Nārāyaṇa* Himself, who, animated by infinite love towards His devotees, taught the science to *Nārada*, *S'āṇḍilya* and other great seers through *Sanaka* and others. According to some critics, the *Pāñcarātra* doctrine is not authoritative since it admits the origination of the *jīva*, which is opposed to *s'ruti*; for instance, from *Vāsudeva* originates the *jīva* called *Sankarṣaṇa*. *S'rī Rāmānuja* in his commentary on the *Vedāntasūtras* (II, ii, 43) strongly controverts the theory of the origination of the individual self by profusely quoting from the *Pāñcarātrāgamas*. Brahman, known as *Vāsudeva*, abides himself in a fourfold form (*vyūha*) with a view to enable His devotees to realize Him in a concrete manner. The identity of the Supreme Brahman with the fourfold form is declared in the *Sātvatasamhitā*: 'This is the supreme *s'āstra*, the great *Brahmopaniṣad*, which imparts true discrimination to *Brāhmaṇas* worshipping the real Brahman under the name of *Vāsudeva*' (*S.B.E.*, XLVIII, part III, p. 525). The *Paṇḍikarāsamhitā* also says, 'That which enjoins that *Brāhmaṇas* have to worship, under

its proper names, the fourfold nature of the Self; that is the authoritative doctrine' (*Ibid.*). What the āgamas emphasize is that the Supreme Self voluntarily assumes the fourfold form of Vāsudeva, Saṅkarṣaṇa, Pradyumna and Aniruddha on account of his love towards devotees. But if it be asked why Saṅkarṣaṇa and others are identified with jīva etc., it is said in reply that since Saṅkarṣaṇa, Pradyumna and Aniruddha preside over the jīvas, internal organ and ego, they themselves are denoted by those names. As Śrī Rāmānuja puts it, the case is analogous to that of Brahman who is designated by terms such as ether, breath, etc. According to some, another objection is that Śāṇḍilya is supposed to have learnt the doctrine as he did not find any basis in the Veda for the highest realization. This is tantamount to saying that the Pāñcarātra system is opposed to the Veda. To this objection Śrī Rāmānuja replies as follows: 'When the Veda says, "morning after morning those speak untruth who make the agnihotra offering before sunrise", it is understood that the censure there passed on the offering before sunrise is really meant to glorify the offering after sunrise. . . . Analogous to this is the case of Śāṇḍilya's alleged objection to the Veda. That the Bhāgavata doctrine is meant to facilitate the understanding of the sense of the Veda which by itself is difficult of comprehension, is declared in the Paramasaṁhitā, "I have read the Vedas at length, together with all the various auxiliary branches of knowledge. But in all these I cannot see a clear indication, raised above all doubt, of the way to blessedness, whereby I might reach perfection"; and "The wise Lord Hari, animated by kindness for those devoted to Him, extracted the essential meaning of all the Vedānta texts and condensed it in an easy form"' (S.B.E., XLVIII, Part III, p. 527). Thus the Pāñcarātrāgamas are authoritative *in toto*, since Śrīman Nārāyaṇa Himself taught it with a view to enable His devotees to apprehend the meaning of the Veda.

34. The origin of Vaikhānasāgama is traced to Brahmā himself who expounded the Śāstra to his four disciples Atri, Marīci, Kaśyapa and Bhṛgu.

35. Code of jurisprudence, morals, social and religious laws, etc.

36. Sixty-four kalās beginning with gīta and ending with the knowledge of the science of magic.

37. The most celebrated Ālvār-saint in the hierarchy of Śrīvaiṣṇavism, known also as Nammālvār, S'āṭhakopa, etc.

38. Śrī Rāmānuja's *magnum opus*, the immortal commentary on the *Vedāntasūtras*, which interprets the *Sūtras* as Śārirakas'āstra in the literal sense of the term.

39. This means that an original composition of a person is *pauruṣeya*.

40. Expectancy (ākāṅkṣā), compatibility (yogyatā) and proximity (sannidhi) are the necessary factors for arriving at a judgement from a given proposition. Expectancy consists in completing the sense of a judgement by desiring a word. For instance, a single word like 'cow' is incapable of conveying complete sense in the absence of another word. Compatibility consists in the sense being not absurd; for example, 'wet with fire' is sublatale. Proximity consists in the utterance of words without long intervals. If words like 'meditate on God' are uttered with undue delay, there would be absence of proximity which is necessary to convey the verbal cognition.

41. Abhidhā is that which conveys the expressed meaning of a word to our intelligence.

42. The philological meaning of a word.

43. Traditional or conventional meaning of a word.

44. By the word 'ādi', yogarūḍhi is meant. Yogarūḍhi is that which relates to both the philological and the conventional meaning of a word. For instance, 'pañkaja' philologically means anything born or originated in mud; but in common parlance the meaning is restricted to 'lotus'.

45. Sound or word proves difference since it possesses the capacity to denote only such things as are affected with difference. Sound has twofold operation, *i.e.*, it operates through words and through sentences. Now, a word is formed from the combination

of prakṛti (radical element) and pratyaya (suffix). Since prakṛti and pratyaya have different meanings, the word also should necessarily convey a meaning affected with difference. And moreover, a sentence containing a plurality of words denoting plurality of meaning, is incapable of denoting an object without difference. Hence the aggregate of words, secular or vedic, denotes a thing affected with difference.

46. The body of a sentient self is that which is absolutely controlled and supported by the 'dweller in the body' for his own ends. Similarly all sentient and non-sentient beings constitute the body of Īśvara, because they are absolutely controlled and supported by Him for His own purpose.

47. Before grasping the true knowledge of Vedānta, the import of words would be incomplete since it was thought that the words denote only sentient beings and non-sentient objects. Hence after the dawn of true knowledge, namely, that Reality is the self of cit-acit body, the import of words becomes perfect inasmuch as one knows at this stage that every word denotes nothing except Brahman.

AVATĀRA FOUR

PRAKṚTI

1. Kaṇāda recognizes (*vide* Vaiśeṣikaśūtras, I, i, 4) six padārthas—substance, quality, activity, generality, particularity and inherence. The Bhāṭṭas admit five padārthas—substance, generality, quality, activity and non-existence; whereas the Prābhākaras recognize eight—substance, quality, activity, generality, inherence, potency, similarity and number. The Sāṅkhyas recognize only prakṛti and puruṣa; while the Advaitins admit two categories—ātman and anātman. Some people think Viśiṣṭādvaita admits three categories, namely, cit, acit and Īśvara.

2. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika classification of activity into five kinds seems to be pleonastic, as motion which is caused by conjunction would include all forms of activity.

3. Viśiṣṭādvaita does not recognize sāmānya or jāti as a distinct category. For instance, when we perceive a beast, no doubt, the perception takes the form 'This is a beast'. But this generic character, uniform as it is to all beasts, is realized in the vyakti itself, and not apart from it. The manifestation of jāti in the vyakti has been possible only owing to the structural similarity called samsthāna, and this samsthāna is nothing but jāti. In this connection it is interesting to know what Śrī Rāmānuja says on the subject: '(That the generic character of a thing is nothing else but its particular structure follows) from the fact that we do not perceive anything, different from the structure, which could be claimed as constituting the object of the cognition that several individuals possess one and the same general form' (S.B.E., vol. XLVIII, part III, p. 45).

4. Samavāya or inherence is an intimate relation existing between whole and parts, substance and attributes, generic character and individuals etc. This intimate relation is inseparable as long as the connected substances do not cease to exist. Viśiṣṭādvaita refutes the view that samavāya is a distinct category. Samavāya is assumed in order to account for the inseparable and indissoluble relation subsisting between two things. Now a reason has to be found out why samavāya is such, and this requires something else to establish it, and so on, *ad infinitum*. Moreover, it is unreasonable to assume any essential nature for samavāya which itself is an unknown entity.

5. *Vide* note No. 38 on saṁyuktās'rayaṇa in the first avatāra.

6. From vaikārika which is of sattva-nature, there arise the indriyas. The bhūtādi which is of tamas-nature produces tanmātras (subtle matter) which in their turn originate gross elements. The taijasa is of the nature of activity, and helps the other two in their functions.

7. The sense organs help us to cognize external objects.

8. Manas is not only the inner sense organ through which consciousness flows to the senses but also the *sense commune* which receives and co-ordinates sense knowledge.

9. Manas is called buddhi when it is engaged in the function of deciding (adhyavasāya); ahaṅkāra or abhimāna when it conceives wrongly—for instance, when the ātman is identified with the body; and citta when it thinks.

10. Adṛṣṭa is the fruit of good and bad actions committed in a previous existence.

11. This resides in particular organs in accordance with the sex or structure of the species.

12 S'ri Rāmānuja's Commentary on the *Vedāntasūtras*. There is another reading here, according to which this passage means 'The view . . . should be explained so as not to be in contradiction with the Bhāṣya'.

13. The adjective 'particular' is used to distinguish the sound from the subtle element of sound which is imperceptible to the senses.

14. The Vedānta doctrine of quintuplication is thus: First, one element is divided into two parts, and one part is again divided into four sub-parts; each of the four sub-parts is mixed with each of the remaining four elements. So on the basis of the quintuplicative process, each substance has a fivefold nature. The distinctive character of any element is determined on the basis of the fifty-per-cent element which predominates over the other lesser elements.

15. The pūrvapakṣin maintains that ākāśa which is all-pervasive and devoid of parts is not at all produced since there is difference of opinion in the scriptural texts regarding this topic. But this view is rejected by S'ri Rāmānuja (cf. Commentary on VS. II, iii, 3) since the *Vedāntasūtras* and śrutis establish the origination of ether (cf. *Taitt. Up.* II, 1; *Muṇḍ. Up.* II, i, 4). Moreover, a contradictory inference has no force when the point in question is established by Scripture.

16. The sense of this sentence is not clear; for the manifestation of prāṇa is weak in the case of non-ambulants. The Telugu edition of the work has here a different reading, according to which the passage means 'that the restriction of function is only

in respect of ambulants. But in respect of non-ambulants there is *prāṇa* in them but it is feeble'.

17. One substance like *tejas* has a twofold form, *viz.*, as *prabhā* and *prabhāvān*. Although *prabhā* is a quality of an effulgent object, it is in itself a kind of substance, and not *bare* quality like redness; for it can exist apart from its substrate and possesses colour as an attribute. It is called substance because it illumines itself and other objects; and attribute, because it always depends upon its substrate.

18. 'That Divinity having entered into these three beings differentiated names and forms. Each of these being it rendered tripartite.' (*Chā. Up.*, V, iii, 3 and 4.)

19. 'Any substance which a sentient soul is capable of completely controlling and supporting for its own purposes, and which stands to the soul in an entirely subordinate relation, is the body of the soul.' (*S'ribhāṣya*, II, i, 9, and *S.B.E.*, XLVIII, part III, p. 424.)

20. The *lakṣaṇa* which is different from the essential nature of the object defined, and yet is the definition by which the object is defined is called *taṭasthalakṣaṇa*.

21. The definition that body is the seat of activity has the defect of over-pervasion, since a jar also would be a *s'arīra* as it is the seat of activity.

22. The definition that body is the seat of sense organs is too narrow as it does not include the organless bodies of stone and wood, and many other physical organisms devoid of sense organs. For instance, the stone-body bestowed on *Ahalyā*.

23. The definition of body that it is what causes the enjoyment of the results of actions does not serve the purpose since it excludes 'earth' etc. which the *Upaniṣad* texts declare to be the *s'arīra* of the *Antaryāmin*. Further, the *aprākṛta* forms which *Īśvara* assumes by His wish as well as the bodily forms of the *nityasūris* are not the fruition of any karma.

24. The definition that body is the aggregate of head, hands, feet, etc. is ridiculous as it includes all inanimate images and figures.

25. Saubhari who was endowed with special powers could assume bodies simultaneously.

26. This may be compared to the simile of the snake and its coils.

27. A yojana is equal to four krosas or eight miles.

28. *Viṣṇupurāṇa*.

AVATĀRĀ FIVE

KĀLA

1. Sattva, rajas and tamas.

2. In the texts, 'In the *beginning*, my dear, there was sat only' (*Chā. Up.*, VI, ii, 1), and 'Then there was neither asat nor sat' (*Taitt. Brā.*, II, viii, 9, 3), the words 'beginning' and 'then' indicate that there was time even before creation.

3. There is no cognition which is not qualified by time.

4. Twinkling of the eye as a measure of time, a moment.

5. Fifteen nimīṣas make one kāṣṭhā.

6. Thirty kāṣṭhās make one kalā

7. Thirty kalās make one muhūrta.

8. Dissolution is fourfold: nitya, naimittika, prākṛta and ātyantika. Nityapralaya is sleep in which every effect dissolves for the time being. Naimittikapralaya is the dissolution at the termination of Brahmā's day. Prākṛtapralaya takes place at the end of every epoch of Brahmā. Ātyantikapralaya is release from the bondage of matter when the jīva realizes God.

9. There are two kinds of time: akhaṇḍakāla (impartite time) and kāryakāla (time as effect). The former is eternal and is the cause of the effected time, whereas the latter, which we experience in our ordinary life, is changing and non-eternal.

10. When Īśvara in sport creates, sustains and withdraws the entire universe, time serves as an instrument in His cosmic functions.

11. Līlāvibhūti is the sport of Īśvara which consists in the production, sustentation and absorption of the entire universe. In the language of the Upaniṣads He becomes Sat and Tyat, i.e., He

who was the Self in the causal state interpenetrates the world in its effected state also as the Self of all temporal objects.

Nityavibhūti is Vaikuṇṭha, the spiritual universe, in which time is dependent on the will of Īśvara. As Prof. P. N. Srinivasa-chari puts it, 'The līlāvibhūti, the world of splendour which exists for the sport of the Lord, is the play of the eternal in the temporal and the nityavibhūti or eternal splendour of paramapada is time as eternity . . . In the former, time is finite and effected by the guṇas, while in the latter, it is not causally related, but is infinite and beyond the place of space-time' (*The Philosophy of Viśiṣṭādvaita*, p. 498).

AVATĀRA SIN

NITYAVIBHŪTI

1. Suddhasattva is a kind of spiritual matter which exists in the Highest Heaven. It is identical with nityavibhūti. As Dr. Schrader says, it is a necessary hypothesis for explaining (i) the aprākṛta bodies of Īśvara, nityas and muktas; and (ii) the presence of the 'means of enjoyment' in Vaikuṇṭha.

2. For the definition of dharmabhūtajñāna, the attributive consciousness, see the seventh avatāra.

3. Dharmabhūtajñāna and suddhasattva are called parāk or external, since they appear *for others only* and never for themselves. That is, they are self-luminous and manifest for the sake of the individual self which is self-conscious.

4. For a clear conception of pañcasakti see *Padmatantra*, XII, 36ff. According to this verse Viṣṇu himself is called pañcasaktimaya. The saktis are sarva, nivṛtti, viśva, puruṣa and parameṣṭhi.

5. The six attributes are jñāna (knowledge), sakti (might), bala (strength), aiśvarya (dominion), vīrya (energy) and tejas (splendour).

6. *Bhagavadgītā* constitutes a part of the Bhiṣmaparvan in the great epic, *Mahābhārata*, comprising eighteen chapters from the twenty-fifth to the forty-second.

7. 'God speed you (in your journey) beyond *across the darkness!*' (*Mund. Up.*, II, ii, 6).

8. Jñānātmakatva means svayamprakāśakatva, self-luminosity.

9. The astrabhūṣaṇa-adhyāya of *Viṣṇupurāṇa* (1, 22) is a great authority on this subject. The ornaments and weapons which adorn the body of the Divine Figure symbolically represent the principles of the universe.

10. Kaustubha is a famous gem obtained by Viṣṇu at the churning of the milk ocean.

11. A curl of hair on the breast of Viṣṇu.

12. These four belong to the regions of Saṅkarṣaṇa, Pradyumna, Aniruddha and Vāsudeva respectively.

13. Dharma, jñāna, vairāgya and ais'varya.

14. Vimalā and others are the eternal attendants who serve the Lord.

15. 'Who with such a consort sits on the eternal Serpent who is the sole transcendental seat of excellent wisdom and strength, and the divine seat of whose body is illumined with streams of light emanating from the clustering gems of his many hoods. Seṣa who is aptly styled by all to be Thy servant (S'eṣa) on account of his different bodies chosen in Thy service, such as house, bed, sandals, garb, pillow and umbrella for keeping out rain and sun and the like' (Śrī Yāmunācārya's *Stotraratna*, 39-40).

AVATĀRA SEVEN

DHARMABHŪTAJÑĀNA

1. Consciousness is not identical with the being, but is the attribute of an individual self. Hence it cannot be held that being is not the object of consciousness. But it may be admitted that the knowing individual self is not the object of consciousness at the time when it is manifesting other objects. But an absolute rule

cannot be made since the knowledge of one person may become the object of the knowledge of another or that one's state of consciousness may become the object of his own apprehension. So it cannot be maintained without deviation that consciousness is self-proved because it is consciousness. In the words of S'ri Rāmānuja the true meaning of *svayamprakāśatva* is that 'the essential nature of consciousness—or knowledge—consists therein that it shines forth, or manifests itself, through its own being to its own substrate at the present moment; or (to give another definition) that it is instrumental in proving its own object by its own being' (S.B.E., XLVIII, part III, p. 48).

2. 'It is like physical light which can only show but cannot know.' (See P. N. Srinivasachari's *Philosophy of Viśiṣṭādvaita*, p. 29.)

3. It has already been told that one substance, say, fire can subsist in twofold form as light (*prabhā*) and luminous substance (*prabhāvān*). Although it is an attribute inhering in a substance, it is itself nothing but substance as the locus of colour etc. Analogously though consciousness is the attribute of individual self, it may be defined as a substance since it is a *viṣayin*, being the substrate of contraction and expansion.

4. Though consciousness is *vibhu* it becomes limited in the phenomenal state of existence owing to the influence of karma. In the state of liberation it becomes all-pervasive and infinite, being freed from the contraction due to karma.

5. When a sense organ or a light manifests an object, it does not require any other sense organ or light for its function.

6. Since sense of sight and light have *sāttvikāhaṅkāra* and *tejas* for their substance, they cannot be classified under the same genus.

7. When there is a repeated cognition of one and the same object, for instance, a pillar, there is no splitting up of consciousness in which the succeeding one comes into existence after the destruction of the prior one. But so long as there is the presentation of one and the same object in all succeeding moments, the consciousness persists as one single stream.

8. It is believed that some particular variety of gems have the power of neutralizing the burning property of fire.

9. *Bṛ. Up.*, I, v, 3.

10. Nīrandhra literally means 'without any hole'.

11. Firm meditation on God which is compared to the uninterrupted flow of oil is called bhakti or upāsana; when such meditation, characterized by sūkṣātkāra, is daily practised till the last moment of death, it becomes the means for the realization of the beatific form of the Supreme Deity. This is in agreement with the *Chāndogya* passage (VII, xxvi, 2) which declares 'on the attainment of recollection, all the knots are loosened'. In this connection the Bhāṣyakāra derives support from the Vākyakāra who declares, 'Meditation is steady remembrance, on the ground of meditation and statement' (*S.B.E.*, XLVIII, part III, p. 15).

12. The eight well-known limbs of yoga as enumerated by Patañjali are meant to control the mind from its outgoing tendencies, and help it to attain the one-pointed concentration. Yama is the moral discipline of non-violence, truthfulness, non-stealing, continence and non-receiving of gifts or favours (*YS.*, II, 30). Niyama is self-purification, satisfaction, austerities, study and contemplation of God (*Ibid.*, II, 32). Āsana or posture is that which is firm and pleasant (*Ibid.*, II, 46). A firm seat enables one to control the respiratory functions. Prāṇāyāma is the control of the motions of expiration and inspiration (*Ibid.*, II, 49). Mastery of respiratory functions helps one to attain control over the vital airs of the body. Pratyāhāra is the withdrawal of the sense organs from their objects and assuming the real form of the mind-stuff (*Ibid.*, II, 54). If the mind is not allowed to contact with the external objects, it will remain tranquil. When the mind is arrested from its outgoing tendencies, it can stick to some object. Dhāraṇa is focussing the mind to some particular object (*Ibid.*, III, 1). When consciousness, devoid of forms, illumines only the content, it is called samādhi (*Ibid.*, III, 3).

13. The sādhanasaptaka has been quoted by Śrī Rāmānuja in the *Sṛībhāṣya* (I, i, 1) as the words of Vākyakāra (identified

with Tāṅkācārya Brahmanandin) who declares them to be the means for bhakti in the form of steady remembrance.

14. Food becomes impure by three defects : Flesh of animals etc. come under jātidoṣa while food coming from improper source, say, a fallen person, has the defect of āśraya. Leavings of food or such food into which some impure thing has fallen has the defect of nimitta or causal. Mental purity is preceded by physical purity. This is consistent with the *Chāndogya* passage (VII, 26) which declares that when the body is pure, the mind is pure, and with the attainment of mental purity dhruvāsmṛti or mental concentration results.

15. Freedom from the web of desires is essential for achieving the calmness of mind, and without mental tranquillity it is not possible to meditate on Brahman. Hence the śruti declares, 'Let him meditate with calmness of mind' (*Chā. Up.*, III, xiv, 1).

16. Repetition of steady remembrance of Brahman results from the mental tranquillity. In this connection Bhāṣyakāra Dramiḍācārya is quoted in the *Sṛībhāṣya* as declaring the famous *Bhagavadgītā* passage, 'Constantly absorbed in the thought of that object' (VIII, 8).

17. Even at this stage the neophyte is not free from the social and moral obligations. Further, the fivefold duties serve as the means for the realization of Brahman. S'ri Rāmānuja quotes the following passages as authorizing this view : 'The performer of virtuous actions is the best among the knowers of Brahman' (*Munḍ. Up.*, III, i, 4), and 'The Brāhmaṇas seek to know Him through the recitation of the Veda, sacrifices, charity, penance and fasting' (*Br. Up.*, IV, iv, 22).

18. Kalyāṇa is the practice of the inner virtues which are indispensable to spiritual life. This is confirmed by the Vedānta texts, such as 'He is to be attained by truth, real knowledge and continence' (*Munḍ. Up.*, II, i, 5), and 'Verily, Brahmaloka is for those who are endowed with penance and continence and in whom truth is established. To them belongs the pure world of Brahman in whom there is neither deceit, untruth or guile' (*Pras. Up.*, I, 15 and 16).

19. Anavasāda is freedom from low spirits owing to unfavourable conditions of time or place and recollection of sorrows. Since dejection is an obstacle in the path of divine life, the s'ruti declares, 'The Ātman cannot be attained by one devoid of strength' (*Muṇḍ. Up.*, III, ii, 4).

20. As excessive exultation is the positive obstacle in the way of meditation, the Upaniṣad states, 'He who knows Him becomes calm, subdued' etc. (*Bṛ. Up.*, IV, iv, 23).

21. When the upāsaka, equipped with the discipline of sādhanasaptaka continues his meditation, which has acquired the vividness of darśana, to the last moment of his consciousness, he perceives the beatific form of the Divine just prior to the exit from the present body. This is called antimapratyaya.

22. Even after the dawn of bhakti the antimapratyaya may not come owing to the non-extinction of the prārabdha. Hence the upāsaka has to wait till the exhaustion of his prārabdha.

23. This has reference to the famous passage, 'The Self, my dear Maitreyi, is to be *seen*, to be *heard*, to be *reflected upon*, to be *meditated upon*' (*Bṛ. Up.*, IV, v, 6), which contains the instruction of meditation. Just as the clause, 'the Self is to be *heard*', is a confirmation of what is already established by some other means, the clause, 'the Self is to be *reflected upon*', is a confirmation of what is already established by '*hearing*'. The first two clauses refer to the sentence-generated knowledge subserving '*meditation*' which itself is declared by the clause, 'the Self is to be *meditated upon*'. The aphorism which authorizes this point is 'Reflection more than once, on account of instruction' (*VS.*, IV, i, 1). In this connection Śrī Rāmānuja says that 'knowledge', which is the means of release, is of the nature of '*meditation*', since the terms '*knowing*' and '*meditating*' are interchangeably used in the former and latter portion of the Vedānta texts; for instance, 'One should *meditate* on mind as Brahman', and 'He who *knows* this shines and warms through celebrity, fame and Brahmayarcas' (*Chā. Up.*, III, xviii, 1 and 6).

24. The Upaniṣads embody thirty-two kinds of Brahmanavidyā which enjoin that the only object of meditation is Brahman and not matter or the jīva. They also prescribe the method of intuiting Brahman for those desirous of release. Besides certain kinds of attributes which are common to all the vidyās, each vidyā embodies one or more special attributes of Brahman, which distinguishes it from the others. Of late, attempts have been made to classify the vidyās along with their Vedānta texts and with the *Vedāntasūtras* in which they are treated. Mr A. Srinivasa Raghavan of Pudukottah has given a list of the thirty-two vidyās with reference to their respective Upaniṣad texts and the *Vedāntasūtras* in his edition of *Śrī Sāriraka Adhikaraṇa Ratnamālā*. The references to the vidyās mentioned below have been traced in accordance with this list.

25. Antarakṣīvidyā is not found in the list prepared by Mr Srinivasa Raghavan. This may be identical with akṣisthasatyabrahmanavidyā, embodied in the text, 'Satya is Brahman . . . the being who abides in the orb of the sun and in the right eye' (*Br. Up.*, V, 5), and discussed in the third chapter of the *Vedāntasūtras* (iii, 20).

26. One of the texts that deal with daharavidyā is, 'In this city of Brahman there is the palace, the small lotus, and within it the small ākāśa. What is within it is to be sought after, for that is to be known' (*Chā. Up.*, VIII, i, 1). This topic is dealt with in I, iii, 13, and III, iii, 38 of the *Vedāntasūtras*. This vidyā, after declaring that the ākāśa within the lotus of the heart is neither elemental nor jīva, but Brahman, praises the Infinite who, owing to His boundless love towards the devotees, becomes the finite in the hearts of all beings as the object of meditation.

27. The conception of Brahman as Bhūman is embodied in the passage, 'Where one sees nothing else, hears nothing else, knows nothing else, that is Infinite' (*Chā. Up.*, VII, 24 and *VS.*, I, iii, 7). This vidyā teaches the knowledge of Brahman as Bhūman and concludes that he who intuites Brahman as the Self of all 'loves the Self, delights in the Self, revels in the Self, rejoices in the Self; he becomes svarāt'.

28. Sadvidyā is taught by the text, 'In the beginning, my dear, Being only was this, one only without a second' (*Chā. Up.*, VI, ii, 1 and *VS.*, I, i, 5). Sadvidyā establishes that the cause of the World is Brahman, denoted by the term 'Sat', and not pradhāna assumed by the others on the basis of inference.

29. 'Verily, this sun is the honey of the devas. . . . He who knows this nectar becomes one of the vasus' (*Chā. Up.*, III, 1 and *VS.*, I, iii, 30). Madhuvidyā teaches that the sun is called madhu or nectar as he is the abode of nectar; and he who meditates on the sun in the above manner procures the position of vasu etc.

30. 'The person that is in the eye, that is the Self; this is the immortal, the fearless, this Brahman' (*Chā. Up.*, IV, xv, 1 and *VS.*, I, ii, 13). Here upakosalavidyā teaches that the Person seen in the eye is none but Brahman since all the beings go to Him. He is called Vāmanī and Bhāmanī as He conveys blessings to the devotees and shines in all the worlds.

31. 'All this is Brahman. One should meditate upon the world with calm mind as beginning, ending and continuing in Brahman' (*Chā. Up.*, III, xiv, 1 and *VS.*, I, i, 1). S'āṇḍilyavidyā teaches that one has to meditate on the world as having its self in Brahman inasmuch as cit and acit are His attributes.

32. Puruṣavidyā or paramapuruṣavidyā is in other words known as trimātrapraṇavavidyā. According to Govindācārya-svāmin the relevant Upaniṣad text that embodies this vidyā begins with 'Ṛtaṁ pibantau sukr̥tasya loke' and ends with 'puruṣānna paraṁ kiñcit sā kāṣṭhā sā parā gatiḥ' (*Kaṭha Up.*, III, 1-11). But according to Mr Srinivasa Raghavan the Vedānta text that elucidates this vidyā is, 'He again who meditates on the Supreme Puruṣa by the syllable Om of three mātras reaches the sun . . . he sees the Person dwelling in the city who is higher than the individual selfs' (*Prasr. Up.*, V, 5 and *VS.*, I, iii, 12). This vidyā declares that the Paramapuruṣa referred to in this context is not Caturmukha-Brahmā, the aggregate of the individual selfs, but the highest Brahman. From this Vidyā we understand that he who meditates on the Praṇava with one syllable attains the world of

mortals, with two syllables, the heavens and with trisyllabic Praṇava which represents Brahman, he reaches Paramapuruṣa, the highest Brahman.

33. 'At present you know the Vais'vānara Self, tell us that ... but he who meditates on the Vais'vānara Self as Prādeśa-mātra' etc. (*Chā. Up.*, V, xi, 6; xviii, 1 and *VS.*, I, ii, 25). In this vidyā the object of meditation is none but the Supreme Brahman. The upāsaka who meditates on Vais'vānara as having the universe for His body becomes purified as declared in the passage, 'Just as the fibres of the iṣikā reed would burn when thrown into fire, similarly the sins of the vidvān are burnt' (*Chā. Up.*, V, xxiv, 3).

34. The connected Upaniṣad text, 'Those who know this, and those who in the forest meditate upon śraddhā and tapas go to light' (*Chā. Up.*, V, 10) is discussed in the third chapter of the *VS.* This vidyā declares that all those who practise meditation go on the path of devas to reach Brahman.

35. 'He who at the beginning created Brahmā, who delivered the Vedas unto him—I, seeking liberation, go for refuge to that effulgent One' (*Svet. Up.*, VI, 18). Nyāsavidyā inculcates the doctrine of absolute self-surrender to Īś'vara by the renunciation of every material consideration.

36. *Vide Ahirbudhnyasamhitā*, XXXVII, ii, 27 and 28.

37. A distinction is made between bhakti and prapatti. While bhaktiyoga is a classical process which generates devotion by means of the severe sevenfold discipline, prapatti provides a simple and easy path for the weak, erring humanity. The bhakta has to fling himself but once at the feet of Bhagavān: the saving grace and mercy will not be far off. Since this act of self-resignation has immediate effect, even the prārabdha-karma is annihilated, and the sādhaṅga need not have to wait for another body for liberation. Further, while the arduous path of bhakti demands continued practice of meditation till the last moment of death, prapatti excludes the necessity of such continued representation by a single supreme act.

38. The Cārvākas are those materialists who identify the 'self' with the body.

39. This is the view of the Vijñānavādins. When the preceding momentary consciousness has perished, the subsequent momentary consciousness originates; hence there is no causal relation between the two.

40. The Jainas hold that the entire complex of things is of a Pyrrhonian nature inasmuch as any attribute can be predicated about an object. To prove that all things are characterized by permanence and non-permanence, existence and non-existence, they put forward the following seven paralogsms: May be, it is, May be, it is not, May be, it is and is not, May be, it is not predicable, May be, it is and is not, predicable, May be, it is not and is not predicable, May be, it is and is not, and is not predicable. (*Vide S.B.E.*, Vol. XLVIII, part III, p. 517).

41. According to this system the individual self in its state of liberation loses all its special attributes including that of pleasure also.

42. According to māyāvāda everything has only an empirical reality save Brahman; consequently the knowledge of Brahman that arises from the study of the empirical texts cannot be final, valid or eternal.

43. Bhāskara and Yādava, who uphold the doctrine of identity in difference, believe that a co-ordination of jñāna and karma is necessary for the intuition of Brahman. This view is rejected since 'meditation' is alone admitted to be the means for liberation.

44. This refers to certain strange practices such as smearing oneself with the ashes of a corpse, eating its flesh, using a skull as a drinking vessel, etc.

AVATĀRA EIGHT

JIVA

1. If jiva is merely defined as 'sentient', there will be over-pervasion inasmuch as Īśvara also is sentient; hence the attribute of 'śeṣatva'.

2. Śrīnivāsa very clearly defines the concept of jīva by distinguishing it from the definition of the dehātma vādin who contends that body is the jīva; from the indriyātma vādin who holds that sense organs are identical with the jīva; from the prāṇātma vādin who contends that the prāṇas constitute the jīva; and finally from the antaḥkaraṇātma vādin who maintains that the jīva is 'cit delimited by the mind.

3. The śruti states that the jīva passes out of the body at the time of death and again enters it at the time of birth. (*Vide VS., II, iii, 20.*) If the jīva is omnipresent, this passing out of the body etc., are not possible. The relevant texts that confirm the 'passing out' and 'returning' are as follows: 'The self departs by that light (of the heart) either through the eye, or through the head, or through other parts of the body (*Bṛ. Up., IV, iv, 2*), and 'he returns from that world to this world for action' (*Bṛ. Up., IV, iv, 6*).

4. The definition that the jīva is *aṇu* does not mean that it has the limitation of a bare monad. In our ordinary experience we find that the light of a luminous body can extend beyond its substrate. Similarly this all-pervasive and infinite consciousness of the jīva can radiate from its nucleus without any limitation.

5. 'The intelligent one is not born, nor it dies' (*Kaṭha Up., II, 18*).

6. The connection of the jīvas with various bodies is due to the karma of those jīvas. The Upaniṣad states, 'the doer of good works becomes good, the doer of bad works becomes bad. He becomes virtuous by virtuous deeds, vicious by vicious deeds' (*Bṛ. Up., IV, iv, 5*).

7. 'Although the souls, as being parts of Brahman and so on, are of essentially the same character, they are actually separate; for each of them is of atomic size and resides in a separate body. For this reason there is no confusion or mixing up of the individual spheres of enjoyment and experience' (*S. B. E., vol. XLVIII, part III, p. 565*).

8. The limiting adjunct which binds the individual self is avidyā which is of the nature of karma, accumulated by the jiva in its previous births.

9. The agent is the jiva and not the guṇas since, Scripture declares 'he who is desirous of heaven should sacrifice'. *Vide* also VS., II, iii, 33 : ' (The soul is) an agent, on account of Scripture (thus) having a purport.' Moreover, if the activity belonged to prakṛti and not to jiva, then it would follow, that, since prakṛti is connected with all the jivas, everyone would experience all actions.

10. While the śarīrin is the controller (niyantā) and supporter (ādhāra) of the body, the śarīra is the supported (ādheya) and the controlled (niyāmya). Just as the physical body, composed of the five elements, constitutes the body of the jiva, the jiva also in its turn forms the body of Īśvara on the basis of ādhāra-ādheya and niyantr-niyāmya principle. Thus the jiva is the body and the indweller of the body from two points of view.

11. The view that each jiva has the same size as the body it occupies has a serious defect; for if the jiva, which was commensurate with the body of an elephant, has to enter into the body of an ant, it would become incomplete as it then occupies less space. See *Sribhāṣya*, II, ii, 33.

12. If, according to Yādavaprakāśa and Bhāskara, Brahman abides in the form of subject, object of enjoyment and ruler, or Brahman becomes the jiva by a real upādhi, all the imperfections and defects of the jiva would become Brahman's also.

13. The ekajivavādin contends that the entire world is fabricated by the avidyā of a single self. He does not predicate multiplicity of the apparently conditioned consciousness.

14. The anekajivavādin maintains the multiplicity of the apparently finite consciousness on empirical grounds; he holds that the jīvas are as many as the internal organs which limit and define the supreme homogeneous Consciousness. *Vide Vedānta-paribhāṣā*, 'tatra jivo nāma antahkaraṇāvacchinna-caitanyaṃ'.

15. It has been already pointed out that though the jiva is not vibhu, its consciousness has not the limitation of a monad. If

the jiva can be compared to a light-house, its consciousness is like the powerful beams of light which can extend to distant places. Thus though the jiva is limited to one place, its consciousness can inter-penetrate and pervade other realms.

16. 'He who behaves thus throughout his life, reaches the world of Brahman, and does not return—he does not return' (*Chā. Up.*, VIII, 15).

17. Brāhmaṇas, kṣātrīyas, and vaiśyas.

18. 'Want and wish exist in their case since they also are liable to suffering, springing from the assaults, hard to be endured of the three kinds of pain, and since they also know that supreme enjoyment is to be found in the highest Brahman, which is untouched by the shadow even of imperfection, and is a mass of auspicious qualities in their highest perfection' (*S.B.E.*, vol. XLVIII, part III, p. 327).

19. VS., from I, iii, 33 to I, iii, 39.

20. Akiñcano ananyagatis'saṇya tvatpādamūlam s'araṇam prapadye (*Srī Yāmunācārya's Stotratatna*, 22).

21. When a prapanna flings himself at the feet of Bhagavān with the intercession of Śrī as puruṣakāra, the Divine Mother who is the embodiment of kṛpā, grants him salvation by Her redemptive mercy.

22. 'He shakes off his good and his evil deeds. His beloved relatives obtain the good, his unbeloved relatives the evil he has done' (*Kauṣī. Up.*, I, 4), and 'His sons obtain his inheritance, his friends the good, his enemies the evil he has done' (*Sātyāyaṇins* quoted in the *Srībhāṣya*, *S.B.E.*, vol. XLVIII, part III, p. 646).

23. *Vide Chā. Up.*, VI, xv, 2: 'his speech is united with the mind.'

24. 'There are a hundred and one arteries of the heart; one of them penetrates the crown of the head; going upwards by that one attains immortality' (*Chā. Up.*, VIII, vi, 5).

25. 'When he departs from the body, he moves upwards by these rays only' (*Chā. Up.*, VIII, vi, 5).

26. The spiritual realm where the divine is ever manifest.

27. 'There is a person, not human, he conveys them to Brahman' (*Kauṣṭ. Up.*, I, 4).

28. *Kauṣṭ. Up.*, I, 4.

29. 'Free from sin, ageless, deathless, griefless, free from hunger, free from thirst, whose wishes are true and whose purposes are true' (*Chā. Up.*, VIII, i, 5).

30. 'He reaches the Supreme Oneness, free from stain' (*Munḍ. Up.*, III, i, 3).

31. Mokṣa is essentially of the nature of sāyujya (communion), and not sālōkya (co-existence), sārūpya (similarity) or sāmīpya (intimacy). Sāyujya does not mean real identity between Brahman and jīva, but connotes some difference between the two. In the beautiful language of *Viṣṇupurāṇa* (V, vii, 30), Brahman leads the jīva towards ātmabhāva like the magnet which attracts the iron: hence there is no loss of personality just as the attracted body does not become one with the attracting body. *Bhagavadgītā* also says that the mukta attains the attributes like Brahman (XIV, 2). The author of the *Dramiḍabhāṣya* declares that the mukta, owing to his sāyujya with Brahman, effects all things like Him.

32. If sāyujya means identity with Brahman, it follows that the power of creation, sustentation and destruction of the world must be attributed to the liberated self. To this the *Vedānta-sūtras* reply is: 'With the exception of cosmic functions' (IV, iv, 17). Moreover, the Upaniṣad texts mention the power of ruling, controlling, etc. with reference to Brahman alone. The *Vṛttikāra* also declares that with the exception of cosmic functions, the mukta is equal to Brahman through light.

33. 'Non-return according to Scripture' (*VS.*, IV, iv, 22), and 'He who behaves thus throughout his life reaches the world of Brahman and does not return' (*Chā. Up.*, VIII, 15). In this connection Śrī Rāmānuja says, 'As, moreover, the released soul has freed itself from the bondage of karman, has its powers of knowledge fully developed, and has all its being in the supremely blissful intuition of the highest Brahman, it evidently cannot

desire anything else nor enter on any other form of activity, and the idea of returning into saṃsāra therefore is altogether excluded' (S.B.E., vol. XLVIII, part III, p. 771).

34. That is, their descent into the world of mortals is not determined by the effects of karma.

AVATĀRA NINE

IS'VARA

1. Isvara is indicated by such passages as 'My dear, Sat only was this in the beginning' (*Chā. Up.*, VI, ii, 1), and 'In the beginning Self only was this' (*Bṛ. Up.*, I, iv, 1).

2. 'Brahman, having for its modes intelligent and non-intelligent things in their gross and subtle states, thus constitutes effect and cause, and the world thus has Brahman for its material cause' (S.B.E., vol. XLVIII, part III, p. 142).

3. Three causes bring about the origination of an object, viz., the upādāna-cause, the nimitta-cause and the sahakārin-cause. For example, in the production of a pot, earth is the upādāna-kāraṇa, potter the nimittakāraṇa and the potter's wheel and other accessories the sahakārikāraṇa. On the other hand for the origination of the universe, Isvara Himself solely constitutes all the three causes.

4. The following objection is raised: The Vedānta text, 'Being only was this in the beginning' (*Chā. Up.*, VI, ii, 1), teaches that 'Being,' which denotes the cause of the universe, is nothing but prakṛti inasmuch as the word 'this' indicates the effected state comprising sattva, rajas, tamas, etc. Since the non-difference of cause and effect has been accepted, the cause must be prakṛti which comprises the three elements of sattva, rajas and tamas. This view is rejected as it is not based upon the śruti; for the śruti expresses a kind of mental activity on the part of the 'Being' as stated in the text, 'It thought, may I be many, may I grow forth' (*Chā. Up.*, VI, ii, 1). Therefore the

non-sentient prakṛti devoid of 'thinking' cannot be the cause of the universe.

5. According to this canon of interpretation the term 'animal' connotes 'goat' in connection with the sacrifice called daikṣa-paśu.

6. According to this nyāya all general terms must find their ultimate significance and meaning in a particular term.

7. Objection raised by the Advaitin.

8. Let us take for instance two apparently contradictory sets of Vedānta texts: the text, 'Now, if a person meditates on another God thinking "he is one and I another", he does not know' (*Bṛ. Up.*, II, iv, 6) dispels the notion that jīva and Brahman are different, while the texts, 'The Lord of the pradhāna and the individual selfs' (*Svet. Up.*, VI, 16) and 'The ruler of all, the Lord of the selfs' (*Mahānār. Up.*, XI, 3) declare difference in the nature of jīva and Brahman. When we are confronted with such conflicting texts, Ghaṭakas'rutis enable us to understand the correct relation free from seeming contradiction. The text, 'He who dwells within the Self, but is different from it, whom the Self does not know, whose body is the Self, who controls the Self from within; he is thy Self, the inner Ruler, the immortal one' (*Bṛ. Up.*, III, vii, 22), establishes that Brahman is the Self of all inasmuch as all beings have their origin, sustentation and absorption in Him and constitute His body. Since every jīva constitutes the body of Brahman, and Brahman constitutes the Self of jīva, there is no real contradiction in the relation between jīva and Brahman. The abheda texts deny difference in so far as jīva is of the nature of Brahman. The bheda texts affirm difference in so far as Brahman is different from jīva in the same way as jīva is different from its body. Likewise, the text, 'Thou art that' does not affirm the essential unity of jīva with Brahman. 'Thou' and 'That' refer to Brahman qualified by difference. The term 'That' denotes Brahman introduced before as, 'It thought "may I be many"', and the term 'Thou' refers to Brahman in so far as having for His body cit related with acit. Thus

the relation of *s'arira-s'aririn* harmonizes the apparent contradiction between *jiva* and *Brahman*.

9. For example, *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* (I, i, 6) in the first half of the mantra denies *Brahman* of all the qualities related to matter, and in the second half defines *Brahman* as possessing eternality, all-pervasiveness, subtlety, imperishableness, creativeness, etc.

10. It may be objected that on the basis of *s'arira-s'aririn* relation, all the imperfections of the sentient beings and the non-sentient matter may cling to *Brahman*, and consequently *Viṣiṣṭādvaita* is wrong in ascribing material causality to *Brahman*. *Viṣiṣṭādvaita* repudiates the idea of *Brahman* being related even with the shadow of evil. Since *Brahman* constitutes the Self of the universe-body, namely, *cit* and *acit*, it is quite consistent to hold that *Brahman's* body is connected with two states, *i.e.*, causal and effected, the nature of which are contraction and expansion. In ordinary life we observe that the states of childhood, youth, old age, etc. effect the body only, while bliss, knowledge, etc. belong to the self. Similarly, the imperfections adhering to *cit* and *acit* do not belong to *Brahman*, and the special attributes of *Brahman* do not extend to *cit* and *acit*.

11. The theory of *Vyūha*, which is one of the foundational doctrines of the *Pāñcarātra*, forms part and parcel of the *Viṣiṣṭādvaita* conception of the Deity. *Saṅkarṣaṇa* emanates from *Vāsudeva*, *Pradyumna* from *Saṅkarṣaṇa* and *Aniruddha* from *Pradyumna*. In the language of the *Pāñcarātra* the manifestation is like 'one flame proceeding from another flame'. As Dr. Schrader points out, the word is a combination of the root *uḥ* 'to shove' and the preposition *vi* 'asunder' meaning 'to shove asunder' of the six *guṇas* into three pairs. Though each *Vyūha* is the manifestation of the highest Divine qualified by all the six *guṇas*, it however, is characterized by two predominant *guṇas*. Further, each *Vyūha* has two sets of activities—cosmic and ethical. *S'rī Rāmānuja* informs us (*VS.* II, ii, 42) of another aspect of the *Vyūha*, referred to in the *Nārāyaṇīya* section of the *S'āntiparvan* of the *Mahābhārata*.

In this alternate view Saṅkarṣaṇa, Pradyumna and Aniruddha are the beings ruling over the individual selfs, internal organs and organs of egoity; and consequently Saṅkarṣaṇa is denoted by jīva, Pradyumna by manas and Aniruddha by ahaṅkāra.

12. Vāsudeva the highest Self possesses all the six guṇas, namely, jñāna (knowledge), ais'varya (lordship), śakti (potency), bala (strength), vīrya (virility) and tejas (splendour). Cf. *Lakṣmī-tantra* (VI, 25) 'Ṣādgūṇyavigrahaṁ devam'.

13. The activities of Saṅkarṣaṇa are to destroy the universe and propound the scriptures.

14. Pradyumna creates the universe and introduces all the dharmas (dharmanayanam).

15. Aniruddha protects the creation and makes known the tattva (tattvam jñāpayati). Or as Dr. Schrader states, 'the ethical activities of the three Vyūhas are declared to be teaching (1) by Saṅkarṣaṇa of the Śāstra or "theory", namely, of monotheism (ekāntikamārga); (2) by Pradyumna, of its translation into practice (tatkriyā); and (3) by Aniruddha, of the gain resulting from such practice (kriyā-phala), to wit, liberation' (*I. Pāñ.*, pp. 38-39).

16. Vāsudeva hypostastizes into Keṣava, Nārāyaṇa and Mādhava, Saṅkarṣaṇa into Govinda, Viṣṇu and Madhusūdana, Pradyumna into Trivikrama, Vāmana and Śrīdhara, and Aniruddha into Hriṣīkeṣa, Padmanābha and Dāmodara.

17. This means they become the presiding deities of the sun in the twelve months of the year.

18. The ten principal avatars are Matsya, Kūrma, Varāha, Nṛsiṃha, Vāmana, Paraśurāma, Rāma, Balabhadra, Kṛṣṇa and Kalkin. According to *Viṣvakṣenasamhitā* and *Lakṣmītantra* all the avatars descend from the fourth Vyūha, namely, Aniruddha. But *Padmatantra* declares that of the ten Vibhavas, Matsya, Kūrma and Varāha descend from Vāsudeva, Nṛsiṃha, Vāmana, Śrīrāma and Paraśurāma from Saṅkarṣaṇa, Balarāma from Pradyumna, and Śrīkṛṣṇa and Kalkin from Aniruddha. (*Vide I. Pāñ.*, p. 48).

19. The great devotee Prahāda who had taken refuge in Nārāyaṇa is referred to here.

20. Pralamba was an asura who assumed the form of a cowherd, and joined the band of cowherds with a view to destroy Kṛṣṇa and Balarāma. Kṛṣṇa knowing the motive of the asura, arranged a sham-fight, the result of which was the members of Kṛṣṇa's party who were the vanquished had to carry on their back the members of Balarāma's party who were the winners. It so happened that Balarāma was carried by Pralamba. The asura, who assumed his real form, began to fly in the air with Balarāma. But Balarāma hammered the head of the asura and made him his own. Likewise he killed Dhenuka who came in the form of an ass.

21. According to *Ahīrbudhnyasamhitā* the avatars are thirty-nine; they are as follows:

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| 1. Padmanābha | 21. Rāhujit |
| 2. Dhruva | 22. Kālanemighna |
| 3. Ananta | 23. Pārijāta-hara |
| 4. Śakyātman | 24. Lokanātha |
| 5. Madhusūdana | 25. Śāntātman |
| 6. Vidyādhīdeva | 26. Dattātreyā |
| 7. Kapila | 27. Nyagrodhas'āyin |
| 8. Viśvarūpa | 28. Ekas'ṛṅgatanu |
| 9. Vihaṅgama | 29. Vāmanadeha |
| 10. Krodhātman | 30. Trivikrama |
| 11. Baḍavāvakra | 31. Nara |
| 12. Dharma | 32. Nārāyaṇa |
| 13. Vāgiśvara | 33. Hari |
| 14. Ekāmbhodhis'āyin | 34. Kṛṣṇa |
| 15. Kamaṭhes'vara | 35. Paras'urāma |
| 16. Varāha | 36. Ś'rīrāma |
| 17. Narasiṃha | 37. Vedavid |
| 18. Pīyūṣaharaṇa | 38. Kalkin |
| 19. Ś'rīpati | 39. Pātālasayana |
| 20. Kāntātman | |

Dr Schrader informs us that the Vibhavas are thirty-nine according to *Sātvatasamhitā* also. But our author, following Varavaramuni, admits thirty-six Vibhavas only, since Kapila, Dattātreya and Paras'urāma are supposed to be secondary avatars.

22. The avatar of Dadhibhakta was assumed with a view to grant the nectar.

23. The avatar of Hayagrīva was undertaken for delivering the Vedas.

24. The avatar of Naranārāyaṇa was assumed in the form of student and preceptor with a view to impart the esoteric doctrines.

25. The mukhya-avatar is supposed to be the Īśvara himself in a spiritual body, whereas the avatar of gauṇa or āveśa is said to be a self in a material body which is possessed by the power of the Īśvara for some particular purpose.

26. The aspirants who seek liberation are advised to worship the primary or mukhya avatars only, and not the secondary ones, since the latter constitute the locus of such selfs which are qualified by egoism.

27. The authority for this conception is the passage of the *Gītā* which states 'I come into being by My own māyā' (IV, 6). 'By My own māyā' is to be taken as 'By My own will'.

28. *Vide Bhagavadgītā* (IV, 8): 'Paritrāpāya sādḥūnāṁ vināśāya ca duṣkṛtām, dharmasamsthāpanārthāya sambhavāmyuge'.

29. For instance, Śrīrāma lived at Ayodhya in the tretā-yuga; but the image of Śrīrāma can be consecrated anywhere and at any time for purposes of worship.

AVATĀRA TEN

ADRAVYA

1. 'For sattva and so on are attributes of substances, but not themselves substances. Sattva and so on are the causes of

lightness, light etc., belonging to substances such as earth and the like, and hence distinctive attributes of the essential nature of those substances, but they are not observed to be present in any effects in a substantial form, as clay, gold, and other substances are. It is for this reason that they are known as "guṇas" (S.B.E., vol. XLVIII, part III, pp. 484-85).

2. Since śabda cannot serve as a material cause, it is viewed as a non-substance.

3. In this connection the 'pilupākavāda' of Vaiśeṣikas and the 'piṭharapākavāda' of Naiyāyikas may be read with profit.

4. *Vide Chā. Up.*, VI, iv, 1. According to this text fire has only three colours, namely, red, white and black.

5. The Naiyāyikas postulate citrarūpa (variegated colour) as a distinct variety.

6. The Vaiśeṣikas hold that, when a pot is baked, even the constituent atoms are destroyed along with their properties; the qualities are produced subsequently. This is known as 'pākavāda' or 'the theory of atoms being baked'. On the other hand, the Naiyāyikas hold that the constituent atoms are not destroyed by the process of baking. This theory is known as 'bhūtvāda'.

7. The Naiyāyikas admit, in addition to the five elements, ākāśa, sūdhhasattva, dharmabhūtajñāna, jiva

8. The Naiyāyikas hold that the conjunction of the monkey with the tree may be present and non-present in the same tree with reference to the monkey. This is known as avyāpyavṛtti in Nyāya. The Naiyāyikas have to admit saṃyogaja-saṃyoga on the basis of the distinction between avayavin (composite whole) and avayavas (composite parts). As Viśiṣṭādvaita does not admit an absolute difference between the whole and the parts, the contact of the hand with the book means the contact of the body with the book.

10. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theorists admit 'vibhāga' as a separate quality.

11. Naiyāyikas do not admit conjunction between two all-pervasive substances. *Vide A Primer of Indian Logic*, p. 125.

12. 'The Lord is all-pervading' (*Svet. Up.*, III, 11): 'Whatever is seen or heard in this world, is pervaded inside and outside by Nārāyaṇa' (*Mahānār. Up.*, II, 6).

13. Śaktayaḥ sarvabhāvānām acintyajñānagocarāḥ,
yato' to brahmaṇastāstu sargādyā bhāvas'aktayaḥ,
bhavanti tapatām śreṣṭha pāvakasya yathoṣṇatā (*VP.*,
I, iii, 2).

14. The twenty-four guṇas according to Annambhaṭṭa are colour, taste, smell, touch, number, size, separateness, conjunction, disjunction, remoteness, proximity, weight, fluidity, vicidity, sound, cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, dislike, volition, merit, demerit and tendency. (*Vide A Primer of Indian Logic*, p. 16.)

15. There are three kinds of tendencies, namely, vega (speed), bhāvanā (reminiscent impression) and sthitisthāpakā (elasticity). The first belongs to earth, water, fire, air and ether, the second belongs to the individual self, and the third is the inclination of a thing to recover its original state after being changed.

16. The Naiyāyika's conception of the 'śūnyamāyā' (IV, 6) is redundant. Since vibhāga is nothing but division, it cannot come under any special classification. Nyāya sādhanā aparatva cannot be explained apart from sparśa sambhavāṁ pointed out by Mm. S. Kuppusvāmi Śāstrin, but the phobia of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers to find an objective reality for every thought in their mind anywhere any need to give a distinct place for all these guṇas.

17. The names of most of the authors of the above exegetics are traced in accordance with 'The Light of the School of Rāmānuja.'

18. By Dramiḍācārya.

19. By Nāthamuni.

20. By Yāmunācārya.

21 to 24. By Rāmānujācārya.

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